



SELINUS UNIVERSITY
OF SCIENCES AND LITERATURE

**INSURGENCY IN THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
KEY CHALLENGES OF INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION HANDLING AND
STRATEGIES TO COMBAT RELATED CRIME**

BY ERNEST OWUSU-KUMIH

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DECLARATION

I, Ernest Owusu-Kumih is the author of this thesis and do hereby declare that except for references to other peoples' work which I have duly acknowledged this thesis remains my handy work and was carried out at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Selinus University of Science and Culture. It was duly supervised by Prof. Salvatore Fava and has not ever been presented either in part or in whole for another degree elsewhere.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my entire family especially and children, Papa Yaw Owusu-Kumi, Nana Kwame Owusu-Kumi and Ohenewaa Owusu-Kumi and my good brother Ansu Gyeabour Kumi Prince for their immense support throughout this research work. My mother and wife could not have been left out considering the role they continue to play in my everyday voluminous life. To the Almighty God who has seen me through it all, I say a big thank you for a gift of fulfillment .Finally, I dedicate this piece of work to the Ministry of National Security and the National Intelligence Bureau, Republic of Ghana.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

COIN	Counter-Insurgency
FOI	Freedom of Information
HSGF	Homeland Study Group Foundation
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
NSC	National Security Council
NDP	National Development Policy
TNS	Theory of National Security
WTRF	Western Togoland Restoration Front
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
PRAAA	Public Records and Archives Administration Act
RTI	Right to Information

ABSTRACT

Insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa commonly occur when the gap between political expectations and the opportunities of a certain group has become unacceptable. Sub-Saharan African states, must endeavour to establish and enforce intra state institutions to generate necessary information on the activities of insurgent groups. Most importantly also is the ability to handle the needed information that has been generated to effectively strategize and respond to combat intended insurgencies. Insurgent activities of two prominent independence organizations in Ghana, the Western Togoland Restoration Front (WTRF) and the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF) have increased in the area referred to as Western Togoland the territory wedged between Lake Volta and the Ghana-Togo border. The WTRF unilaterally proclaimed independence of Western Togoland in September 2020. Ghana as a matter of urgency need to gather requisite information, effectively strategize and adequately deal with these insurgent groups in the Volta Region of Ghana before its escalates. Though Ghana is regarded as a sanctuary of peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, the country is not immune to the tendencies of insurgencies if it fails or unable to sufficiently deliver on its basic political, economic and social responsibilities.

Analyzing from the perspective of the social disorganization theory and based on the survey through the use of mixed method, the study is aimed at finding out the factors that compel the recent activities of the WTRF and HSGF. This still will make some recommendations to the Ghanaian government in fulfilling its basic needs to people, ensuring security presence around the trans-Volta Togo land space a primary responsibility to thwart the possibilities of the rise of insurgency spilling over Ghana.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background

For every county to thrive in stability, there is a prerequisite of an everlasting peace to prevail amongst every fiber of the society. Fundamentally, societies are unable to move on in development and peaceful coexistent when insurgent activities escalate (Ali et al. 2016). Globally, there are a number of undercurrent factors that contribute to the rise in any form of insurgency. Insurgency in the America's, Asia, Europe, and Africa is not a contemporary phenomenon Majumder, (2020) and will continue to exist as long as people are always able to pinpoint reasons, perceive and relate to displeasure in the political, economic, religious, social, cultural and educational institutions borne out of identifiable inequity. Insurgency May be born when a governing power fails to address social or regional polarization, sectarianism, endemic corruption, crime, various forms of radicalism, or rising expectations (Aliyu and Ushie, 2020). Political activist very often hide behind, religion, ethnic and cultural beliefs try to revive their hidden ethnic and or religious identities to establish a supreme base and to open up access, utilize and control resources readily available to them by challenging established state institutions. Usually, presence of breaches between political expectations of the governed and the chances available to certain groups of people has generated into unacceptable level. This makes them believe that it is only through the use of force that can to bring equity and by relying entirely on the active support of the population.

Due to their weakness, insurgents normally adopt guerrilla strategies while endeavoring to solicit broader public backing Jones, (2017). Their goal is to eventually be bigger and better structured force. According to Hoffman (2006) in Iraq, for instance, a number of insurgent groups have “remained separate resembling a 'netwar' than the typical centralized conceptions of insurgency.

Decentralization may, in fact, be an effective strategy.” Different insurgent groups have drawn support from Ba'thist loyalists, Islamists, foreigners, nationalists, and those who lost loved ones or their livelihoods as a result of the US invasion (Hashim, 2003). The presence of many insurgent groups has complicated things for Americans in terms of devising effective military tactics, negotiating with different groups, and even discerning the motives of insurgents. Information technology has allowed for the rapid spread of lessons from insurgencies elsewhere (Shaohua, 2009).

According to Onat and Çubukçu, (2019) in their publication “Unresolved conflict, urban insurgency and devastating consequences in Turkey between 2015 and 2016, they are of the view that insurgents have no hope of matching the military might of the government. As a result, their actions are designed to erode public support for their opponents (government) and sap their opponents' will to fight on. Insurgent attacks demonstrate that the government cannot protect its citizens. Attacks increase popular fear and resentment of the government (and any outside interveners or occupiers, as the case may be), if the insurgents lose more combatants as a result. The confidence of security assurances is threatened by continued insurgency, which is a crucial part of peace-building (Olu-Adeyemi and Shaibu, 2019). When a foreign occupier is the dictating force and can leave at any time, the insurgency turns into a struggle of wills in which the rebels try to make the occupation more expensive in terms of lives lost and resources expended (Beckett, 2005). Nationally, insurgents do not need widespread active support; public complacency is sufficient (Mumford, 2012). Such acceptance is likely in many post-conflict situations like Iraq where long periods of abusive rule have taught people that "the best way to survive is to stay out of conflicts between the powerful (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012)

One common tactic for insurgents is to attempt to disrupt reconstruction efforts. It is an attempt to generate public impatience with the government's inability to create economic opportunity (Jayasuriya and Weerakoon, 2019). Attacks against Infrastructure targets like Iraq's power grid and oil sector are intended to stall economic recovery, heighten public unhappiness, and further erode public support for the government. Insurgents also often attempt to intimidate non-government organizations and foreign contractors to prevent them from delivering services. Ultimately, continued instability will inhibit investment and limit prospects for economic development (Granville, 2020).

With insurgents lacking any international standing, they are often less constrained by legal and ethical norms. However, if they hope to ever take control of the government and need international legitimacy, it would be beneficial for them to moderate their behavior. This may also be important to avoid alienating potential domestic support. Iraqi insurgents, for example, appear to be cognizant of public opinion in that they have changed tactics, such as the use of beheadings, after widespread revulsion at the practice (Words, 2006).

Insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa commonly occur when the gap between political expectations and the opportunities of a certain group has become unacceptable for them and they believe that the issues can only be solved through the use of force. Insurgent groups always rely on the population for active support. In order to forestall and manage insurgency in the sub-region, there is need for cooperation among member states in information gathering, handling and adequate strategies put in place to combat insurgency and other related crimes such as terrorism (Ratcliffe, 2007). Sub-Saharan African states, must endeavour to establish and enforce intra state institutions to generate necessary information on the activities of insurgent groups. Most importantly also is

the ability to handle the needed information that has been generated to effectively strategize and respond to combat intended insurgencies.

During the Cold War, superpowers used rebels' sponsorship as a key instrument of foreign policy. The US and USSR backed and supported various rebel movements against regimes they saw as enemies (Bryjka, 2020). After the Cold War, some states have metamorphosed into external support for rebels in what has been referred to by Ameyaw Brobbey as "unholy alignment" – unnatural and mostly temporal cooperative relations external states build with rebels. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, (2011) asserts that majority of all rebel groups active since 1945 explicitly or implicitly received foreign support. In their account, out of the 74 rebels' active since 1991, 44 of them were believed to have received external state support that strengthened them to initiate and sustain conflict and in some cases achieved victory. Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola supported rebels in Democratic Republic of the Congo that resulted in Congolese civil war. Chad supported rebels in Sudan and Central Africa Republic, Sudan did same in Chad and Ethiopia, India and Pakistan support each other's rebels, Gadhafi's Libya supported rebels far and near. Examples are countless.

Ratcliffe (2007), advance that Law enforcement agencies rely on a multitude of information sources and utilize a variety of approaches to prevent and respond to crime and disorder problems. According to him, these approaches, whether broad or specific, are typically tactical, operational, or strategic, and each requires that information be collected, synthesized, and analyzed into a usable format. The sources of information may vary (arrest data, wiretaps, informants and crime data) depending on the objective, but the analysis of these sources into useful information and data is largely the task of law enforcement analysts who focus their efforts on trying to identify crime patterns, trends, and linkages between individual offenders and/or organized groups.

Govender (2012) argues that, in Africa, crime is becoming progressively diverse, complex and challenging to fight. Criminologists believe that to be able to combat insurgency and other related crimes, intelligence gathering is very important. Having specific knowledge, skills and attitudes are required to address insurgent situations. The examination of any form of insurgency involves approaching all geographical and socio-demographic information, in combination with needed techniques, to investigate, avoid, and solve crime and disorder problems.

Good intelligence is critical to the success of combating an insurgency as Manwaring, (2020) postulates that with their small, poorly equipped forces, the leaders of insurgencies need to know when to strike and when to pull back. This reliance on intelligence means that an effective counterinsurgency must also rely on good intelligence (Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, 2019), so that the counterinsurgents may know where the insurgency will strike, where they are based, how they are supplied, where they keep their weapons, and other essential pieces of information. However, most state institutions in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, face daunting challenges of effective handling of insurgent information amongst the various institutions of state hindered by the lack of integration amongst them due to various issues, such as departmental policies, type of information gathered, information sharing and handling culture, and a lack of leadership.

1.2 Problem statement

Globally, Insurgencies are not new in the history of states (Fafowora, 2013). Internationally, insurgency has become one of the defining structures of our society today (Ngige, Badekale and HammanJoda, 2016). Back dating to ancient times, as far back as the old civilizations of the Greek city states and the Roman Empire when the rulers of these ancient civilisations often had to face the challenge of insurgencies, insurrections and revolts. In contemporary history, examples of insurgencies and terrorism in retrospect dates back to least four centuries, covering many

continents and states. These include the French revolution of 1789 that replaced the Bourbon monarchy by a new French Republic, and the 1776 American war of independence from British colonial rule. The 19th century was an even more unstable and turbulent era during which German unification was brought about by force under Chancellor Bismarck. The unification of Italy was also achieved by force under the leadership of Garibaldi. In the Balkans, the old Habsburg Empire was overthrown by a series of insurgencies including the murder at Sarajevo of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist (Fafowora, 2013). This incident led to World War 1 and the breakup of the Habsburg Empire and Monarchy. The Ottoman Empire that had for centuries held sway in central Europe and the Balkans also fell after World War I, and was replaced by modern Turkey. In Russia, the Romanov Empire was brought down in the 1917 revolution against Imperial Russia. This bloody conflict, in which the entire family of the Tsar was wiped out, gave rise to the new Communist Empire of the Soviet Union. More recently, internal dissent and grievances led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its replacement by several separate republics, once part of the Soviet Union. Ethnic war and cleansing in Yugoslavia led to its collapse and the rise of several successor states in its place. Other governments and states, in central Europe and the Balkans, also faced a lot of security challenges and violence as many of the central European states fought for the independence of their countries against foreign domination (Fafowora, 2013). In the Middle East, the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians remains unresolved, with bands of insurgents and terrorists moving freely from one country to the other.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and other Sahelian states mostly in the West Africa Sub region have witnessed insurgent activities (Bala and Tar, 2021) sparking a warning that insurgencies are spreading rapidly in the Savannah region of West Africa and the Sahel. Nigeria is just one of the possible targets of insurgency and terrorism in West Africa which

has a potential to extend beyond Nigeria (Fafowora, 2013). In the early stage of the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian government treated it lightly, almost as a minor uprising that would disappear in no time. According to Fawole (2013), government response to the Boko Haram menace has not been coordinated and focused. Information gathering and handling has been poor and this has affected the Government of Nigeria from adequately combating the menace.

Though scary, Ghana has carved a relatively peaceful society but this trend is on the verge of being challenged due primarily to rebel insurgent activities which have become a key factor of conflicts in Africa. Although plans of the Ewe ethnics (occupying the easternmost part of Ghana) for independence, or at least, a reunification with kindred in Togo are historical, there seem to be recent insurgency dating back to 2019. Insurgent activities of two prominent independence organizations, the Western Togoland Restoration Front (WTRF) and the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF) have increased in the area referred to as Western Togoland the territory wedged between Lake Volta and the Ghana-Togo border. The WTRF unilaterally proclaimed independence of Western Togoland on 1 September 2020 (Distler and Heise, 2022). Compared to other regions globally, therefore, Africa has experienced the fewest attempts at secession. In some of these instances, such as the Nigeria–Cameroon border dispute over Bakassi Peninsula and the Namibia–Zambia dispute over Kasikili/Sedudu Island, the issues have been settled through international arbitration.

Ghana's posture in dealing with recent insurgencies is resonance of the lack of effective machinery to deal with them. And that, an appropriate response strategy at insurgents' period of vulnerability (early stage) is effective repression, or else, they become strengthened with time and space.

To critically examine the possibility of the emergence of insurgency in Ghana and assess its historical antecedents, this research sought to identify how the historical antecedents, Ghana's

response to insurgencies and how information handling of insurgent activities will influence Ghana's ability to put in counter insurgency measures to quell threats posed.

1.3 Research Objectives

The general objective of the study is to identify major security concerns in Ghana. The specific objectives are to:

1. Explain historical underpinnings of insurgency in the sub-Saharan Africa
2. Elaborate modern approach to combat insurgencies
3. to recognize Explain the repercussion of Ghana's failure early counter-insurgency
4. Explain how Ghana should respond to insurgency development

1.3.1 Research Questions

1. What are the historical underpinnings of insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa?
2. What are the modern method to combat insurgencies?
3. What are the repercussions of Ghana's failure to recognize early counter-insurgency?
4. How should Ghana respond to insurgency development?

1.4 Justification

The economic, political and religious issues that have established the foundation for insurgencies in the sub region can be identified in Ghana. Currently in Ghana the activities of the two secessionist groups in the Volta Region creates undercurrent suggesting that Ghana is sitting on a time bomb ready to explode at any given time. This study therefore will add to the limited existing literature on the activities of insurgents groups in the country and the states readiness to adequately handle information in dealing with insurgent activities in Ghana.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce theories that underpins the concept of insurgency and some historical antecedents. The Sub-Saharan region presents a singular combination of some of the poorest states in Africa with widespread security challenges in the form of recurring violent conflict and long-standing insurgent activities. It will also provide a general overview of handling of information about insurgencies and the conduct of a counter-insurgency (COIN).

2.1 Theoretical framework

Generally, in the social scientific world, theory is used to explain a phenomenon. Rationally, theory is expected to forecast future incidences through empirical observations. In the humanities, social theory refers the use of theoretical frameworks to study and interpret social structures within a particular school of thought. This is an important tool used by academics to analyse society. This study will be conducted with the guidance of two theories thus the Social disorganization theory and the theory of information dominance to serve as guide to all aspects of the study and set out the limits within which the study will be conducted.

2.2 Theory of National Security

The study employs the concept of National Security as its theoretical foundation. Predictably, the concept of National Security entails to fend off threats. States are supposed to embrace defense mechanisms in order to protect it against territorial aggression from the sea, land or air by employing every strategy or approach required to prevent the threats (Prah, and Chanimbe, 2021 ;Stone, 2009). Due to the changes in the international system after the Second World War and the

establishment of modern ideas for the safety of states, and the emergence of new concepts such as peaceful coexistence, deterrence, containment, international polarization and international balance, have led to an extension of the concept to contain all the complete abilities of the state such as economic, military, industrial, human power, cultural, social and educational capabilities to ensure that the theory of national security is without its ambiguities (da Cruz, 2012). In the assertion of Harold Brown, national security entails the ability of states to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory: to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to secure its frontiers; to preserve its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from external forces (Pally, 2020). Based on this theory, this study seeks to explore the defence strategies adopted by Ghana to protect the country against the threat of insurgencies. In Barry Buzan's quest to illuminate and further develop the concept, he defined it as a state's quest for freedom from threat (Buzan, 1991). Buzan enumerates two levels namely national and international, in the quest for states and societies to maintain their independent identity and concrete unity (ibid). In the view of Bester, (2019) in his paper on emerging challenges in terrorism and counterterrorism, the concept of national security firstly includes the ultimate survival of human collectives (population-centric) before the personal security of individual human beings. Thus, the unit of analysis in the concept of national security is the sovereign territorial state (Alvarez, 2006). In this regard, this study investigates what national and international strategies have been employed by Ghana to prevent insurgencies in the country. Due to criticism against the theory of being too state-centric and lacking the boldness to tackle modern existential threats of the survival of states and has advanced to include individuals, groups and communities to address the intricate intertwined challenges effective measures or mechanisms to avert the threat insurgencies poses to humanity (Besenyő, 2019). This has ensured the reevaluation of security

strategies of most countries, particularly in terms of internal security (Jain, 1985; Katzenstein, 1996). In opposition to the concept of national security, the Human Security Concept has arisen as the leading provocateur. In the contention of Human Security, the concept of security is only limited to the physical survival and territorial integrity of states as postulated by Harold Brown and many others. UNDP's 1994, Human Security Report affirms that the concept of National Security has for too long been interpreted narrowly. It has often been seen as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy. It has been related to nation-states more than people (Chernega et al., 2022). Prah and Chanimbe (2021), establishes that Qantson's proposition suggests that human security should be the focal point of national security. In his estimation, national security should be identified with four basic words; survival, safety, wellbeing, and contentment. He argues that people must survive, and the survival must be decent. Having survived, they should be protected so they can feel safe. After their survival and safety, the other logical imperative security needs must be their well-being and then contentment. He concluded that the security of a nation can be at risk if the security of its human beings is threatened and that unless the security needs of the people are comprehensively and holistically addressed, national security could be a protracted risk (Millar, 2008). By this, the study shall explore whether individuals, groups and communities have contributed to the escalation of insurgencies. Regardless of the apparent opposing views, the theory of National Security in the context of this research implies the modern strategies employed to secure the territorial integrity of the state from the threat of insurgents. Its importance to the research stems from the fact that any form of insurgency is an existential threat to the very survival of every state and its prevention is therefore a national security concern.

2.3 The theory of information dominance

Information dominance requires a focus on three implicit tasks. First, an organization must have the capacity to collect information on an adversary. Second, the organization must possess the ability to control the information, process it, and exploit it for further gain. Third, an organization must be able to defend against an adversary's attempts to gather information on its activities. While this last task is important, it is not within the scope of this study. This thesis will concentrate on the ability of an organization to gather information and process it for further exploitation

Achieving information dominance involves far more than having more data than the enemy. It will require that available data be transformed into relevant information in a timely manner for a multitude of forces, each with varied and dynamically changing but inter-related information needs. While information gathering of insurgent activities collected from the population is important, achieving information dominance involves more than merely collecting greater volumes of information than an opponent. To achieve information dominance the information that is received must be analyzed and processed into actionable intelligence in a timely manner that can be used to effectively target the enemy (Arnold, O'Gwin, and Vickers, 2010).

The elements of effective intelligence organization and operations are numerous and complex. An effective system requires not just collection of information from multiple sources but also processing, classifying, evaluating, storing, and retrieving information. Indeed, modern technological progress in information processing and handling is probably more important for counterinsurgency than are changes in weapons technology. Thus, the effectiveness of information processing is a critical component, not just to the intelligence collection effort, but also to the entire counterinsurgency equation as a whole (Bousquet, 2022). Vickers, (2010) in his doctoral dissertation titled *Small town insurgency: the struggle for information dominance to reduce gang*

violence was of the view that effective information processing can aid in early detection of insurgent movements, and allow seemingly unrelated intelligence to be combined to form a comprehensive picture of the insurgent movement itself, and can be used to identify and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure. Organizations differ broadly in their structure. What are the organizational characteristics that are most effective in fighting an insurgency? What characteristics maximize an organization's ability to process, classify, evaluate, share, and retrieve vast amounts of information for the purpose of defeating an insurgency? What is the repercussion of a state's failure to recognize early counter-insurgency? How should a weak state like Ghana respond to insurgency development?

In the United States though insurgents and gangs do not seek to overthrow the existing government, the asymmetric relationship between civil authorities and the gangs exhibits important similarities to COIN operations (Metz, 2012). For this reason, central concepts from COIN theory can be useful in identifying and explaining many of the problems city officials encounter when conducting counter-gang operations. In the following sections, a COIN based theory of information dominance will be developed to empower communities to effectively collect and process information to uncover the infrastructure of illegal organizations such as gangs. Just as dominating the high ground gives a force a decisive advantage over an opponent in a conventional war of maneuver; dominating information in an asymmetric conflict provides a similar advantage. According to Mao Tse-tung, in the early stages of a revolutionary movement, the insurgent attacks at a time and place of his choosing and then disappears by merging back into the population. Mao Tse-tung observed that the insurgent moves amongst the population as fish would water, demonstrating the inherent connectedness that the insurgent has with a population. The population provides money, food, guns, and recruits to the insurgent; therefore, it is imperative that these

facilitation networks remain anonymous, lest they be discovered by the counterinsurgent. This frames the counterinsurgent's principle problem: finding the insurgents, and their supporters, from among the population. This task stresses the need for good intelligence.

In much of the counterinsurgency literature, intelligence is regarded as the sine qua non of success by the counterinsurgent, and the argument can be made that the same holds true for the insurgent as well. Therefore, it is important to understand the role of information as it relates to how both the insurgent and counterinsurgent attempt to dominate information to achieve their respective goals. Information dominance allows the insurgent to shape and mold his operating environment. He is more likely to influence the people than the government is, since he can more easily move within the population. Once he has information dominance, he can establish his own "shadow government," thus increasing his legitimacy by becoming the authority. Galula describes the effective use of this methodology, implying that "infiltration... agitation, and propaganda," are the true subversive hallmarks of an insurgency. Conversely, information dominance can aid the counterinsurgent in "seeing" the insurgent's infrastructure and effectively targeting it. By properly collecting and exploiting information, the counterinsurgent can raise the cost to the insurgent of acquiring resources such as new recruits, weapons, and finances. Accurate information from a supporting population can also illuminate facilitation networks by which the insurgent processes inputs into outputs. By changing the production coefficients, the counterinsurgent can force the insurgent to spend inputs on merely surviving rather than producing effective outputs. An underlying premise in COIN theory, which will be applied throughout the scope of this research, is that the population, as a collective entity, knows everything about an insurgent organization; therefore, the population holds the key to favorably shifting the balance of information in favor of the counterinsurgent. Accordingly, this study presumes that the same holds true in regards to the

activities of insurgents. In other words, the population amongst which insurgents thrives knows everything the civil authorities need to be able to effectively dismantle the gang. This assumption naturally leads to questions such as: why do communities tolerate gang activity, or refrain from sharing information that might eliminate their presence? Or alternatively, what factors prevent the local civic authorities from extracting this information from the population? Also puzzling: what practices implemented by the local authorities either retard, or improve their ability to gather information from the population? Using COIN theory as a point of departure, this paper hypothesizes that factors such as government legitimacy, the population's sense of security, and trust of public authorities weigh heavily in the population's calculated willingness to cooperate with authorities to eliminate gangs.

Often, governments fighting an insurgency face a problem of legitimacy. A preponderance of literature addressing the topic of COIN places the pursuit of legitimacy ahead of all other objectives of the state. Legitimacy is defined as, "the extent that [the] citizens regard [the state] as proper and deserving of support." Experience has shown that in a counterinsurgency campaign, the state requires support from the population to be effective. Support and cooperation from the population is directly linked to the population's judgments about the legitimacy of the state. A key antecedent condition bolstering the population's perceptions of the state is the population's assessment of the manner in which the state exercises its authority. Although the state has many resources at its disposal, without the support of the population it cannot effectively target the insurgent's infrastructure. As with most theories, the ideas surrounding legitimacy are broad and varied. In the view of Timothy Lomperis, "Insurgencies are won—or lost—by the relative amounts of legitimacy the competing sides achieve;" legitimacy is a function of political and economic engagement with the affected population (Lomperis, 2000). Additionally, Chalmers Johnson

describes how a loss of authority, or the loss of confidence of the governed for the governing, creates a power deflation that prevents proper social interactions, making engagement and information diffusion difficult. Similarly, Leites and Wolf describe legitimacy as a zero-sum game. If the population is not for the government it must be for the insurgent, criminal, or gang. Thus, leadership must provide solutions and opportunities endogenously in order to maintain sufficient legitimacy. Alternatively, Seth Jones (2008) summarizes legitimacy as a function of capacity. Essentially, a governing entity will naturally create and maintain legitimacy if it has the physical and moral means to govern and enforce its laws. Lastly, Tom Tyler approaches the issue of legitimacy as a function of law and order, suggesting that laws focus of procedural fairness to maximize benefit to the government and minimize violence and other misconduct. All agree that legitimacy is tantamount to reducing violence associated with insurgencies.

The interconnectedness between the insurgent and the population brings to the forefront another obstacle to the counterinsurgent's attempts to gain information about the insurgent: the security of the population. In counterinsurgency operations, security is the degree to which the population is separated from the coercive influence of the insurgent. Thus, population security is perhaps one of the most fundamental considerations when attempting to uncover information from within a given population. Providing a safe environment in which the population feels free to share what it knows is the key task. Kilcullen aptly describes security of the population as fundamental, "otherwise, the enemy re-infiltrates the area and intimidates or co-opts the population, and only once security is consistently established can the population be...induced to provide information about local...enemy." Additionally, Galula argues that population and resource control measures provide a tremendous degree of population security. These control measures are designed to physically separate the population from the insurgent, creating a secure environment. Galula suggests that

this can be accomplished through aggressive patrolling, curfews, censuses, and other related tools. Eventually, the population will begin to provide any information it has, once it feels sufficiently separated from the insurgent. Finally, Bard O'Neil suggests that security is a function of effective organization and is a deliberate process. The security apparatus must be fairly and intentionally applied, otherwise popular support will shift away from the government. Similarly, from a counter-gang perspective this axiom seems to hold true. A population that is exposed to gang coercion will be much less likely to provide information to local law enforcement officials about what they know about illegal gang activity.

2.4 Information Analysis-assessment databases

Databases are integral parts of the analytical-evaluative process, because they contain all pieces of information necessary for the execution of analysis and evaluation and the preparation of informatory reports for the users (Vida, 2016). Fundamentally, databases have two main parts. One contains every information gathered by the collectors, while the other has thematically database filled with information about a given target area, person or object. (For example, databases of names or organizations, or technical databases belong to this group) aside from these, analytical-evaluative personnel can use other, external databases as well. These are operated by other organizations. These databases need to be examined and their credibility must be verified, because intelligence services can only use credible, reliable databases. These external databases can be commercial OSINT databases purchased by national security services. Informatory system informing the users is the most important stage of the intelligence cycle, because this is the part when it becomes clear whether the intelligence was useful for the users. At this time, the whole process is evaluated as the users decide whether the products of the intelligence were useful to them. Intelligence services develop their informatory system based on this. In the system, there

are different, predetermined types of information. Information can be distinguished based on their periodicity, subject, extent, level of procession and urgency. As for periodicity, there are daily, immediate, periodical (weekly, monthly, yearly etc.) and ad hoc information. The subject is mainly determined by the information requests of the users, but certain information might cover more than one subject, and can offer a full, global-scale review about a given question. The extent of reports can be quite varied, but they should never be too long, because users have a limited time to read intelligence reports.

Information Handling

Information handling involves gathering, storing, manipulating, interrogating and using information for the purpose for which it was collected. This volume of information gathered is then stored in an orderly manner to enable individual items to be added and amended. The ability to handle information is very crucial and important and can be done with 'real-life skill. Information is the essential ingredient in decision making. The need for improved information systems in recent years has been made critical by the steady growth in size and complexity of organizations and data (Helbing et al. 2015). Information handling and processing problems are present all around us in a variety of forms and in various degrees of complexity. Helbing (2015) points out that as Expressed in International Instruments, freedom of expression is recognized in the UDHR where it is provided under Article 19 as follows: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (O'Flaherty, 2012; Helbing, 2015). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expands on this freedom under article 19 by, including how information can be sought, received and imparted Dastyari, A. (2020). Thus, in clause 2 of this article, the ICCPR provides,

inter alia, that this process of seeking, receiving and imparting information either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. Also, the ICCPR recognizes that the freedom has limitations and consequently seeks to clearly define the parameters within the freedom can be enjoyed. Thus, article 19 (3) stipulates:

The state secrets Act, 1962 (Act 101) define state secret Section 106(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) defines "state secret" as information considered confidential by the Government, that has not been officially disclosed to the public. In this case, government is obliged to gather information on insurgents and their activities as a national security document. It means that handling of such information can be tagged a classified document. The system of classification is entrenched and detailed and it is used to prevent disclosure rather than ensure adequate protection. The Ghana government is relatively free to classify any information relating to the national security. This is unchanged in the proposed RTI bill. Classification and non-disclosure of information are if anything more entrenched in the current RTI (sections 5-18) (1).

Access to information and national security in Ghana

Attempts in Ghana to enact a right to information Act began in 1999. By 2003, the first RTI bill has been drafted to operationalize the constitutional right to information as provided under article 21(1) (f) of the 1992 Constitution (Appiagyei-Atua, 2015). The general rule is that access to information may not simply be restricted or denied citizens on the grounds of national security even if the law supporting it does not indicate that the restriction is necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate national security interest. Thus, a right to information Act should meet this standard, as noted by Principle 11 of the Johannesburg Principles Mosweu and Rakemane, (2020) and according to Salau, (2017), everyone has the right to obtain information from public authorities, including information relating to national security. No restriction on this

right may be imposed on the ground of national security unless the government can demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society to protect citizens. The present Act does not define state secret Section 106(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) rather does and defines "state secret" as information considered confidential by the Government, that has not been officially disclosed to the public, and which it would be prejudicial to the security of the state or injurious to the public interest to disclose. Section 1(1) of the State Secrets Act provides situations where access to information may be limited on the basis that it may compromise the security of the state. It stipulates: 1(1) Any person who, for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Republic- (a) approaches, inspects, passes over, or is in the neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited place; (b) makes any sketch, plan, model or note that is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to a foreign power; or (c) obtains, collects, records, or publishes or communicates in whatever manner to any other person any secret official code word, or password, or any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information that is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to a foreign power; commits an offence under this Act. Section 1(1) (a) does not provide any limits on the exercise of the powers to deny access to state secrets. It therefore does not seem to meet the standard required under Johannesburg Principle on access to restricted areas, which states, among others, that restriction on the free flow of information may not be of such a nature as to thwart the purposes of human rights and humanitarian law. (Schrijver, 2009).

2.7 Challenges of handling insurgency information

The goal of intelligence and information gathering is not limited to any one particular target or conflict. Intelligence and information is collected and produced to support and inform decision

makers (Breakspear, 2013). This is true whether the intelligence target is a nation-state government or a non-state actor, and it holds true in both conventional and unconventional conflicts. The intelligence process itself though is heavily dependent upon the target, and it must be designed specifically to address the realities of the situation in which it is being employed (Calvin, 2009). Shaffer, (2018) argues that during the Cold War, the American Intelligence Community grew and evolved to collect against and analyze the Soviet Union and the threat posed by a powerful nation-state adversary in a global ideological conflict. MacEachern, (2018) however posits that, the current conflicts of the early 21st century, countering complex insurgencies with interdependent local and global elements in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, Isis in Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria are fundamentally different in nature. Intelligence efforts to support decision makers in counterinsurgency (COIN), whether policy makers or military forces, must adapt to the unique nature of the conflict to be effective (Calvin, 2009). Calvin continue to point out that, intelligence in counterinsurgency should be concentrated primarily on the population and must take a full spectrum approach, addressing the political, economic, social, humanitarian, development, and informational components as well as the military. In furtherance, Calvin assumes that this requires a new intelligence paradigm, based on flexibility and adaptation enabled by expanded human intelligence capabilities, networked integration and collaboration, and an emphasis on local partnerships. Therefore, the issue of local partnerships remains very important to any intelligence information gathering. The local populace cannot be overlooked if cogent intelligence information gathering is needed in this current dispensation by any government fighting any kind of insurgency.

Insurgent movements are armed opposition groups and their support bases. Insurgents engage in guerrilla warfare attacks against security forces and terrorist attacks against civilians (Moghadam,

Berger and Beliakova, 2014). While some groups are involved confined to local insurgencies, others engage in transnational operations. Today, insurgent movements and government security forces that oppose them are the foremost producers of combat and civilian fatalities and casualties, internal displacement and refugee flows, and are among the main sources of human rights violations (Hough, 2011). Gunaratna and Schnabel, (2015), deliberate that insurgent activity has become aggravated by a resurgence of ethnicity and religiosity; greater awareness and concern for human rights and humanitarian assistance; increased movement of people across international borders; the free flow of ideas and technologies; and the saturation of the black and gray arms market. Moreover, globalization, the increased interconnectivity between states, entities and individuals has given a new motivation to insurgency (Lia, 2007). The contemporary face of insurgency has been reshaped by globalization and the forces of globalization catalyze and empower existing and emerging insurgent movements. Instead of resisting globalization, even the most puritanical insurgent groups exploit their forces to advance their political aims and objectives (Oke, 2018).

The goal of intelligence and information gathering is not specific to any one type of target or conflict. Intelligence and information is collected and produced to support and inform decision makers. This holds true whether the intelligence target is a nation-state government or a non-state actor, and it holds true in both conventional and unconventional conflicts. The intelligence process itself though is heavily dependent upon the target, and it must be designed specifically to address the realities of the situation in which it is being employed. During the Cold War, the American Intelligence Community grew and evolved to collect against and analyze the Soviet Union and the threat posed by a powerful nation-state adversary in a global ideological conflict. Intelligence in counterinsurgency should be concentrated primarily on the population and must take a full

spectrum approach, addressing the political, economic, social, humanitarian, development, and informational components as well as the military. This requires a new intelligence paradigm, based on flexibility and adaptation and enabled by expanded human intelligence capabilities, networked integration and collaboration, and an emphasis on local partnerships. This paper puts forth a model of insurgency that can be used in understanding the intelligence requirements of COIN, discusses the unique nature.

Insurgent movements are armed opposition groups and their support bases. Insurgents engage in guerrilla warfare attacks against security forces and terrorist attacks against civilians. While some movements engage in local insurgencies, others engage in transnational operations. Today, insurgent movements and the government security forces that oppose them are the foremost producers of combat and civilian fatalities and casualties, internal displacement and refugee flows, and are among the main sources of human rights violations. Insurgent activity has been exacerbated by a resurgence of ethnicity and religiosity; greater awareness and concern for human rights and humanitarian assistance; enhanced movement of people across international borders; the free flow of ideas and technologies; and the saturation of the black and gray arms market. Moreover, globalization the increased interconnectivity between states, entities and individuals has given a new motivation to insurgency. The forces of globalization catalyze and empower existing and emerging insurgent movements. Instead of resisting globalization, even the most puritanical insurgent groups exploit their forces to advance their political aims and objectives.

2.9 Insurgent Use of the Internet and New Media

When we deliberate on the challenges of handling insurgency information, use of the Internet and new media by insurgents, we are actually discussing three separate but closely linked items:

technology, systems for utilizing this technology, and a culture that influences how technology and systems operate. All are well known to anyone living in a moderately advanced nation or city around the world (Rid and Hecker, 2009). In the view of Pencarelli, (2020), he observes that primary among the technologies is the Internet which is simply a system of devices and technologies used to exchange digital information. The second key technology is mobile communications which permit the exchange of information to take place. The third are technologies to digitize data so it can be exchanged, particularly digital still and video cameras, along with the software to capture, alter, and share high quality images and video. This technology is now quite cheap, easy to acquire, and relatively easy to use. Until recently the technology to create high quality images and video was expensive and extremely complicated, thus limiting the number of users who could master it. It required extensive training. Since those individuals and organizations with the resources to purchase this expensive equipment and undergo the training to utilize it were relatively few, states knew who they were and often could control them. Mertz (2012) argues that today, images and videos are created and distributed via “decentralized networks of users who can incrementally improve (them) by applying personalized skill sets.” The old, industrial method of production required training workers who then built to standards under the supervision of a hierarchy. Distribution was executed in a similar manner. The new technique is “crowd sourcing,” a collective process where self-inspired and often self-trained participants are involved, and quality control is via collective evaluations (commonly known as the “wiki” process after the Internet encyclopedia Wikipedia). In the broadest sense, the initial costs associated with being an information creator, whether it involves education, research, or physical equipment are significantly lower than in the past, permitting more people, some with nefarious intention, to assume the role. The system for the exploitation of new technology includes the World Wide Web,

e-mail, file-sharing programs such as peer-to-peer networks, chat rooms, blogs, microblogs (most famously Twitter), instant messaging, short message services on mobile phones, social networking (most famously Facebook, but including thousands of other forms), cloud file storage and sharing (Davidson, 2003).

The third component and the one which makes the Internet and new media useful to insurgents is the culture that supports its use. Technology itself did not create the culture, but it amplifies various trends, characteristics, and aspects. One important dimension of this is anti-authoritarianism. Young people, who are the most likely to embrace the Internet and new media, are naturally antiauthoritarian, particularly at this time in history when traditional structures for the exercise of authority have broken down (Gapova, 2015). The Internet and social media add to this environment by allowing those with antiauthoritarian feelings to communicate with others who share their beliefs, capitalizing on what Audrey Cronin calls “a global explosion in chaotic connectivity.” (Metz 2012). Digital connection reinforces antiauthoritarian attitudes because those who hold these beliefs do not feel they are alone. In a broad sense, the world is witness to “the emergence of a visually-oriented, ideologically impulsive Internet culture with the means to rapidly and collectively plan and act.” In some societies this can lead to the development of the transnational hacker or hacktivist communities but it can also, with proper leadership, lead to the establishment of insurgent organizations. Phrased differently, it provides the psychological and attitudinal raw material for insurgents to exploit. The Internet helps fill the authority vacuum left by the decline of traditional structures and the inability of the state to replace them. The challenge for twentieth century insurgents was to overcome the passivity and deference to authority among the peasantry, to stir them to action by overcoming the belief that they owed an obligation to the state but the state did not owe one to them. Today’s insurgents do not face passivity and deference.

Web-skilled youth inherently believe that the state has an obligation to them, to include the provision of services, education, and employment. The challenge for insurgents then is to organize, operationalize, and sustain the preexisting antiauthoritarianism. It is a matter of channeling an existing propensity to action rather than creating it. This is an important concept since much of the thinking regarding counterinsurgency is based on traditional and increasingly obsolete notions of authority as portrayed in the concept of legitimacy, which is often defined as an attribute of the state. The culture of the Internet is depersonalizing and insurgents can exploit this fact. Organized violence always requires depersonalizing the enemy in an effort to overcome the natural reluctance to kill. The inherent depersonalization of the Internet facilitates this. Video games may contribute as well, making violence seem unreal and camouflaging its real cost. For many terrorists, their victims are simply characters in a game rather than real, living beings. This blurring of the distinction between reality and a virtual world is a central component of Internet culture (Metz, 2012). For some who are immersed in this culture, it is difficult to distinguish their online, virtual life from their real one. In extreme cases, the virtual life dominates. Insurgents who use the Internet and social media for recruitment often exploit this phenomenon, portraying

2.5 Global insurgencies

Globally, insurgencies have often been violent and arise as a result of intense discontent, a dissatisfaction with the current political and social reality. This often is in opposition to a ruling party, colonial occupation, social order, religious majority, or entire government system (Raji, 2020). When people believe that their grievances cannot be addressed within the current structure, such popular discontent provides the momentum for leaders to mobilize supporters for action. Mobilization includes raising funds, training fighters, organizing, acquiring supplies and weapons, and planning.

Usually, insurgencies are internal conflicts aimed at effecting change within the borders of a nation. However, insurgent activities may occur across borders of neighboring states spiraling external support from other nations Shultz and Dew, (2009) and Metz, (2004) indicate that very often, insurgencies try to change power structures, overthrow governments, change the social order and in their view remedy perceived injustices.

Globally insurgent groups such as within the Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Taliban in Afghanistan civil wars, and comparisons of groups across the Malaya, Indochina, and Philippine communist insurgencies. The Tamil Tigers from the mid-1980s onward and Hamas in Lebanon, Al Qaeda in Iraq in the early days of the Iraq war, The Jaish al-Mahdi in Iraq during the mid-2000s and the contemporary Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Irish National Liberation Army in Northern Ireland and the Bolsheviks during the Russian 1917 revolution which later became the communist party of the Soviet Union.

Joe-Akunne, (2014) contends that insurgencies can be characterized in several ways. He is of the view that two of the most common ways are to distinguish insurgencies by their goals or by the primary method they employ. However, Mahoney, (2020) portends that many insurgencies exhibit characteristics linking different types while their goals are likely to change in the course during of the conflict. In some insurgencies, multiple insurgent groups may operate simultaneously, either competing with one another or setting aside the fact that they may have differing views on post-conflict governance to form provisional alliances counter to the government (Moghadam, Berger, and Beliakova, 2014). Besides, the motivations of individual fighters may differ from that of the group in general, giving the insurgency extra chaotic, less unified quality. By and large, the goals of an insurgency most often fall into one of five categories namely: Revolutionary insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing

transformation of the economic and social structures. - Reformist insurgencies which do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel the government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic, or social reforms; Separatist insurgencies that seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries; Resistance insurgencies seeking to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given territory and Commercialist insurgencies which are encouraged by the attainment of wealth or material resources. To them, political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the wealth.

2.6 History of insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa

Insurgency is born, lives, and dies in a specific strategic, historical, and psychological context. In the broadest sense, its environment is the Third World. There are common structural, institutional, and psychological features which combine to form the preconditions for insurgency (although not necessarily the causes). These include the macro-level mal-distribution of wealth, unemployment, underemployment, poverty, anxiety and confusion generated by rapid modernization, the collapse of traditional social structures, corruption, factionalization, and inefficiency within the regime, frustration brought about by unrealistic expectations concerning the government's capabilities, repression, weak or nonexistent national identity, and inadequate political mechanisms for peaceful change.

Clemmer, (2011) is of the view that insurgent warfare is not new and in a broad sense, are classified as limited, guerrilla (little wars-Spanish) conflicts such as in Afghanistan, Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa including southern Africa. To buttress the long existence of insurgencies, Clemmer points out that the Chinese studied it 2,500 years ago according to (Sun Tzu's writings). The English were confronted with it by the Scots, Irish and Americans, and the Spanish used it

against Napoleon Bonaparte. Insurgency warfare has developed for several reasons. The most obvious is the enormous cost of conventional conflict today.

Geography, population growth, urbanization, endemic corruption, governmental inefficiency, and economic stagnation make Sub-Saharan Africa prone to insurgency. With the possible exception of South Africa and Zimbabwe, African militaries have not proven effective at counterinsurgency. The governments of Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique, for instance, have been unable to defeat relatively weak insurgencies and the Marxist regime of Ethiopia suffered outright defeat. Furthermore, the tendency of neighboring states to provide assistance and sanctuary to African insurgents makes them difficult to defeat. The weakness of state institutions, the personalization of politics, the pervasiveness of cultures with a strong spiritual content, and, most of all, ethnic and tribal heterogeneity open the way for the spiritual form of insurgency. Most Sub-Saharan African states were European colonies until recently. As documented by writers such as Joseph Conrad, Frantz Fanon, and Kwame Nkrumah, this exacerbated the search for a structure of identity among Africans. In fact, many African insurgencies of the past such as the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya, the Simba movement in Congo (now Zaire), and the Mozambique National Resistance. In fact, the dominant political form in Sub-Saharan Africa for the past few decades has been "personal rule. This means that spiritual insurgencies which do develop will likely be built around a charismatic leader. Spiritual insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa will likely take one of two forms. One is separatist or secessionist violence based on ethnicity, tribalism, or religion. This has traditionally been the most common pattern in the region. (RENAMO) had strong mystical or spiritual dimensions.

In a comparative study of Post-independence separatist conflicts in Togo and Cameroun, LonNfi and Pagbe Musah, (2021) recounts that former Togolese presidents Sylvanus Olimpio and

Gnassingbé Eyadéma had voice support for the separation of Western Togoland from Ghana and reunification with Togo prior to the 1970s. This is not to say that Togo will support Ghanaian rebels but it is to say that over a long period, support is not unlikely especially as ethnic issues are involved. The horn of Africa has experienced more insurgencies far greater than any other part of the continent. Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and even the tiny microstate of Djibouti have all been badly affected by acts of insurgency. In the Somali Republic, the United Somali Congress (USC) an insurgent group of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, aided by a variety of insurgent other groups, managed in January 1991 to oust President Mohamed Siyad Barre; a few months later, in May 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) which had led the fight against Barre in the former British Somaliland in the north of the country, declared this territory's separate independence as the Republic of Somaliland. In the same month, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized control of Addis Ababa, while almost simultaneously the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) took control of Asmara and established the provisional government which led in May 1993 to the internationally recognized independence of Eritrea. The former united Ethiopia and Somali Republic thus provide three and perhaps four governments which between them illustrate the widest range of consequences of successful insurgency. (Alyou, 2019).

In general, Sub-Saharan Africa is ripe for insurgency. In fact, no nation is immune. The region is composed of relatively weak states, heterogenous societies, and nations with exploding populations, economic stagnation, and rapid urbanization. As part of the legacy of the cold war, Africa is full of experienced insurgents. All of this does not bode well for the future stability of the region.

2.9.1 Modern approaches to combat insurgencies in Ghana

There has been a dramatic increase in the number and sophistication of insurgencies around the world. Insurgent struggle has become a self-reliant military art where many of the rules of conventional warfare are distorted or not applicable (Grice and Grice, 2019). Many Scholars (Grice and Grice, 2019; Woldemariam, 2018) are of the opinion that insurgency consists of any organized attempt by a group of people to use force against an established nation or government either to break up the nation, overthrow the government or otherwise significantly change the status quo.

Preventing insurgencies is easier than fighting them (Moe, 2018). The elimination of obvious corruption and favoritism, preferably through the fair and rapid administration of established civil and criminal law, is critical to preventing insurgents from gathering. Alternative preventive technique, is a government guarantee of free speech and a free press. In the views of Mulligan and Bamberger (2018), free speech enables governments to determine the temper of its population by merely listening and to avoid the problem of being “out of touch” with its citizens. People can air grievances freely, thus lessening the feeling that no one cares about their concerns. Finally, the government can watch “chronic” complainers, helping to locate would-be revolutionaries before they cross the line between dissent and destructiveness (Daskal, 1986). It is not always possible to defuse an insurgency although these basic actions will help contain it (Kilcullen, 2006).

Anti-insurgency security measures must avoid alienating the general population with excessive violence or repression, relying, instead, upon mobility, training and developing a well-publicized program for “rallying” repentant rebels back to the government (Daskal, 1986) When needed, force should be applied quickly, precisely and thoroughly. Counterinsurgency primarily relies upon police-like actions and small-unit tactics, not artillery or air power which can destroy everything within a given area. Civil police with handguns is not the appropriate response either. Armed

insurgents are not ordinary criminals; they are self-perceived revolutionaries and soldiers. Insurgents, unlike criminals cannot be expected to surrender to an inferior force or respond to pleas to “reason.” They must be met by sufficient force, have no possible avenues of escape and have no alternative but unconditional surrender. Negotiations are not an answer. If the insurgents really felt their demands were negotiable, they would have tried to obtain them through peaceful demonstrations or political action rather than through armed rebellion. They should also be warned, by public broadcast and well-seeded rumors prior to the beginning of operations against them, that taking hostages will not save them from surrender or death. Appropriate action, taken rapidly and resolutely, will normally defuse the insurgency. If the insurgents have little popular support and fail to cause confusion and repression by the government, the insurgency will die, even if a foreign power is backing the insurgents. Realizing the insurgency has failed, the foreign power will abandon it to avoid wasting resources and possible embarrassment. Unfortunately, some governments ignore the problem, hoping it will disappear, or overreact with repressive policies such as martial law or suspension of civil liberties. This allows the insurgency to continue to grow and possibly drive many citizens to join the insurgents. The insurgency gradually ceases to be a localized problem caused by a few dozen hard-core radicals and becomes a regional or national problem, with an army of revolutionaries able to take and hold territory. Once the general population begins to doubt the government’s ability to protect them, they begin to support insurgent groups.

Today, Ghana might be at peace with neighbors but in the conduct and practice of international relations, interest always prevails, domestic regimes change, nothing is certain and one cannot predict what another may want or what kind of grievance against each other may erupt tomorrow.

Though there has been insurgent activities in Ghana, the issue of the Trans Volta Togoland has long been in existence that threatens Ghana's statehood. In as much as Ghana can control what happens internally especially by crushing rebels in their infancy, it cannot control which regime comes to power in Togo and what that regime may want. In the past, Ghana has had issues with some governments of Togo concerning the secession of the TranVolta Togoland. The postindependence period has witnessed secessionist demands by the former British Togoland, a former United Nations (UN) trust territory administered by the United Kingdom which joined the British colony of the Gold Coast to become Ghana at independence in 1957.

Very recently, the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF) whose leader on 16 November 2019 declared an independent Western Togoland state (Adotey, 2022). Adotey narrates that the "HSGF came to public attention when on 6 March 2017, a member of the group, Martin Asiana Agbenu, was arrested by the police at Tokokoe, a village near Ho for selling T-shirts with the inscription '9th May 2017 is OUR DAY Western Togoland'. '9th May' means 9 May 1956".

It refers to the date of the plebiscite in Togoland under UK administration to decide whether it wanted to join the Gold Coast or remain separate. Interestingly, the T-shirts were on sale on 6th March which happens to be Ghana's Independence Day from Britain. This is significant because it represents the independence of Western Togoland from Ghana's 'colonisation' just as Ghana's from Britain.

Though Ghana has a long history of democratic governance, social cohesion and peaceful co-existence, it is not oblivious of the global threat of Insurgencies, Violent-Extremism and Terrorism. Ghana has being following the evolution of the threat globally as well as on the African

continent, especially the Sahel-Sahara and the West African sub-regions. Ghana is signatory to various international instruments against Violent-Extremism and Terrorism and has developed a legal framework to prevent and combat Violent-Extremism and Terrorism in the country.

As a derivative of the overarching National Security Strategy, Ghana's legal Framework forms the basis for the production of detailed and comprehensive National, Institutional, Regional, District and Community Action Plans for the prevention and countering of violent extremism and terrorism in Ghana. Based on Ghana's comprehensive policy framework for preventing and combating future terrorist activities and also insurgencies, the National Counterterrorism Framework was developed around four mutually reinforcing main pillars, each with specific short, medium to long-term objectives.

The pillars are: Prevent (measures to prevent insurgencies by addressing the root causes, minimizing vulnerability, and building resilience); Preempt (activities to detect and deter threats of insurgencies); Protect (measures to protect vulnerable infrastructures and spaces); Respond (activities to mitigate impact and recover from incidents of insurgencies) (Christensen and Edu-Afful, 2019). The framework was spearheaded by the Ministry of National Security (MNS) charged with the mandate of harmonizing and ensuring cooperation and collaboration among security forces operating within the country, i.e., Ghana Armed Forces (GAF); Ghana Police Service (GPS); Ghana Prisons Service; Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); Ghana National Fire Service (GNFS); Research Department (RD); and the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). The framework mainly seeks to promote inter-agency counterterrorism efforts, to establish the responsibilities of the different stakeholders, and to define their specific functions, including the possibility for law enforcement agencies to detain and prosecute individuals suspected of terrorism (Adarkwah, 2020).

Although Ghana does not have any policy document on insurgency, has at its disposal, domestic anti-terrorism legal frameworks and instruments including but not limited to the following; Anti-Terrorism Act 2008 (Act 762), the 1992 Constitution, Economics and Organized Crime Act 2010 Act 804, Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2012, the Directive Principles of State Policy and the the National Disaster Management Organization Act, 1996, (Act 517), and the Emergency Powers Act, 1994, (742) (Anim, 2016). Despite these pieces of legislations, it appears Ghana is still lacking important additional legislation that would firm up the legal framework and improve the national preparedness against critical national risks posed by insurgents (Norman, Aikins and Binka et al., 2014). At the sub-regional and continental level, Ghana has also acceded to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials and ratified the Algiers Declaration of 1999. It is a convention adopted by the African Union (AU) in combating terrorism (Darkwa, 2011; Ehiane, 2018). On the global stage, Ghana is also a member of the UN and has over the years ratified and signed several International treaties, which directly or indirectly contribute toward peace and security in combating terrorist activities. Examples include: the ratification of the following United Nations (UN) treaties; The Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and Terrorist Financing in 2002; International Convention for the Suppression of

2.9.2 Consequences of failing to organize counter-insurgency

Although the state claims monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a territory, many states are not able to maintain dominance over armed power due to their lack of capacity. Nevertheless, the basic point that needs to be made about insurgent movements is that, they start off militarily weaker relative to the state they are fighting against no matter how weak the state is. Insurgents start rebellion with the hope that they will grow with time, either through external support or

internal self-strengthening. If they are not defeated at this period of vulnerability, a negative correlation is developed where the prospect of government victory diminishes with time while simultaneously increases rebels' capabilities and chances of success, or at least, ability to obtain concessions. To defeat rebels at this stage, a state must be able to identify potential fighters through its domestic agencies and apply coercion because "if government forces knew who the rebels were and how to find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured. This is true even in states whose military and police capacities are low." Thus, rebels' survival beyond the period of vulnerability is a function of government's willingness and desire to apply effective repression.

Insurgents rebel out of a demand and a government has two policy options to respond to the demand. It can choose to either accommodate or repress. Insurgents themselves do not expect to be accommodated at their onset and this why they hide their activities and choose rebellion over non-violent approach because non-violent means such as petitions, negotiations and lobbying are likely to be costly. Government also attempts to avoid cost by subjecting policy choices to rational cost-benefit calculation. Accommodating rebels demand whiles they're still infant would signify the state's weak resolve and this would open the floodgate for other aggrieved or greed people to stake claims. Moreover, insurgents may interpret early accommodation as an appeasement and would whet their appetite to ask for more. Thus, it will serve governments well to avoid accommodation and choose early repression.

In theory, counter-insurgency uses coercive means to defeat the clandestine insurgents on one side, while improving the general living conditions of non-combatant populations on the other. The underlying philosophy is winning the "hearts and minds" of the non-combatant population, which requires the reconstruction of stable state institutions in parallel with military activities. In Afghanistan and in Iraq for instance, the United States' counter-insurgency strategy was two-

pronged: its aims were to defeat insurgents while also legitimizing the governments formed after its military intervention.

But this strategy comes at a significant cost for the intervening countries. Firstly, it requires a massive mobilization of human, economic and logistical resources to compensate for the lack of legitimate state structures, which have either been damaged by war or did not exist in the first place. Secondly, counter-insurgency also comes at a political cost. The recent use of such tactics has led to enduring conflicts, perceived as failures by the publics of the intervening countries. Governments must know that engaging in counter-insurgency operations is a long-term commitment, the duration of which will almost certainly exceed most term limits. The intervening states have undeniable obligations of visible results.

Insurgency activities of two prominent independence organizations – Western Togoland Restoration Front (WTRF) and the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF) have increased in the area referred to as Western Togoland – the territory sandwiched between Lake Volta and the Ghana-Togo border. Distler & Heise, (2022) account that WTRF unilaterally proclaimed independence of Western Togoland on 1 September 2020 and on 25 September, the insurgents blocked major roads in the region amid burning tires, stormed and stole weapons from police armory and asked all security forces to leave the region. Elaborating further, they contend that the insurgents held three (3) officers hostage until freed after a shootout with security forces. Thirty one (31) insurgents were arrested and one killed. They attacked a bus terminal in the regional capital, burning one vehicle and damaging another on 29 September. The WTRF claims of about 4000 fighters and on 24 September, published photos of graduation ceremony for about 500 personnel who had reportedly completed months of training. Eighty one (81) members including the leader of HSGF were arrested but charges were dropped (anecdotal).

Ghana's position and dealing with recent insurgencies is resonance of pampering, and that, an appropriate response strategy at insurgents' period of vulnerability (early stage) is effective repression, or else, insurgents will become strengthened with time and space. Rather than accommodating them, rebels should be sought for and crushed completely without consideration to any form of negotiation. The issue of secession of the Trans Volta Togo land (Western Togoland) has persisted for a long time but Ghana's inability to crush the organizers and the group at its infancy stage, has given them the impetus to pose a threat to Ghana's existence as a sovereign state.

2.9.3 Responding to the development of insurgency in Ghana

Ghana's government claim to be dealing with it as the vice president declared "the area today they call Western Togoland must be a figment of their imagination. It does not exist. There is no legal basis for their claims. No negotiations! With those criminals?" Of course, as terrorism is a subordinate dimension of insurgency, states hope to avoid negotiation with terrorists and insurgents because negotiation reward them for violent behavior. Due to insurgents' inability to practice credible commitments, there is a distrust that they will honor their promise. In dealing with rebels, it is not about what you say after they strike but what you do to them at the period of calm because they are preparing to come hit and run. It must be advised that repression strategy would be more appropriate at this early stage of rebels' growth. It can effectively use repression only at this stage of rebels' vulnerability and if it pays lip service and allows this period to pass, it will have no choice than to accommodate which would involve some unpalatable political and economic costs.

At the sub-regional and continental level, Ghana has also acceded to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials and ratified the

Algiers Declaration of 1999. It is a convention adopted by the African Union (AU) in combating terrorism and in this case insurgencies (Darkwa, 2011; Ehiane, 2018). On the global stage, Ghana is also a member of the UN and has over the years ratified and signed several International treaties, which directly or indirectly contribute toward peace and security in combating terrorism and insurgent activities. Examples include: the ratification of the following United Nations (UN) treaties; The Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and Terrorist Financing in 2002; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism the Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Klein, 2009; Wu, 2018). At the Security Council level, Ghana has adopted the UNSCRs 1267 of 1999, 1373 of 2001, and 1718 of 2006. These UNSC resolutions are all aimed at the freezing or seizure of terrorist and insurgents assets and related matters (Bamba, 2014).

Ghana also has the National Defense Policy (NDP) to deal with all forms of threats against the survival and existence of the country. The defense policy classifies the threats faced by Ghana into internal and external threats. These are not unique to the country but similar to those confronting other sub-regional countries including Ghana's neighbours and allies (Prah and Chanimbe, 2021). In the view of Prah and Chanimbe, (2021), these threats have a potential of creating uncertain and volatile security situations necessitating periodic calls for Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA). This is the current situation in Ghana where the military have taken civil authority in prevent escalations due to the recent insurgent situation of secession in the Volta Region. According to Cesarini, (2010) in his study titled *Shaping democracy: The politics of transitional justice in Italy and Portugal*, affirms that though internal threats are in-exhaustive, key ones in

Ghana include “military coup d’états, ethnic conflicts, illiteracy, corruption, proliferation of arms and ammunition, mass unemployment, political intolerance, greed, poor economic growth, and poverty”. All these are breeding grounds for insurgent activities that to a very large extent, has the potency to threaten the political and economic fiber of society. According to Bob-Milliar, (2014) Ghana’s National Development Plan (NDP) identifies a list of events as threats such as violent crime, armed robbery, chieftaincy disputes, religious fanaticism/intolerance, drug trafficking, money laundering, cyber-crime, illegal migration, and smuggling. Political vigilantism, breeding of terrorists’ cells, inactivity of the youth, contract killings, state sponsored violence, abuse of state institutions, as well as subjugation of national interest to partisan interests are all current threats to Ghana including also insurgent activities of secession. Developing threats rooted in feeble political management, uncertain and reticent state security institutions, a deep misunderstanding of the beliefs of a democratic state, bad governance, and the casual attitude of Ghanaians have the tendency affect the survival of the Ghanaian state negatively. These threats show the delicate nature of the security of the ordinary Ghanaian that needs not be matched with a complacent and less resolved security architecture. Consequently, the NDP advocates for a professional, well trained and resourced military institution, which will remain subordinated to the Civil Authority and which will promote democratic practices as well as military – civil relations. The NDP thus added that the “Armed Forces shall continue to be adequately funded, trained and equipped to discharge” its constitutional responsibilities (NDP, 2012). It also advocated for an improvement in the capacity of the Ghana Police Service for an effective discharge of their primary responsibility in the security and Defense space of the country.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research design, method, data collection methods, sampling technique as well as the sample size. The chapter will discuss how the data collected will be managed and analysed.

3.1 Profile of the study area

Volta Region is one of the sixteen regions in Ghana. It lies on the eastern side of the country. The region derived its name from the Volta River, which virtually separates it from the rest of the country. The region prior to the recent re- demarcation of the region was unique in the sense that it was the longest of the regions and has all the ecological zones and ethnic groups found in Ghana living in it as indigenes. For this uniqueness, the region is described as a microcosm of the country. Historically, the northern part of region, with the exception of the regional capital, Ho, was part of the German colony, while the southern part was administered as part of the Gold Coast colony. After Germany's defeat in World War I, its colony of Togoland was partitioned. One portion was placed under the protectorate of Britain as the British Togo. The other, under French protectorate, became the French Togo, now the Republic of Togo. The British protectorate of Togoland, later to be known as Trans-Volta Togoland (TVT), was administered by the Governor of the Gold Coast. After Ghana achieved independence in 1957, the Parliament adopted a resolution to merge and integrate the Trans-Volta Togoland with Ghana, under the name Volta Region.

Western Togoland is a territory of 550 km by 60 km extending along the Togolese border from Burkina Faso to the Gulf of Guinea. It has 4 million inhabitants. Initially part of the German

protectorate over Togoland, it was attached to the British Gold Coast in 1916. After the Gold Coast gained independence in 1956, the people of western Togoland had to decide in a referendum whether they would remain attached to the new republic of Ghana or join Togo, still a French colony. By 2/3 of the votes, the population voted in favor of keeping Western Togoland within Ghana. But the results of the referendum were never really consensual among the population.

3.2 Political Secession

In 2020, a secessionist movement in the Volta region - the Homeland Study Foundation - declared that it wanted to create an independent state in southeast Ghana, “Western Togoland”. This movement also demands that the eastern fringe of the northern and eastern regions be attached to the Volta region as part of Western Togoland. In the context of the jihadist threat to northern Ghana, the Ghanaian and Togolese authorities are now concerned about the creation of bridges between armed groups and independence fighters in Western Togoland. In any case, the Ghanaian authorities have conducted several series of arrests of activists linked to the Homeland Study Foundation in recent years (Adotey, 2022). The latest was the arrest of Georges Nyakpo, secretary of the movement, in the summer of 2021. A civil society umbrella organization, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, of which the Homeland Study Foundation is a member, has denounced these arrests as arbitrary. The issue is not so much the legitimacy of these independence demands, which are stirring up many parts of the world, but the possibility of instrumentalizing these rather minority aspirations in a context of destabilization a part of the country. However, the national authorities seem to be taking measures against such risks and seem to be considering some form of consultation with the populations concerned in order to strengthen their support for the national community and their resilience in the face of attempts by armed groups to exploit them.

3.2 Location and size of the Area

The region is located between latitudes 5° 45'N and 8° 45'N along the southern half of the eastern border of Ghana, which it shares with the Republic of Togo. It shares boundaries to the west with Greater Accra, Eastern and Brong Ahafo regions, to the north with the Northern Region and has the Gulf of Guinea to the south. Its total land area is 20,570 square kilometres, representing 8.7 percent of the total land area of Ghana.

Figure 1: Map of Volta Region (Trans Volta Togoland)

Figure 1: Map of Volta Region (Trans Volta Togoland)



Source: Homeland Study Group Foundation, 2023

A brief early history of the area

A union with the Gold Coast meant reservation of some political autonomy for Western Togoland, and the UN invited Britain to take the necessary steps to realise the union. Had this union

materialised, Western Togoland would, perhaps, have had some legislative and executive powers with much bearing on its development. However, instead of a political union, Kwame Nkrumah, a Prime Minister of the Gold Coast and later Ghana's first President, integrated Western Togoland into the Gold Coast in two ways. First, he created the Trans-Volta Togoland (which later became the Volta Region) by welding south-Western Togoland with parts of south-eastern Gold Coast in 1952. Second, he fused north-Western Togoland with northern regions in the Gold Coast. Thus, at independence, Nkrumah had, arguably, subverted the envisaged political union and compromised the territorial identity of Western Togoland. Opponents of Nkrumah's actions – mainly Ewe nationalists of south-Western Togoland regions such as Ho and Hohoe – were either exiled, imprisoned or co-opted.

Eweland was first divided between the Gold Coast, a British colony and Togoland under German rule. However, this division did not create much attention at the time. After the defeat of Germany in World War 1, German Togoland was divided between France and Britain and put under the respective administrative authorities of Dahomey and Gold Coast. This arrangement further divided Eweland and became source of agitations among ewes led by Ewe Unification Movement which aimed to unite Ewelands under one administrative authority. Ewe Unification Movement dies off when British Togoland formerly became an administrative region of independence Ghana in 1957. The post-independence period of Ghana also continues to witness periodic agitations and protests led by British Togoland Movement which comprises other smaller movements for the restoration of British Togoland as an independent state. The latest agitations by street demonstration took place in 2018 and some of the protesters were arrested by the security agencies

Figure 2: Map of Ghana Showing Volta Region (Trans Volta Togoland)



Source: Ghana Red Cross Society

3.3 Political and Administrative Structure

As in the other regions in Ghana, the Volta Region has a decentralized political and administrative system. Until December 2018 when new regions were created under an executive instrument, the Volta region was divided into 18 administrative Municipal/District Assemblies headed by

Municipal/District Chief Executives. Each Municipal/District Assembly has responsibility for the overall development of the area under its jurisdiction. The Municipal/District Chief Executives are also responsible to the President through the Regional Minister who is the political head of the region. Administratively, the Municipal/District Assemblies are composed of zonal, urban, town and area councils. The lowest level sub-structures are the unit committees. The apex of the decentralized administrative system is the Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) and the District Assembly. The RCC comprises the Regional Minister, his Deputy, representatives of the Regional House of Chiefs, the District Chief Executives of the region, Presiding Members, and representatives of the various decentralized ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs).

Table 1.1: Districts in the Volta Region and their capitals

District	Capital
South Tongu	Sogakope
Keta Municipal	Keta
Ketu South	Denu
Ketu North	Dzodze
Akatsi North	Ave Dakpa
Akatsi South	Akatsi
North Tongu	Bator-Dugame
Cntral Tongu	Adidome
Adaklu Anyigbe	Kpetoe
Ho Municipal	Ho
Ho West	Dzolokpuita

South Dayi	Kpeve
North Dayi	Kpando
Hohoe Municipal	Hohoe
Anloga District	Anloga
Afadzato South District	Ve-Golokwati

Source:

3.1 Research Design

According to Goddard and Melville (2004), a research method has to do with the methods adopted by the researcher to collect data in relation to the issue or problem being investigated. Kothari (2004) makes a brief distinction between research method and research methodology by explaining that, research method involves those techniques used in conducting a research whereas research methodology, refers to the logical and practical ways of tackling a research question. Kothari adds that, the scope of research methodology is much wider and covers research methods. The logic of a research method is supported by the research methodology, and explains why a particular method or technique is used instead of another (Kothari, 2004). According to Goddard and Melville (2004), a research method has to do with the methods adopted by the researcher to collect data in relation to the issue or problem being investigated. Kothari (2004) makes a brief distinction between research method and research methodology by explaining that, research method involves those techniques used in conducting a research whereas research methodology, refers to the logical and practical ways of tackling a research question. Kothari adds that, the scope of research methodology is much wider and covers research methods. The logic of a research method is supported by the research methodology, and explains why a particular method or technique is used instead of another (Kothari, 2004).

A qualitative research method is used in the study. The qualitative method allows for a detailed explanation and examination of a research subject, without restricting the scope of the research and the nature of participant's responses

In quantitative research, an investigator relies on numerical data (O'Connor and Joffe, 2020). In developing knowledge, the researcher cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific variables, hypotheses and questions, use of measurement and observation, and the test of theories. A researcher isolates variables and causally relates them to determine the magnitude and frequency of relationships. Additionally, a researcher decides which variables to investigate and chooses instruments, which will yield highly dependable and valid scores. Alternatively, qualitative research is "an inquiry process of understanding" where the researcher develops a "complex, full picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting" (Awasthy, 2019). In qualitative research, data is collected from those engrossed in everyday life of the situation being studied. Data analysis is based on the values that these participants perceive for their world. Eventually, it "produces an understanding of the problem based on numerous experiences (Tracy, 2019).

It also allows for a more open in-depth analysis and interpretation of the problem. Qualitative research approach provided an avenue for a detailed description, narrations, and explanations of events surrounding insurgency in this study. The qualitative method in this research involved gathering of expert opinions, ideas and judgments, close reading of texts, taking notes, reflecting on the data and writing down interpretations to reach conclusions on the empirical findings. As indicated by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), issues of the changing social world and its associated information cannot be subjected to quantitative methodology. Social science requires comparison based on value judgments which are a qualitative methodology. (Bird, 2020)

3.2 Source of data

The research made use of both primary and secondary sources for data collection. Thomas (2004) provides a basic distinction between primary and secondary data as he indicates that the former is constructed by the researcher in the context of his or her own research project, while the latter is been constructed by others, who may or may not be fellow researchers, for purposes which may or not be research. Similarly, Hox and Boeije (2005) describe primary sources of data as firsthand information collected from the original sources for the users' express purpose. Such data are usually obtained from the field through interviews, questionnaires, surveys, planned experimental observations or recording of official transactions, among others. In this research, face to face semi-structured interviews were used to collect primary data from Ghanaian diplomats, police, judiciary and military officials in Ghana, as well as experts working in international security research institutions in Ghana. The research also sourced knowledge and views from private security experts as well as views of academic experts in insurgent activities. Interview, according to Easwaramoorthy (2006), is an appropriate method when there is a need to collect in-depth information on people's opinions, thoughts, experiences, and feelings. Interviews are useful when the topic of inquiry relates to issues that require complex questioning and considerable probing. The complex nature of insurgency and its accompanying debate on causal factors and motivations required this research to adopt interview method, to be able to explore in detail the views of identifiable persons and institution with relevant expertise. Since the subject under study in this research is a Ghanaian phenomenon, expert opinions from the country were also sourced. Respondents were given a structured interview guide on which their responses revolved. The use of structured interview was necessary in some of the data collection because the researcher could

not have direct contact with the respondents and could therefore not ask related, spontaneous and follow-up questions.

3.3 Sampling Technique

Barreiro and Albandoz (2001) describe sample size selection as a process of selecting a proportion of the population considered adequate to represent all existing characteristics within the target population for the purpose of generalizing the findings from the sample about the sample itself, the target population and to any other population(s) having characteristics with the target population (Barreiro & Albandoz, 2001). The authors add that, a sample is the subset of the population that is selected for the study, and could also be called subjects or respondents of the study. The sample or respondents for this research were taken from Ghana. Three (3) relevant institutions were consulted and experts within the organizations were interviewed. Other individual experts' opinions were also sourced. The research used the purposive sampling technique to select the interview participants. Purposive sampling, also known as judgmental, selective or subjective sampling, is a type of non-probability sampling technique where the units or persons are selected based on the judgment of the researcher on who poses the required knowledge to address the research objectives and the problem under investigation (Yadav et al., 2019).

The purposive sampling technique used in this research ensured that the researcher acquired a wealth of information for a detailed study from the right persons and institutions, rather than randomly selecting respondents who may not have been able to provide adequate information and expert explanation. As Yadav et al., (2019) indicate, purposive sampling enables researchers to have a pool of knowledgeable professionals on the subject matter who have access and could provide relevant information to the questions under consideration. The purposive sampling

technique enabled the researcher to identify and approach relevant institutions and individuals in Ghana to speak about insurgency.

3.4 Sample Size

Sample size is one of the critical considerations in research methodology that attracts the attention of both investigators and their audience. This is because whiles audience prefer large samples to represent a population; researchers are mostly constrained by time and funding. Ideally, it is important to organize a justifiable sample size and therefore to ensure a sample size acceptable as a representative of the whole, numerous factors are considered. Guest, Namey and Chen, (2020), underscored that in research, a large population does not necessarily require large sample sizes. The acceptability of a sample size is therefore reliant on a researcher's ability to give articulate and convincing reasons for the choice. De Vaus, (2002) opines that the determination of a sample size is based on two key factors; "the degree of accuracy required for the sample and the extent to which there is variation in the population with regards to the key characteristics of the study". In order words, it suggests that a researcher must ensure that a sample would lead to findings that are accurate rather than skewed. It also must ensure that the different groups of people in the population are fairly represented. In this study, ten (10) people were interviewed. The number comprised of four (4) ECOWAS Parliamentarians, two (2) each from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The others include three (3) International Relations, Security and Human Security Experts with proven their knowledge in Political Security and ECOWAS through extensive researches. They were chosen from the University of Ghana's Political Science Department, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) and the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCS). To complete the list are two (2) senior officers from the ECOWAS Desk of African Bureau at the Ghana Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and an official from the West African Network for Peace (WANEP). The respondents were selected based on their in-depth knowledge on the issues under study. The sample size of 10 is because there was nothing new coming forth from the respondents any longer. Thus, the responds at this point were just either a confirmation or repetition of what the earlier respondents had said. The variations in the number of people interviewed in the various categories was largely influenced by the availability and readiness of the respondents to respond to the researcher. The table below further explains the composition of the respondents.

Table 1: Institutions and Numbers of Respondents

No	Institution	Numbers Persons Interviewed
1.	Ghana Police Service	2
2.	Ghana Army	2
3.	NPP	1
4	NDC	1
5.	CPP	1
6.	Ghana Immigration Service	1
7.	Traditional leaders	1
8	Community members	1

3.5 Interviews

For interviews, we sought out people that were most visibly involved in the fight against gang crime in Salinas. Interviewees fell into two broad categories: the indigenous people and government security employees. It was believed that these individuals would provide depth to the

research, as it was assumed that they would be attuned to the issues of secession. The interviewees aided this research by providing unique perspectives on the ongoing suppression, intervention, and prevention initiatives currently in use to combat the insurgent secessionist group in the Volta Region of Ghana. The interviews were conducted with questions based on our condition variables. The questions ranged from baseline assessments of the gang situation, to perceptions of city government. Not all questions developed for this research were applicable to every person interviewed. Thus, we developed tailored interview questions for each interviewee based on their role and knowledge of the issue insurgent secession. To elicit thoughtful and candid responses from the interviewees, we attempted to be as transparent as possible by providing the questions identified for discussion prior to the interview. All interviews were conducted in person with at two researchers assistants present during the interview. At all times, interviewees were made aware that we were taking notes of the interview, and all respondents agreed to be quoted; however, some of the respondents did not want to be referred to by name in the final publication of this paper. Interviews ranged between 30 to 45 minutes in length. The feedback during the interviews reflected an array of substantive responses, from additional discussion topics beyond the scope of this research, to responses that directly addressed our key variables. Follow up phone calls helped clarify responses as needed.

3.6 Data Analysis

The study used a thematic analytical approach to aid analysis and interpretation of the diverse data gathered. This approach, according to Mills et al (2010), allows for qualitative data to be systematically analyzed “by identifying themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding and classifying data according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking commonalties, relationships, overarching patterns, theoretical constructs, or explanatory

principles” (Mills et al., 2010). This research therefore used relevant themes pertaining to insurgency in Ghana. For instance, socio-economic variables such as poverty, education, unemployment, social developments among others, are used in a thematic structure to demonstrate the causal and motivating factors regarding the emergence and persistence of insurgency.

3.7 Ethical Consideration

The study made some provisions in adherence to ethical issues in a sensitive research study as this one. Full confidentiality of all information and the anonymity of participants were maintained. Participants were informed of any potential limitations to their confidentiality of any information supplied. Ethical measures such as seeking the informed consent of each respondent were adhered to before being interviewed, explaining the purpose of the research as well as the role of the respondents. Following the ethical demands of research, and to ensure confidentiality acronyms were employed by using letters of the alphabet to represent respondents. Interviewees were quoted for better understanding. Consent of the respondents were sought for through signing of forms done by both researcher and the respondents (Husband, 2020). Care was taken not to disclose respondents’ identity to third parties and ensured that their responses were used purposely for this study only. The consent form made known researchers’ identity and the purpose of study. Respondents’ were asked not to feel compelled to answer any questions and can willingly withdraw from the interview any time they felt uncomfortable or did not want to continue (Trotter, 2012). Also, the researcher strictly adhered to seeking prior consent of interviewees before recording the interviews (Husband, 2020). The researcher engaged the respondents solely for the objectives of the research and respecting the views of the respondents by not asking any biased question. Additionally, to secure the credibility of the research, no portion of the information collected was falsified or distorted (Rose and Johnson, 2020).

3.9 Challenges and Limitation of the study

The main limitation of this research is the scanty volume of data on insurgency. Another limitation of this research is the unwillingness of respondents to provide adequate information on response preparedness due to security concerns. The study, therefore, relied more on secondary sources of data. These problems notwithstanding, did not affect the study so much as to render it unreliable since the research objectives are achieved.

Predictably, the student came across many challenges before, during, and after the interviews. One of the major limitations was about respondents honouring interview appointment time requested. This led to the cancelation of some appointments arranged initially with respondents. In some instances new appointments had to be made. Another major issue was the insufficiency of funds and time. The researcher was constrained by time and finances for a broader study. The availability of these resources could have helped the researcher extend the sample size to include respondents from all political parties and security agencies in Ghana.

One of the limiting aspects of collecting data for this research was the lack of any significant historical survey data, specifically focused on the Volta Region, which could be analyzed longitudinally with respect to insurgency violence. While the surveys allow for specific analysis of one point in time, no comparisons with past surveys could be conducted. This limited our analysis to current perceptions, and prevented us from understanding how those perceptions have changed over time as the insurgence violence in the Volta Region of Ghana has been sporadic.

3.9.1 Organization of Chapters

The dissertation will be organized in five chapters. Chapter one will look at the introduction while chapter two takes aspects on the review of related literature. The research methodology, results

and discussions/analysis will be captured under chapter three and four respectively. Finally, Chapter five will focus on conclusions and recommendations.

3.9.2 Conclusion

The chapter outlined the methodological framework and methods that underpinned the study. The primary data as used for the analysis was generated mainly through in-depth interviews using well designed semi-structured interview guides as tools. The respondents were selected using the purposive sampling technique. In-depth interviews were conducted on 10 persons in their organizational capacities. Their responses were recorded, transcribed, coded and used for the analysis. Content and context analysis were the techniques used in the data analysis process.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

4.0 Introduction

This Chapter presents data as gathered from interviews. It summarizes the major findings of the study in relation to its objectives. It points out the state of Ghana's vulnerability to secession in the Volta Region formerly the Trans Volta Togoland, the historical antecedents, instances of secession of the Volta Region from Ghana, measures put in place to address them and the adequacy of those measures.

4.1 Historical antecedents of insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa is an extremely weak and volatile regional sub-system in the globalizing world system with prevalent and tenacious violence with long and often terrible armed conflict that took place before European domination and colonization. However, subjugation by Europeans colonialists was the introduction of brutalizing and presenting new dynamics prompting the use of violence—*“from technological advancements in the ways to kill one's fellow man, to introducing new and exclusionary political systems and extractive economic practices that increased social stratification in many communities. Though it certainly does not hold a monopoly on violence, Africa has become synonymous with armed conflict in the popular imagination of many around the globe”*.

Though African insurgencies just like any other are fashioned and influenced by highly multifaceted and opposing desires bottled in globalization, many of such insurgencies are pronounced and seen in some regional conflict zones in Africa in the post-cold war era thus the late 1980s through to the new millennium. First and foremost was in West Africa, primarily around the Mano River Basin, capitulating in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and

Guinea. Interestingly, a second insurgency ensued and developed around the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa and impacted Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe after the collapse of Mobutu's Zaire between 1996 and 1997. It was then observed that localized insurgencies were building up into cross-border insurgencies and often posing insecurity threats in most parts of Africa as occurred in West and Central Africa.

Between 1946 and 1989 at the height of the cold war to its end, there was constant increase in the number of insurgent warfare in Africa during the Cold War and the period of decolonization continuing through the early years of the 1990s. A large part countries in the sub region over forty were experiencing insurgent wars at the peak in 1993. This is attributable to the protracted duration of wars during the Cold War period. Since 1993 though insurgent wars exist in the sub region, the number of insurgencies have reversed and the general magnitude of war decreased to about half its peak value by 2004

4.2 Commonalities in insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa

In the sub region, localized insurgent conflicts become intertwined and take on regional dimensions in complex ways that helped to sustain and spread conflict. It is believed that the current African insurgencies are deeply entrenched in local, historical undercurrents. With more than fifty multi-ethnic states in the continent and the rise in insurgent activities in the 1960s when most African states began to gain independence, what has been mostly common in sub-Saharan Africa has been the widespread of episodes of secessionist sentiment and secessionist talk. Over the years there has only a few actual secessionist movements in sub-Saharan Africa. Notably there are only Eritrea and Southern Sudan.

Commenting on the commonalities that exist in Sub-Saharan Africa insurgencies, some participants expressed their views as:

There are always underlying ethnic cleavages in Africa that are always the source of domestic instability and conflict. Rebel groups (and political parties) are organized on clan, tribal, or ethnic lines, and politicians and would-be leaders often play upon ethnic differences to rise to power.

Female_Opinion Leader

4.3 Historical antecedents of insurgencies in Ghana

Despite significant socioeconomic and political challenges, the country has kept a relatively clean slate in regard to its regional, continental, and global reputation. Largely, the political culture in Ghana is neither anarchic, nor repressive. A true success story of African democracy, Ghana is not a divided country. Though there has been pockets of insurgent activities in Ghana in almost every region, only a few have been violent. An example is the Nanumba and Kokomba conflicts and the recent secessionist insurgent activities in the Volta Region. Ghana has not experienced the kind of internal insurgent disruptions that have plagued some of its regional neighbors such as Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. After leading the African liberation struggle by being the first Sub-Saharan African country to gain political independence from British colonialism in 1957 and Suleiman, (2017) affirms that Ghana has kept its sociopolitical fabric intact in a region that was deep in the abyss of civil war, especially in the post-Cold War era. This has earned the country the reputation of being an “oasis of peace” in West Africa.

Narrating the historical antecedents of insurgencies in Ghana, a participant had this to say:

Although Ghana is peaceful and democratically stable, there is no extent of any large-scale conflict between political, ethnic, and religious groupings. Although Ghana continues to witness intermittent conflicts around chieftaincy and land rights, intra-religious and

interethnic conflicts, and other resource-driven communitarian clashes. Male_Political Party Rep

Another participant also said that:

The Dagbon chieftaincy crisis and the Kokomba-Nanumba conflicts in the northern regions of Ghana, Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict in the Volta Region, and the perennial Farmer-Fulani violence in the Afram Plains area and Agogo in the Ashanti and Eastern regions respectively, are a few examples of conflicts in Ghana. Male_Political Party Rep

Another community leader added:

Although there dozens of religions and ethnic and language groups, thousands of tribal, clan, and familial groupings. Most of them probably feel aggrieved towards others. Hardly any of them settle their differences by fighting. Most groups find ways to cooperate most of the time.

4.3.1 Historical antecedents of insurgencies the Volta Region of Ghana (Trans Volta Togoland)

Western Togoland is the territory spanning the easternmost portion of Ghana, north to south, along the border with neighboring Togo. It corresponds to the territory of the former British Mandate of Togoland (1916-1956). Some pro-independence organisations claim that the region connecting the former British mandate—which was landlocked—with the coast should also be regarded as a part of Togoland, since in 1952 the British merged both areas into a single administrative region. A participant asked about the issues of insurgent activities said:

“The issue of Trans Volta Secessionist insurgencies has been an age long struggle right after the 1956 plebiscite. We believe in the reunification of British Togoland with French Togo to forming a single, Ewe-majority country”. LC_Female_leader

Some participants further narrated during the interviews that folklores indicate that the present-day independence movement supposedly tagged as insurgents are of the view that the 1956 plebiscite was unlawful and that, they have always been against and will fight to make sure that Volta Region unites with Togo. A participant stated in this regard:

“Anyway, the Ghanaian authorities divided Togoland into several regions, without autonomy. For these reasons, independence proponents claim that integration has no validity. The Ghanaian government, on the other hand, argues that integration was legitimate and democratic, the plebiscite being a genuine exercise of the right to self-determination of Western Togoland”. LR_Male_influential

Other stories of insurgent secessionist activities were that Western Togoland has been discriminated against by successive Ghanaian governments, both politically and economically, and in relation to the territory’s infrastructures. They also claim that Ghanaian authorities are criminalizing pro-independence sentiments, are hiding Togoland’s history, and are neglecting the Ewe people. According to participants who are mainly youth, they also recounted that:

“There is lack of infrastructure development as compared to other parts of the country. The economic situation here is very bad and there is no job for the youth. If we have been part of Togo, our situation would have been different. If people talk about their concerns and threaten to fight on, then they are seen as criminals. How can that be? All governments have neglected the Volta Region”. LR_Male_Opinion leader

4.3.2 Recent Activities of secessionist The Homeland Study Group Foundation

For the past ten years the issue of small group of people trying to break up parts of Ghana have become issue of concern. The Volta secessionist groups known as Homeland Study Group Foundation has embarked onn a campaign in the Volta Region and parts of Northern Region of Ghana the secede to create a new country called Western Togoland which was formally Trans Volta Togoland and did not fall within the territory of the Gold Coast borders now modern day Ghana until the 1956 plebiscite. Recently, the insurgent activities of this group has become a matter of concern to the security and territorial integrity of Ghana.

In an interview with some participants across parts of the Volta region, some expressed their dismay of the activities of the Homeland Study Group Foundation. Several participant indicated that the modus operandi of The Homeland Study Group Foundation was illegal and Government must take charge, as stated in this extract:

“We feel disappointed in the way The Homeland Study Group is acting. How can they attack a police station? This is a rebellious action against the state. If you block major roads at various locations attack a Police Station and hold a whole police regional command to ransom, then the state must deal with you”. **LR_ Female_ Trader**

Another participants had this to say:

“If they feel or believe they have a legitimate concern to secede, why they don’t use appropriate channel to address their concerns. Attacking a police station, blocking roads freeing inmates at police station, shooting and injuring a police commander is heinous. As for me, their behaviour resembles that of terrorist and the Government arrest and prosecute them”. **LR_ Female_ business Woman**

4.3.3 Approach to combat insurgencies in Ghana

Governmental agencies and other security-sector partners must begin to explore how to leverage and explore systems and approaches that are intended to predict impending threats of insurgencies and support the mitigation of those.

In expressing their views on the approach to use to combat insurgencies in Ghana, some participants said that;

There should be community engagements with the local people. This will help the security agencies to know the existence of insurgent groups or any other group with similar intentions. This can only be achieved when they build and maintain relationships and partnerships with communities to establish trust between the diverse communities and law enforcement.

*The security forces must engage with the people. This is the best way to combat insurgencies. Community engagement should not be a single agency work. Appropriate communication and interaction with partners, stakeholders and other levels of security enforcement are essential. **SP_Male***

Other participants also shared their views about ways to combat insurgencies:

*The security agencies must arrest and prosecute such people immediately they have information about their activities. I am happy because so far, some suspected Homeland Study Group Foundation members whom I consider as criminals have been arrested and charged by state prosecutors. **SP_Female.***

*What will work in my view is the need for the security agencies to be selective and engage with the most critical, and the most influential members of the communities. **LR_Male***

*The Ghana armed forces must work with the Ghana police and anyone who is found getting involved in such insurgents acts must be arraigned before a court of prudent jurisdiction and charged with treason and participation in campaign of prohibited organization. **LR_Male Opinion Leader***

Other participants also expressed their view that Ghana must secure its borders in order to prevent any acts of insurgency. Some participants had this to say;

*Ghana like many other states south of the Sahara is has porous borders which make it easy for the inflow of foreigners from neighbouring countries. This allows international collaborators from neighbouring countries such as Togo to get involved in insurgent activities. **SP_Male***

*Other participants interviewed also indicated that ineffective manning of Ghana's borders and the existence of illegal routes from Togo and other places similar border issues, must be addressed to help prevent insurgent activities. **SP_Female***

The failure of Ghana's security agencies to protect the country's borders and control conflicts and the movement of persons at entry and exit points from the country is one of the reasons for the rise of insurgency in the country. "To combat insurgencies our borders must be protected"

The Military and police forces are active participants in virtually every one of the insurgent activities that erupts. The state security apparatus always deal with such incidents before they escalate.

4.3.4 Repercussion of Ghana's failure of early counter-insurgency

Some participants shared their views on the consequences of Ghana's failure to find counter insurgencies measures to deal with it decisively. Majority of respondents believed that it is the duty of the government to put in place counter insurgency measures that can help quell acts of insurgency in the country. They were of the view that failure to do so will threaten the security and territorial integrity of the country.

*Ghana's failure to decisively deal with the issues of insurgencies over the years, is likely to have a rippling effect on its sovereignty and security. Ghana must strictly consider that diasporas – immigrant communities established in foreign countries may play important role in creating and sustaining insurgent movements. **SP_Male***

Another respondent added:

*"The advancement of telecommunication and spread of social media make it easier for ethnics living abroad to reconnect and share issues of mutual concern. In situations where they cannot physically rebel themselves, they can contribute money that can be used for arms purchase, motivate fighters, feeding, and training. In some cases, these Diasporas help rebels to establish diplomatic relation and threaten our security". **SP_Female***

Other respondents also shared their views saying that:

If government does not take firm decisions to deal with insurgences in the country and particularly the Volta Region of Ghana, their activities will destabilize the country and bring Ghana to a status of failed state. Male_Political Party Rep.

Also there was expression of losing the peace of the country as narrated by some respondents:

“We must make sure not to trade the peace of the country. If these insurgents are allowed to have their way, they will subvert the peace of the country and this can be very dangerous. I believe this is not the time for government to negotiate with these insurgents. Negotiating with them means legitimizing their existence and that can give them some sort of power to continue to threaten the peace of the country” Male_Political Party Rep.

There could be an uprising of violence among the local population by directly getting involved in attacks. Therefore government must work hard to gain the support of the people. SP_Female.

Majority of people interviewed gave varying account about the effects of failing to put in some counter-insurgency measures.

If these violent attacks by the insurgents continue, it will plunge the region into a state of chronic food insecurity. The prices of food will continue to rise making it difficult for individuals and households to purchase sufficient and nutritious food for a healthy life. This will put individuals at the risk of hunger, starvation, malnutrition and even death”.

4.3.5 Responding to insurgency development

Responding to insurgent activities is very important in every country's quest to crack down on activities that has the potency of jeopardizing the existence of the state and its institutions. Interviewed participants in the communities perceive that it is important for the government to respond quickly to insurgencies in order to prevent their activities from gaining grounds.

Interviewers observed that:

*Once the insurgency has been established but still young and small, there should be measures to prevent them from further growth. This must involve the arrest of the master minds behind these insurgent activities. **Female_Political Party Rep.***

*"How should a weak state like Ghana respond to insurgency development? For me Ghana's attitude in dealing with recent insurgencies is characterized by pampering". Ghana must avoid pampering these insurgents at their early formative stage in order not to allow them grow wings. **Male_Political Party Rep.***

*"Ghana must adopt an appropriate response strategy at insurgents by effectively repressing them in their period of defenselessness (initial stage) so that they do not become strengthened with time and space." **Female_Political Party Rep.***

*Government must avoid not taking any significant action against insurgent groups. These rebels should be pursued for and crushed totally without deliberation to any form of negotiation. **Male_Political Party Rep.***

“...for it is important that Ghana keeps a very tight border in order to control the free movement of people. Considering the recent activities of the secessionist groups in the Volta region, one would believe that they harbour a tendency to destabilize the sovereignty of Ghana. This is how terrorist groups develop and for me I think Government must deal with them as terrorist groups and crush all their activities as soon as possible” **Female_Political Party Rep.**

“Government has to avoid accommodating insurgents demand whiles they are still infant. If government continue to accommodate them, it would signify that the Government is weak and this would open the floodgate for other aggrieved or greedy people to also make unnecessary claims” **SP_Male**

4.4 Summary of results

4.1 Introduction

This research sought to interrogate the insurgencies in Ghana, with particular emphasis on the recent insurgency by the Homeland Study Group (HSGF). The theory of Nation Security (TNS) was adopted to examine how the recent insurgent activity in the Volta Region fits into principles National Security perceived threats of insecurity of the country. Considering the prevalence of poverty and underdevelopment in the Volta Regions as cited by the HSGF, the study sought to find out “Insurgency and secession of the Volta Region from Ghana” The objectives of the study were to find out historical underpinnings of insurgency in the sub-Saharan Africa. It was also finding put the approach used by Ghana to combat insurgency and to explain the repercussion of

Ghana's failure of early counter-insurgency measures. Finally, to explain how Ghana should respond to insurgency. The outcome of the research is presented below.

The results indicate that there are some historical underpinnings to all insurgency situations in sub-Saharan Africa. This is highlighted by the colonial demarcation of the map of Africa. In West Africa, East Africa Central and South Africa, there have been pockets of insurgent activities which are mostly linked to Geo-ethnicity.

It is evident from the results that Ghana as a nation since independence has not faced any major insurgent situations that have threatened the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country. However, historical and recent activities in 2017 of the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF), a platform created to discuss the rights of the people of Western Togoland, announced its intention to declare the independence of the territory. The Western Togoland Restoration Front (WTRF), a political-military organization that openly advocates armed struggle against the Ghanaian government, was formed. In September 2020, it carried out a unilateral declaration of independence for a sovereign state of Western Togoland.

Furthermore, Participants shared the views on consequences of Ghana failure of counter-insurgency measures. Participants suggested that Ghana must avoid pampering insurgents groups but rather be very decisive to repress their activities in their infant stages. To them government must avoid engaging them in any negotiation because it will mean legitimizing their activities which will give rise to other people harbouring similar sentiments.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION

The Chapter sets the stage for discussion by providing a historical synopsis that constitutes an overview of insurgent activities in Ghana. It points out the state of Ghana's vulnerability to secession in the Volta Region formerly the Trans Volta Togoland, the historical antecedents, instances of secession of the Volta Region from Ghana, measures put in place to address them and the adequacy of those measures. This section discusses the key findings according to the study objectives.

5.1 Historical antecedents of insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere is faced with armed struggles that are in a constant state of change. As new technologies, strategies, ideas about the state, and pathways to resistance emerge, existing insurgencies adapt while new ones are created. Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of colonialism has been fighting upsurge of insurgencies. Insurgency situations in Sub-Saharan Africa are all rooted in some historical chronicles. The findings of this study indicate that there are historical underpinnings to insurgent activities in the sub region.

This finding is in consonance with a study by Loban and Dalton (2017). They are of the view that insurgencies continue to erupt in many nations of Africa. However, the techniques and intended purposes of contemporary insurgencies in Africa are evolutions of historical versions of insurgencies, long-standing strife among ethnic and political groups, and modern-era movements reflective of many past and current insurgencies that have occurred in Africa such as those of the horn of Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Nigeria, Cameroun including Mali, where West Africa's insurgency took root in 2012. Relatedly Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, (2020), examine the consequences of how Africa was historically partitioned between colonial powers and established

that partitioned ethnic groups suffered greater conflict compared to those which have not been impacted by the border partition.

5.2 Historical antecedents of insurgencies in Ghana

Although over the past decades there have been issues of land and chieftaincy disputes in some parts of the country, none has threatened the territorial integrity of the country than that of the insurgent activities of the Volta Region of Ghana. Insurgent activities in this region is rooted deep in the history of the then Trans Volta Togoland. This history has been highlighted by some participants and reference made to the 1956 plebiscite which eventually brought the Former British Togoland and the then Gold Coast together in Modern day Ghana after independence from British rule in 1957. This assertion corresponds with the study by Heise, (2021) Titled: United Nations Colonial Complicity in Decolonization Referenda: Un-Supervision of the 1956 Referendum in Western Togoland. The study confirms that the insurgent group HSGF have been campaigning for the separation of Ghana's Volta Region and parts of the Northern and Upper East Region to form the state of "Western Togoland", which the HSGF claimed existed before Ghana's independence in 1957 which is also highlighted in the study by (Osei, 2017). He confirms that 9 May 1956 was the day of the very first independence referendum under supervision of the United Nations (UN), which sealed the integration of the UN Trusteeship Territory of British (Western) Togoland into the colony of the British Gold Coast. The two amalgamated territories subsequently gained independence as Ghana in 1957. Contrary to historical evidence, the HSGF claims that although the 1956 referendum in British Togoland was rigged (Kudzordzi, 2018), it was still bound to a moratorium, which required an approval of the "union" between Ghana and Western (British) Togoland within 50 years; otherwise, the union would be void (Amenumey, 2016; Kudzordzi,

2018b). Until then, the people of Western Togoland would merely remain so-called "plebiscite citizens in Ghana" (Dzamboe, 2016).

In the case of the British Togoland crisis in Ghana, Heise, (2021) confirms that irredentist demands by Ewe ethnic nationalists predate the country's independence and that even though the United Nations (UN) General Assembly approved the union of the territory with the Gold Coast, based on the outcome of a 1956 UN plebiscite, successive governments in post-independence Ghana have had to deal with various shades of the same crisis. The resurgence of the same issue in 2020 and crises such as the Ambazonia conflict in Cameroon thus illustrate the failure of their management both at the national level and within the confines of Africa's declaration of the inviolability of colonial borders. They also show that secessionist tendencies, unless properly addressed, cannot be swept under the carpet.

5.3 What are the modern method to combat insurgencies?

Insurgencies are awfully challenging to defeat once they become deep-rooted. Combating insurgency require campaigns of extensive military, diplomatic, and economic resources over prolonged periods of time, and ultimately require resolution of some of the underlying political grievances that lead the insurgents to take up arms. A better approach is to prevent insurgencies from arising in the first place, and to prevent emerging insurgencies from taking root in local populations.

To defeat a tough and determined insurgent opponent, the enemy's weaknesses must be exploited. Insurgent forces often have exploitable weaknesses that increase their vulnerability. These weaknesses often include limited access to technology. Specifically, a lack of modern communications capabilities often hinder insurgent operations. This weakness deserves attention, because insurgent forces lacking communication capabilities are often vulnerable to a mobile and

versatile opposing force. Another exploitable insurgent weakness is logistical support owing to the lack of extensive popular and external support early in the conflict. Resupply of food can become particularly difficult for insurgent forces. Another insurgent weakness is the resupply of ammunition." Early in the conflict, the insurgent forces often rely on captured government forces arms and ammunition. Thus, adequate supplies become dependent on success in battle. As the insurgent forces equipment becomes sophisticated, continuous resupply of arms and ammunition becomes critical. These supplies are delivered through lines of communication. Resupply becomes an exploitable weakness because counterinsurgency forces can establish ambushes that interdict the enemy lines of communications. Thus area ambushes are essential tasks for counterinsurgency forces. To analyze mission essential task lists, one must comprehend the nature of the insurgency and the insurgent. Insurgencies require innovative approaches because of the political nature of the conflict. The government must solve the underlying political, economic, and social problems to gain popular support. The insurgent relies on popular support for success and survival. Consequently, the insurgent must be separated from the population. To accomplish this, government forces must defeat the enemy on the battlefield and eradicate the insurgent organization among the people (Reed, 2007). Thus, counterinsurgency forces must adapt their tactics in insurgencies.

5.4 What are the repercussions of Ghana's failure to recognize early counter-insurgency?

Lasting peace is an offshoot of lasting stability. There are many of factors that determine whether conditions become stabilized and peace realized or insurgency reemerges. Prolonged insurgent activities in the territory of every state, has a tendency to bring about negative repercussion to the state as well as affect its institutions and the populace in general. This corresponds with a study by

Humanitarian Needs Overview will that says that individuals are at the risk of hunger, starvation, malnutrition and even death. According to the 2015 Humanitarian Needs Overview (2014), “a SMART Survey conducted by the national government and UNICEF food and Nutrition insecurity are the fundamental threats to human security and the need to curb this insurgency cannot be overemphasized”. This presupposes that acts of prolonged insurgencies have rippling effect on the food and nutrition security of the people. When insurgencies become prolonged and deadlocked where insurgents are up in arms, it brings fear to the people. Therefore people are unable to go about with their normal activities. In agricultural rural communities, farmers and others involved in the food chain business find it very difficult to engage in their farm activities if insurgent activities are rife.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the health of the people is paramount. WHO Report on Violence and Health launched in October 2002 stated that each year, more than a million lives are lost and many more experience nonfatal injuries as a result of various forms of violence. Therefore, if government fails to adopt emergency counter insurgent measures against the HSGF in the Volta Region and other parts of the country, their activities will become violent and will claim lots of lives and also inflict injuries to people. This confirms a study done Pulse.ng, (2015) which found out that over 600 teachers have been killed as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency and as at 2013 the study reports again that over 882 classrooms in Borno State had been damaged and all schools were closed in Yobe state (Awortu, 2015).

5.5 How should Ghana respond to insurgency development?

A bipartisan approach is crucial and needed to tackle the issue of the insurgent secessionist activities in the Volta Region and any other that may rise up in Ghana. Rana, and Britton-Purdy,

J. (2020). Africa's framework for the management of secessionist claims and demands for self-determination which is anchored on the principles outlined in Article 2 of Resolution 16(1) of the 1964 Organization of African Unity's Cairo Declaration (Lizak, 2016). Lizak mentions that, in the declaration, African states pledged 'to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence'. This means all borders are held to be unchallengeable. Since independence, this is one of the few principles to which all African countries resolutely subscribe. It is worth to note that since 1964, African leaders have condemned all secession attempts including in Nigeria's Biafra, Senegal's Casamance, Angola's Caprivi and northern Mali's Azawad. They have also re-articulated their stance on the issue in Article 4(b) of the African Union's (AU) Constitutive Act. The establishment of the AU's border project is another indication of the seriousness with which African leaders view the issue. Ghana must therefore rally all African nations and to unanimously take a tough stance to reprimand any nation that overtly or covertly support insurgents in other countries to secede. This is very crucial as

Ghana's government claim to be dealing with it as the vice president declared "the area today they call Western Togoland must be a figment of their imagination. It does not exist. There is no legal basis for their claims. No negotiations with the insurgent (criminals) because there is only a thin line between insurgency and terrorism. Therefore states must avoid negotiation with these insurgents who want to undermine the geographical and territorial integrity of Ghana. Negotiation reward terrorists for violent behavior as well as due to terrorists' inability to form credible commitments, a distrust that they will honor their promise. In dealing with rebels, it is not about what you say after they strike but what you do to them at the period of calm because they are preparing to come hit and run. It must be advised that repression strategy would be more appropriate at this early stage of rebels' growth. It can effectively use repression only at this stage

of rebels' vulnerability and if it pays lip service and allows this period to pass, it will have no choice than to accommodate which would involve some unpalatable political and economic costs. Effective repression, or else, rebels become strengthened with time and space. Rather than paying lip service, rebels should be sought for and crushed completely without consideration to any form of negotiation. Insurgents through external supporters including indigenous wealthy individuals those in the Diasporas, states also provides the most significant support and remain the most active supporter of insurgents although Diasporas support maybe more reliable.

Providing a safe haven for rebels to recruit and train is essential and only a state can provide it. If rebels have sanctuary where they can hide from government capture, hit and run will be easier and their activities will grow. Money is no doubt also important form of support needed for rebel operationalization and sustenance. Therefore the government of Ghana through proper information gathering must endeavour to stifle the financial source for the activities of all insurgent groups that may arise in the country. According to Diatta et al. (2020), Africa's tough stance against secession has ensured that state boundaries on the continent have remained more or less the same since the end of colonial rule, with the exception of Sudan and Ethiopia, despite the continent's many internal diversity management challenges. In order to protect the territorial integrity of Ghana and also safeguard the survival status as a one country, the country must therefore take a tough stance against any secession tendencies that is by haboured by any insurgent group in the country as asserted by (Diatta et al. 2020).

Calls for Western Togoland's independence are untenable yet understandably linked to the region's deprivation. The government of Ghana must as a matter of urgency enact Political and economic reforms to address the region's development aspirations and as noted by Haruna (2020),

this would not be far-reaching but reduce the structural triggers for insurgent secessionist development.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter is on the summary of major findings of the study in relation to the objectives of the research. It points out the state of Ghana's vulnerability to secession in the Volta Region formerly the Trans Volta Togoland, the historical antecedents, instances of secession of the Volta Region from Ghana, measures put in place to address them and the adequacy of those measures. The chapter also deals with the conclusions drawn from the findings and some recommendations. These are discussed below.

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are given:

The threat of insurgency does not seem to be a significant issue in Ghana but must be given maximum attention. However, the government needs to critically look into the reasons for the emergence of insurgency and close such gaps. Political, religious, Socio-economic issues such as poverty, unemployment, ethnic and religious discrimination are drivers and indicators for the rise in terrorism. Creating more jobs with a better pay system for sectors of the population of Ghanaians will help curb the high level of poverty prevalent in some regions and societies where poverty is rife. As poverty is one of the main reasons people join insurgents, there's a need for government to come up with schemes to alleviate poverty in some regions particularly Volta Region, Upper East, Upper West, Northern and Western North Regions. Building the capacity of entrepreneurs in these poverty stricken regions through the provision of funds and a revitalization of the educational system to incorporate the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) fields. This will enable the up and coming youth to gain employable skills thereby

bridging the unemployment gap in the societies of the aforementioned regions and reducing poverty. A system of checks and balances should take precedence in the political arena of the Ghanaian society and the political grassroots must deeply be involved in the polity of their respective communities. Ethnocentric and tribal preferences must be discouraged. One of the ways to ensure that tribal and ethnic discrimination is discouraged is through the various leaders of communities and religious bodies coming together to show a unified front and take a stand against discrimination of any kind. There is the need for the government to reassure citizens, especially children, the youth, women and the elderly of their safety and security. The government must affirm its commitment to protecting the fundamental human rights of its citizens especially the communities found in the trans Volta Togoland which is now Volta Region of Ghana after the 1956 plebiscite .

The issue of insurgency and its subsequent agitation for secession of the Volta Region from Ghana which have been lingering on and resurfacing from time to time makes a clarion call on the government to review and explore new ways of addressing the issue. There is need for a clear and coherent national policy on insurgent activities. Akin to this, a well-trained anti-insurgency and or anti-secession squad must be created from the Ghana Army, Air Force, Navy, Police, Immigration, BNI and other State Security Services. The role of these security organizations must be clearly stated in order to prevent duplicity and conflict of functions. This is necessary and critical to Ghana's preparedness to contain the development and spread of insurgency groups harbouring the idea of secession from Ghana. There is also the need for sensitivity when it comes to cultural differences and values. Government institutions and the media must respect and acknowledge the plurality of the cultural environment in Ghana and reinforce border security measures to better prepare them for insurgencies. It is also vital that they do not underestimate the ability of secession

insurgent groups to regenerate and reinvent themselves and must therefore maintain high level border security at all times.

Conclusion

Usually, insurgencies begin for a reason. There could be reasons of injustice, or alleged injustice, that has not been, cannot be, or will not be addressed by the government. This impasse leads the most radical factions within the populace usually to some form of violence or armed resistance. The core belief that their cause is righteous (whether it is or not) stiffens the tenacity of the cadre and creates a powerful foundation upon which to fuel the passions of the general public. Regarding the history of The Trans Volta Togoland, if this situation were easily resolvable, one could argue that the insurgency would have never started in the first place. But by virtue of the existence of the insurgent movement, to this day, the government has not properly prevented the crisis from escalating nor set the conditions for peacefully resolving it. The insurgents enjoy the initial momentum. They have freedom of action; choosing the Ghana's government claim to be dealing with it as the vice president declared "the area today they call Western Togoland must be a figment of their imagination. It does not exist. There is no legal basis for their claims. No negotiations! With those criminals?" Of course, as terrorism is a subordinate dimension of insurgency, states hope to avoid negotiation with terrorists because negotiation reward terrorists for violent behavior as well as due to terrorists' inability to form credible commitments, a distrust that they will honor their promise. In dealing with rebels, it is not about what you say after they strike but what you do to them at the period of calm because they are preparing to come hit and run. It must be advised that repression strategy would be more appropriate at this early stage of rebels' growth. It can effectively use repression only at this stage of rebels' vulnerability and if it pays lip service and

allows this period to pass, it will have no choice than to accommodate which would involve some unpalatable political and economic costs.

The historical antecedents and recent upspring of secessionism in Ghana, underpins comparative deficiency as a core incentive. Indeed, this is highlighted by Haruna (2020) suggesting that such deprivation has been the driving force behind similar secessionist claims in nearby Western Cameroon. In his view, a sustainable and conclusive response requires a bi-partisan consensus on political reforms that divulge significant political and economic powers to the various 16 regions. Political decentralization or devolution theoretically promotes inclusive political processes and stimulates interdependence between sub-national units and central government (Nantharath, et al. 2020). When accompanied by a significant transfer of political and economic resources, devolution can promote local development (Nyikadzino and Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2020). However, Haruna (2020) asserts that “these forms of decentralization are lacking in Ghana, though there may be requirements to, at least, compensate the ex-Western Togoland territory (including the Volta Region) for the missed political union. Nevertheless, since the ex-Western Togoland regions would not be the only beneficiaries of such reforms, progressive resource distribution, taking into consideration their relative neglect, may leave secessionists with little or no room to make further demands.”

Notwithstanding the recent dynamics, Haruna (2020) suggest that the secessionist demands of the creation of Western Togoland is not feasible. He notes that distinct Ewe ethnic groups in south-Western Togoland (part of Volta Region) have invariably refused to pursue this goal. Suffice to say that the “*majority of the ethnic groups and regions that constitute Western Togoland (including Oti Region, parts of Northern, North East and Upper East Regions) have been silent on Western Togoland’s restoration. Even within the Volta Region, the secessionist movements appear to have*

weak local support as chiefs in the region have condemned their actions”. Consequently, for the Government concerned with Ghana’s territorial integrity, negotiating with these groups may legitimize their claims with the potential of overturning the outcomes of the 1956 Plebiscite (Nartey 2022) yet, Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh, (2022) these groups, as Acheampong did in 1972, would constitute a righting response that does not address the structural questions.

Though the Volta Region has seen modest tangible investments, among others, the establishment of a university and a yet-to-be opened airport (anecdotal), these have not visibly transformed into enhancing the region’s relative socio-economic deprivation. Invariably, insurgent secessionist demands partly echo in-built feelings of neglect by successive governments, climaxed by political events in the last four years under the current New Patriotic Party (NPP) government. These events include the creation of the Oti Region out of the Volta Region in 2018 Akufo-Addo, (2019) and the inadvertent omission of the region’s roads from the 2020 budget presented before parliament in November 2019. Events lamented by the HSGF and exploiting this caveat as evidence of economic neglect, which led to the failed declaration of independence later that year.

Recommendation

Hassan (2014) stresses that establishing security for the people is the first step to counterinsurgency. It presupposes that no nation is secured if it does not guarantee the security of its citizens” (Danjibo, 2012:487). In essence there should be pragmatic measures towards ensuring the security of all citizens.

Secessionist demands are evidence to the fact that relations among groups in a particular state are unequal Balcells, et al (2021) and Ikeanyibe, et al (2021) is of the view that the management of secessions in Africa is very much a governance issue. The rise of secessionist movements raises questions about an underlying crisis of legitimacy linked to governance deficits, equitable

distribution of resources and equal political representation of marginalized groups. Good governance in such countries is, thus, a major preventive management option, rather than the use of the military. Therefore:

- There should be political consensus in Ghana about threats to territorial integrity and its complicated matters. The politicization and militarization of situations that could otherwise be resolved peacefully must be avoided and rather encourage dialogue
- To defeat insurgents at this stage, government must be able to identify potential rebels through intelligence and apply coercion because “if government forces. Thus, rebels’ survival beyond the period of vulnerability is a function of government’s willingness and desire to apply effective repression.
- The threat of insurgency continues to be a significant issue in the Volta Region of Ghana. Therefore, the government needs to critically look into the reasons for the emergence of insurgents and close such gaps. Socio-economic, political and socio-cultural issues such as poverty, unemployment and ethnic discrimination are drivers and indicators for the rise in insurgency with the aim of seceding from Ghana. Creating more sustainable jobs with a better pay system will help curb the high level of poverty prevalent in the Volta Region. As poverty and underdevelopment is one of the main reasons of the insurgency. Building the capacity of entrepreneurs through the provision of funds and a revitalisation of the educational system to incorporate the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) fields. This will enable the up and coming youth to gain employable skills thereby bridging the unemployment gap in the Volta Region and reducing poverty

- The government should ensure that the basic needs of man's survival are met. There is need to invest in the agricultural sector in order to improve food production, create sustainable jobs for the people. This will help solve the issue of poverty in the region.
- Provide the citizens with adequate protection from insurgents and to ensure that the security forces given such responsibilities do not fall victims of the same crime or engage in the violation of the citizens human rights. Every counter measure undertaken by the Government will also only be effective if issues of poverty and development of the area are addressed.
- Insurgency is a global phenomenon and a global solution cannot be overemphasized. The government should strengthen their collaboration with the global community in combating the activities of insurgents

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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE

The interview is being conducted to gain information from experts in the security field as well as the judiciary on the subject of insurgency to assist me in the completion of my thesis on “Insurgency in the sub-Saharan Africa: key challenges of intelligence information handling and strategies to combat related crime at the University of

The respondent is guaranteed of code of ethics including confidentiality and anonymity on any information given. Counting on your cooperation.

Name of Respondent.....

Institution of Respondent.....

Title of Respondent.....

Date of Interview.....

The following list of interview guide organized to represents the questions used to conduct the interviews necessary to support the research:

General Questions

1. What is insurgency?
2. What is the dynamics of insurgency in Ghana?
3. Is the current trend of insurgency in influenced by ethnicity or there are other underlying factors that is making Ghana
4. What are some of the measures the Ghana government need to adopt in order to combat insurgency? What are the challenges encountered by the government in containing the threat posed insurgent groups
5. Do you think insurgents are a problem in Ghana?
6. Do you think that insurgent activities are more of a problem in recent times?
7. Can you enumerate some historical antecedents of insurgencies in Ghana?
8. In your opinion is Ghana taking any unified approach to fight or prevent insurgencies? Can you give some examples?

9. What are some of the modern approaches being used by Ghana to prevent insurgencies
10. What will happen if Ghana fails to adopt counter insurgency measures?
11. How should Ghana respond to insurgency development?
12. Must insurgents be pampered in Ghana?
13. What is the role of the judiciary and security forces in the fight against insurgencies
14. Is the communication among government agencies effective to curb insurgencies?
 - a. within the police department?
 - b. With other law enforcement agencies?
 - c. With the city officials?
 - d. With the public?

Security

1. In your opinion how important is security for Ghana?
2. In your opinion is Ghana a secure state?
3. What strengthens security and what weakens security of Ghana?
4. In your opinion what are some indicators of insecurity in Ghana?
5. What are some steps taken or being taking to combat insecurity of Ghana due to insurgencies?