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**THE NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN GHANA'S
PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS:
A PERCEPTION OR FACT?**

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DECLARATION

I, Gideon Asamoah Tetteh declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as a result of my own original research, entitled “**THE NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN GHANA'S PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS: A PERCEPTION OR FACT?**” and has been prepared under the valuable guidance and supervision towards the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy and Administration at the Selinus University of Sciences and Literature.

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ABSTRACT

Corruption is an invaluable hindrance to Africa's equitable economic growth, and it is a systemic threat to development in Africa of which Ghana is no exception. Although Ghana is largely hailed as a pinnacle of democracy and good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, the pace and commitment of the country to fight against corruption have been unsuccessful and disappointing. Not only does corruption remain endemic in Ghana, but evidence also suggests that the problem is worsening within various public organizations. The study sought to investigate normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector and assess the prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana and establish whether corruption in public sector organizations is a perception or fact. The study employed mixed method to collect primary data from public sector workers of selected public sector organizations in Accra using questionnaire and the public using interviews. The study has shown that there is high prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations and that corruption has adverse political, social, and economic effects on the country. The study concludes that corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana is a fact and this due to institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. Consequently, the established that robust and coordinated anti-corruption interventions play a significant role in fighting corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

| | |
|-------|---|
| ACI | Anti-Corruption Interventions |
| APSA | Active Private Sector Actors |
| CDD | Ghana Centre for Democratic Governance |
| CPI | Corruption Perception Index |
| CSOs | Civil Society Organizations |
| DVLA | Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority |
| GIPSS | Ghana Integrity Initiative Public Services Survey |
| INS | Institutionalization |
| OECD | Organizations of Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OLS | Ordinary Least-Squares |
| ORC | Office of the Registrar of Companies |
| RAT | Rationalization |
| SOC | Socialization |
| SPSS | Statistical Package for Social Science |
| SPW | Strong Political Will. |
| TI | Transparency International |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| VIF | Variance Inflation Factor |

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The term corruption originates from the Latin word, "corruptus," which translates as "corrupted". In the context of law, refers to a misuse of a trusted position within one of the strands of power namely the executive power, legislative power, and judicial power, or within the political context or other organizations having the intent of obtaining any material benefits that are illegally justified for either oneself or others (Sumah, 2018). Corruption was first mentioned in the Bible as a major sin: "You must not accept a bribe, for a bribe blinds clear-sighted men and can distort the words of righteous men" (Exodus 23:8 - *New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures*).

Nevertheless, the roots of corruption can be traced back to the origins of law and the state, and it has been regarded as an evil that undermined public administration and the effective operation of a democratic system. The first allusion to corruption dates to the thirteenth century BC, during the Assyrian civilization. The archaeologists deduced how and who took bribes from the discovered cuneiform plates. Corruption was described as offering, receiving, or claiming to gain the favour of officials regarding their duties under Roman law (Sumah, 2018). Because of the high level of corruption in the country, this law was reinforced by an amendment that anticipated restitution for damage in the amount of the damage, as well as the extinction of political power for the perpetrator of the corrupt act. However, this failed to reduce corruption, especially because corruption was most prevalent among lawmakers and top state officials, both in Rome and in the rural Roman provinces (Kaufmann & Gray, 1998).

The early Christian faith condemned corruption, but corruption later developed greatly in ecclesiastical structures, reaching its apex through the promoting of indulgences in the Middle Ages, all until Martin Luther condemned the latter as well as other wrongdoing of the clergy, with the Pope at the helm of the Reformation. Aside from condemning corruption, the Reformation resulted in a split with the previously dominating Catholic population and the creation of Protestant tenets. Consequently, while corruption has existed in human society from its inception, it has only recently been given increased attention. Research on the issue and its harmful consequences became more widespread following 1995 after countries and international organizations became aware of the problem. Until then, the public's attitude toward corruption was neutral (Kaufmann & Grey, 1998).

Corruption is a major global problem. Policymakers at all levels, international organizations, and academics are all worried about the consequential effects of corruption on both the economy and the business landscape (Awasthi and Bayraktar, 2015). Corruption remains a widespread problem not only in so-called underdeveloped countries and civilizations, but also in industrialized nations such as Europe, America, Japan, and the former Soviet Union, despite institutional and cultural disparities. Some authors have suggested that corruption is pervasive in third-world countries, but data has revealed that corruption is also present in developed countries, and each government, whether developing or developed, devises appropriate methods to combat corruption (Xie et al., 2017).

Even though corruption is widespread, according to Egwakhe Johnson (2007), corruption settings of institutional actors are totally separate and independent, making it easier to legitimately describe the degree of casualty or precedence that exists between the perpetrator and the recipient or beneficiary. Extractive corruption arose because of the bureaucratic system.

Critical examination demonstrates that corruption occurs when institutional decision-makers use their political or institutional power to design and perpetuate their self-interest, power, position, and riches. The extractive behaviour of the agents evolves towards avoiding the iron shackles of the law, establishing a contingent reciprocal environment existing between the agent(s) and the law offender. Afolabi (2007) and Obasanjo (2004) identified several types of corruption as fee fraud (known as 419), money laundering, weird and dubious trade practices, misuse or diverting funds, kickbacks, under and over-invoicing, extortion, unsubstantiated declarations, misuse of power, and collection of unlawful fees. Other contextual connotations include a breach of integrity, morality, or moral ideals, as well as the unauthorized use of resources for personal advantage. Agbaje (2004), in contextualizing corruption within the domain of the public service, mentioned reasons such as the pervasion of public regulations and the misuse of official power for self-interest, as well as the frustration of the electoral process, which makes free and fair elections difficult. Other kinds of corruption to him include the willful reluctance to declare one's assets upon the ascension of power and expiration of public office, as well as the use of one's official status to obstruct the administration of justice, which is prevalent among executives (past and present).

As measures in fighting corruption in Ghana, the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) as amended, the Public Financial Management Act 2016 (Act 921), and the Internal Audit Agency Act 2003 (Act 658) among others encourage accountability in the public sector and work to prevent corruption. Companies and individuals found guilty of wrongdoing are forbidden from bidding in the future for up to five years. Under the law, corruption is considered a criminal offence. This is contained in Section 179c of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29), Using Public Office for Profit (Republic of Ghana, 2012). Efforts to combat corruption have been

made in several African countries over the years. For example, the Whistleblowers Act (Act 720) (Republic of Ghana, 2006) provides protection to people/workers who disclose any sort of misconduct. There are also the Conflict-of-Interest Guidelines (CHRAJ, 2006), and the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) of Ghana. Furthermore, significant entities designated to combat corruption and money laundering in Ghana include the Financial Intelligence Centre, the Economic and Organized Crime Office, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Moreover, while there is a Whistleblowers' Act, which was introduced in 2006 to safeguard witnesses in corruption cases from punishment when they come forward and disclose relevant information, it is rarely enforced because potential informants commonly fear losing their well-paid jobs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

It is imperative to state that the implementation of the relevant legislations is lacking (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; GAN Integrity, 2020). A UN study issued in February 2015 emphasized the government's incapacity to enforce anti-corruption policies and prosecute offenders efficiently (Freedom House 2016). According to a UN study on corruption in Ghana, more than eight out of ten people in Ghana had at least contact with public officials, and more than a quarter of those who had contact with public officials paid bribes to them (UN, 2022). Furthermore, the survey revealed that half of those who pay bribes to public officials in Ghana do it to speed up processes or guarantee the completion of the processes (UN, 2022). It is imperative, therefore, to emphasize that corruption remains a scourge in Ghanaian society, and combating it is a major task for the government, business, civil society, and all citizens. Therefore, the question that begs for an answer is how corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations is normalized.

It is important to note that addressing this hypothetical question, requires further interrogation as to whether corruption is viewed as a normal phenomenon in public sector organizations. In this regard, According to Ashforth and Anand (2003), institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization all contribute to the normalization of corruption within the social realm of work, hence reducing doubts and guilt. However, occurrences that eliminate the distinction between work specific and society's universal principles may highlight this clash of normative systems and produce ambiguity. A clear line, on the other hand, allows people and groups to cognitively partition their micro and macro worlds, allowing them to accomplish whatever they choose. Admitting the existence of the problem is surely a solution to the problem (Castro, Phillips & Ansari, 2020). The most critical steps in problem-solving are effectively identifying the problem and understanding its underlying causes. There have been several models suggesting policy solutions for fighting corruption, such as establishing a system that prevents corrupt transactions from happening (Byrne, Anne-Katrin, & Fumiko, 2010). As a result, an essential problem with perception is the fact that it may be a skewed depiction of reality. Whenever perception-based and experience-based studies are investigated, large disparities in perception and real experiences of corruption were discovered (Trapnell, 2015).

Despite these grave consequences of corruption, present study indicates that in many organizations, corruption is regarded as "normal." This happens whenever corruption is taken for granted, tolerated, and practiced daily, according to Ashforth and Anand (2003). This can happen when corruption is institutionalized in daily routines and structures, when people rationalize corruption to relieve themselves of any responsibility/guilt, or when immigrants are socialized to view corruption as normal and desirable. Such normalization mechanisms are strengthened by secrecy and a state of isolation in which actors are socially covered up (Greil

& Rudy, 1984) from non-corrupt others, resulting in a moral microcosm that would probably die off outside of the organization (Brief et al., 2001). As a result, secrecy is a critical factor in normalizing corruption in organizations (Yu et al., 2018).

Based on the foregoing, this study examines corruption in public sector organizations by advancing the existing literature and answering the question of whether corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations is "normal", perception or fact. The study seeks to do this by collecting evidence-based data to determine the prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations, its typologies and prescribe measures for policymaking and practice necessary for curbing the menace.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Corruption is an invaluable hindrance to Africa's equitable economic growth. It denies the poor basic socio-economic rights and needs. Corruption is a systemic threat to development in Africa of which Ghana is no exception. Although Ghana is largely hailed as a pinnacle of democracy and good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, the pace and commitment of the country to fight against corruption have been unsuccessful and disappointing (Boateng, 2018).

Not only does corruption remain endemic in Ghana, but evidence also suggests that the problem is worsening within various public organizations, including especially those responsible for combating the menace. According to the most recent Afrobarometer study, conducted in 2019, 75% of the Ghanaian people believe corruption incidences have increased. Corruption has spread like chronic cancer in Ghana, harming the next generation and the nation (Boateng, 2018). According to Integrity International (2018), the Ghanaian economy losses up to US\$3 billion each year due to corruption. This estimate was corroborated by the 2021 study by the

Ghana Integrity Initiative Public Services Survey (GIPSS), which revealed that GHS5 billion in bribes were paid to public officials in only 2021 (GII, 2022). The country's score on corruption has incrementally declined over time, showing that corruption incidences in Ghana are growing and worsening. For instance, according to the 2022 Afrobarometer study, around 77% of Ghanaians said corruption had worsened, indicating increase from 53% in 2019. In addition, 65% of Ghanaians believe that most public officers are corrupt. Most citizens, at all levels, hold negative attitudes towards the Presidency, the Judiciary, the Legislature (Parliament), the Electoral Commission, Civil Service officials, and other public sector organizations (Ghana Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD), 2022). Evidently, there exists a lack of public trust in many of the public sector organizations, which is an indication of moral deterioration in state institutions. Corruption has become so ubiquitous in Ghanaian society that it has become a norm rather than an exception (Boateng, 2018).

According to the 2021 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Ghana scored 43 out of 100 points and ranked 73 out of 180 countries in the index. In 2022, Ghana scored 43 out of 100 and ranked 72 of 180 countries. These pieces of evidence suggest that Ghana failed in making progress in the battle against corruption in 2021 and 2022 (Transparency International, 2022). Although Ghana has a comprehensive legislative framework and strong institutional structure for detecting and prosecuting corruption-related cases, investigations and prosecutions are not effective. Ghana does not aggressively pursue a policy of tackling corruption in the country (Boateng, 2018). Corruption is estimated to cost Ghana approximately USD 4 billion per year (Asomah, 2021), endangering citizens' human rights. This is because the wasted funds could have been channeled towards investments that would have helped to provide social services such as health and education that address the basic needs of the people (Asomah, 2021). It is

revealed that little has been done and accomplished in comparison to the significant efforts to combat corruption (Boateng, 2018).

A noteworthy outcome is that corrupt people do not see themselves as corrupt and consequently regard the corrupt act as normal (Benson, 1985; Cressey, 1953). In effect, institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization contribute to the normalization of corruption within the social realm of work, hence reducing doubts and guilt. Empirically, extant literature exists on corruption perception and corruption indicators and indeed, perception studies are relevant in the fight against corruption. Nevertheless, there are extra benefits when actual corruption experiences of individuals are added. Some of these studies include the Corruption Perception Index, Eurobarometer, Global Corruption Barometer, and Afrobarometer surveys, to name a few. These experiences come from either direct or indirect sources. Both direct and indirect experiences from respondents throughout a study aid in bridging any gaps and avoiding any bias caused by perception studies (Erlingsson & Kristinsson, 2020). The importance of numerous corruption perception indicators is apparent, but the question is how to reconcile these with actual actions and outcomes in combating corruption. Perception studies have limits. There is nonetheless the risk that, relying on public perception as an underpinning for policy recommendations may undermine the credibility of the research investigation. Most often than not, officers in public sector organizations may tend to defend their organizations' reputation. In terms of corruption, what respondents believe may not always represent what occurs (Castro, Phillips, & Ansari, 2020). There is, therefore, a gap between corruption perception and reality (Castro, Phillips, & Ansari, 2020).

Furthermore, corruption has been frequently defined as the exploitation of public office for private benefit and this has prompted policymakers and scholars to treat corruption as a

principal-agent problem. However, as much as this argument holds in a way, corruption involves public and private actors engaging in corrupt activity to enhance their personal interests (Mistree & Dibley, 2018). In this regard, fighting corruption from the principal-agent perspective is inconclusive (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Likewise, many have argued that the reliance on the collective action theory has not yielded significant positive results in the fight against corruption (Castro, Phillips, & Ansari, 2020).

In bridging the aforementioned gaps, this study seeks to provide an empirical exposition on whether formalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations is a perception or fact. The study attempts to do this by applying the principal-agent theory and collective action theory. It is critical to recognize that the true difficulty of combating corruption is that it poses both principal-agent and collective action issues (Naidoo, 2013; Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Certain types of corruption may be best addressed using the principal-agent paradigm at times, while others may be better phrased in collective action theory (Castro, Phillips, & Ansari, 2020).

Bridging the empirical gaps, in an attempt to curbing corruption in Ghana, the study will employ the Ashforth and Ananad (2003) framework for normalization of corruption and advance on the principal-agent theory and collective action theory to map out applicable anti-corruption interventions for public sector organizations in Ghana.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general goal of this study is to examine normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector and assess the prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana and establish whether corruption in public sector organizations is a perception or fact.

. The study seeks to address the following specific objectives:

1. To assess the prevalence and typologies of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.
2. To examine the fundamental factors for normalization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.
3. To evaluate the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.
4. To determine whether normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations is a perception or fact.
5. To examine the mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana.

1.4 Research Questions

1. What is the prevalence and typologies of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana?
2. What are the fundamental factors for normalization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana?
3. What are the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana?
4. Is corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations a perception or fact?
5. What are the mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study is considered significant in that, corruption is considered an endemic socioeconomic phenomenon in a country and it has become a critical issue due to its negative consequential effects on the moral fabric of the society, its people and the country at large. Corruption is a major hindrance to economic and human resource development of every nation. Therefore,

providing pieces of solid evidence on the extent of corruption, whether it is regarded as a social norm, its pernicious effects and how to collectively fight the canker. In effect, they will help galvanise effective anti-corruption measures based on evidence-based investigations in driving the crusade of “zero tolerance of corruption” in public sector organization and Ghana in general.

1.6 Contributions of the Study

This study contributes to three different contexts, thus, policymaking, practice, and research. Regarding policy, the study will provide useful information for guiding policymaking in the public sector. In effect, the findings from the study will serve as benchmark measures for developing sound and effective policies and strategies for fighting corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. Thus, policymakers in public sector organizations will find the outcome and recommendations of this investigation useful, in terms of getting better understanding on prevalence, causes, normalization and effects of corruption and how to devise strategies to fight the problem of corruption in public sector organizations.

In terms of practice, the implication of this study would help public sector organizations in positively influencing the behaviour of public officials as well as public organizations to reverse the harmful normalization of corruption. Thus, it will help public sector organizations to develop the most effective intervention strategies for curbing corruption in their organizations.

Furthermore, this study adds to the design of a plan for eradicating corruption by proposing solutions for de-normalizing corruption in Ghana's public sector, allowing resources to be deployed more effectively and efficiently to ameliorate the problem. As a result of dismantling corruption. In effect, the study will recommend anti-normalization techniques to ensure that existing resources are deployed effectively and efficiently to areas that will yield long-term

advantages so that they are not wasted through corrupt practices. The study will also be useful to the public in raising their awareness about the effects of corruption as well as in deepening their understanding of how they can also help in fighting the canker.

In terms of a body of knowledge, the study will also act as a steppingstone for scholars who wish to conduct additional research on the subject. This study will be a vital source of information for future researchers who will want to advance on normalization of corruption in public sector organizations.

1.7 Definitions of Key Terms

To have a better understanding of the topic and its related concepts within the context of this study, the following key terms are defined:

Corruption – the abuse of public office or authority for private/personal, or organizational gain.

Corruption perception - the extent of belief of the levels of corruption in the public sector.

Normalization of corruption – A process or system or mechanism where corruption is routinely taken-for-granted, accepted, and practiced. That is, when corruption becomes institutionalized in practices and structures, when individuals rationalize their actions to relieve their responsibility/guilt, or where newcomers are socially conditioned to view corruption as permissible and/or essential practice of the "day".

Public sector - refers to any state institution where government activity is carried out.

Fact – An act that is known or proven to be true or exists.

1.8 Scope of the Study

In terms of contextual underpinning, the scope of the study was confined to investigating the prevalence of corruption, corruption typologies, normalization of corruption, effects of corruption, and perception or fact of normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector.

Geographically, the study was conducted in Accra which is the capital town of the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. Accra is the seat of government and where all the public sector organizations in Ghana are headquartered. The study focused on three public sector organizations, namely the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA), the Passport Office and the Office of the Registrar of Companies (ORC).

To help provide an in-depth understanding of the extent of corruption in terms of statistics, the study used secondary data generated by Transparency International which covered 23-year period from 2000 to 2022.

1.9 Limitation of the Study

It is important to indicate that studies on corruption have its own limitations. There exists always a possibility that relying on public perception as the foundation for recommendations for policy may undermine the reliability of the study. When it comes to the public sector, officials may tend to defend the reputation of their organizations. Nonetheless, the high ethical considerations observed in this study and the data contributed by the study participants were adequate and relevant in addressing the research questions. Moreover, the variables and data outcomes used in the study satisfied the validity and reliability criteria. Furthermore, due to the sensitivity of the issue of corruption, the study was constrained by a low sample size, but this did not affect the findings of the study.

1.10 Structure of the Study

The study is divided into five chapters, with each chapter addressing a different aspect of the research. The first chapter, Chapter One, attempts to introduce the research. This chapter includes the background pertaining to issues corruption, general and specific objectives, and research questions to be addressed, significance of the study, scope, limitations and organization of the study. The second chapter is a Literature Review which provides an in-depth overview of the theories and concepts of corruption. The chapter also examines pertinent empirical studies on the subject at hand. The chapter offers a conceptual framework that serves as a guide for the study based on the literature reviews and theories thereon. The third chapter gave a methodological context of the research which explains the methods employed in the study and the justifications for choosing a particular method. These include the philosophical underpinning, research design, approach, and technique. It also describes the target population, sampling process, data type, research instruments, and data analysis procedure. The findings from the field are discussed in the fourth chapter. It also discusses the results of the study. The conclusions and recommendations are presented in the fifth chapter. It also provides suggestions for furthering knowledge on the subject matter or in related fields of research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a review based on theoretical and empirical literature and places the study in context. The review identifies and discusses scholarly contributions to the research area and forms a basis for the current research. The first part of the chapter reviews the literature on policy implementation.

2.1 Conceptual Review

2.1.1 The Concept of Corruption

The term corruption may be traced to the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, where it was alluded to a procedure through which government degenerates into another kind of governance due to a lack of virtue and laws. This transition in governance was thought to be bad, and it was frequently followed by violence and turmoil. Plato and Aristotle underlined the supremacy of rules and the critical need for a proportional distribution of power in governments. Corruption became thus equated with the inability to preserve this government-to-government equilibrium. When the law is subject to another power and possesses no authority of its own, then the country is on the verge of collapse; but when the law serves as the master of the government and the government agencies is its slave, the circumstances is full of promise, as well as men find delight in all the blessings that the gods lavish on a state (Plato in *The Laws*, 346 B.C./1888).

Plato felt that rules and educated leaders were crucial to state leadership. Aristotle also felt that legislation should support just ideals in the common good for all people, rather than just a few. Governments which consider the common good are formed in accordance with strict rules of

justice, and thus are accurate forms; however, governments that consider only the rulers' interests are all defective and perverted forms, as they are considered despotic (Aristotle in *The Politics*, Book III, 1279a/95). Polybius (200-120 B.C.) is well remembered for advocating for a devolution of powers in democratic power. He maintained that gaining excessive power (political, money-related; or military) should result in expulsion from the polis (*polis-a city state in ancient Greece*). Polybius similarly argued that corruption constituted an unavoidable result of "constitutional upheavals" in which a particular style of government evolved.

Different people, notably social scientists, interpret the notion differently. As a result, its consequences for the international community's various geopolitical zones are moot. Corruption, like most notions in social sciences, falls under the category of highly contestable concepts, as defined by Gallie. As a result, the definition which could have been attached can be analyzed and limited. Onigu Otite described corruption as "the twisting of integrity or conduct, either bribery; favour, or sexual depravity... societal impurity" (quoted in Okafor, 2009). Corruption is defined by Lipset and Lenz (2000) as an effort to preserve power or wealth employing illicit techniques for personal gain at public expense (Fagbadebo, 2007).

David (2012) defines corruption as a culture that is practiced worldwide and is even ingrained in practically all segments of society, with the majority of individuals deeply participating in it. It is a worldwide evil that has engulfed human understanding in its social setting. It deliberates unjustified profits on a few persons in violation of societal legal and moral norms. It hinders the government's efforts to provide prosperity for all residents because the finances to do so are concentrated in the hands of a few in society (David, 2012).

Nkom (1982) defines corruption as the distortion of the public good for private gain. Nkom also believed that corruption included bribery or the utilization of unauthorized gifts to influence

persons in positions of authority to behave or decline to act in manners that benefit the giver's personal advantage and later that of the recipient. It involves the theft of resources and money from the public for personal gain, nepotism, and so on. In a similar spirit, Doig (1996) defined corruption as the use of official positions, or official resources for personal gain, or a potential conflict of interest involving the public good and private benefit. This involves wrongdoing by public officials and is normally addressed by a range of internal regulations. According to the definition given above, corruption is the distortion of the public good for private gain. Bribery, payoff, misuse, misapplication, or the use of one's position to gain an unfair benefit are all examples of corruption in this context. Thus, any transaction that violates a public office holder's responsibility and is intended to acquire or amass resources illegally for personal gain and self-gratification is considered an act of corruption. In other words, any intentional deviant activity for personal gain is a corrupt act.

Gibbons (1976) defines corruption within the context of politics and argues that corruption in politics is defined by how public office forgoes public interest as assessed by the general population to attain some type of political advantage at the price of public interest. Akindele (1995) provided a more comprehensive definition of corruption, stating that it is a socio-political, economic, and moral-illness that typically pervades all aspects of society. According to Akindele (1995), the concept of corruption has ideological, moral, cultural, and intellectual discourse. Another useful straightforward, easy, and all-encompassing definition of corruption encapsulates obtaining personal gains to which a person who is an integral part of society, in addition to a public official is not entitled (Salawu, 2007). Corruption, when viewed from this perspective, implies a deviation of what society believes to be correct practices in the trade of goods and services on the part of everyone who makes up the community. Corruption,

according to the World Bank (2009), is the ultimate hindrance to reducing poverty and to economic and social growth. Furthermore, according to Otite (2000), corruption is the degradation of integrity or the condition of affairs by bribery, favour, or moral depravity. Khan (1996) described corruption as an act that departs from the formal standards of behaviour that govern the acts performed by individuals in an official capacity of public authority seeking private benefits, such as power, wealth, or prestige. Corruption is an issue of society that exists in various manifestations and forms in all societies, even the most basic (Ekiyor, 2005). In his broad definition of corruption, Ekiyor (2005) defined it as the illegal abuse of official authority or power by a government official in two ways for the benefit of himself or even more advance himself and/or someone else at the cost of the public, in violation of his pledge of office and possibly in contradiction against the norms or laws in force. It is regrettable that this threat recognizes no time or era; it occurs at any time or period in any nation's history. According to Gardiner (2017), corruption is a greedy practice in which one person's rights are sacrificed for the benefit of the financial gain of another. According to Transparency International (2019), corruption is defined as the misuse of power for personal benefit. According to Parveen et al. (2017), it is the foundation of the most significant challenges confronting states, non-state actors, and business organizations around the world.

2.1.2 Forms of Corruption

2.1.2.1 Petty and Bureaucratic Corruption

Petty corruption is nevertheless a common and detrimental part of citizens' daily interactions with the state. According to World Bank (2016) survey results, small corruption impacts all the public services to some extent. Corruption of this sort tends to be especially prevalent in interactions with police officers. The persistence of minor corruption in the bureaucracy of the

state can be associated to a variety of factors, including social conventions that have developed within positions of power; low salaries that force officials to take recourse to corruption to make ends meet; and excessive bureaucratic complexities that bestows discretionary authority on public servants and opens possibilities of corruption (World Bank, 2016). An article by Brookings Institution (2016) provided instances of these concerns in practice in the field of customs, demonstrating the outrageous customs taxes provide substantial incentives to negotiate and lower import prices using bribery.

2.1.2.2 Grand and Political Corruption

An article by Brookings Institution said although few incidents have been publicized in the media's spotlight, widespread corruption is thought to be a substantial concern. Citizens polled in the Afrobarometer, for example, have poor trust in elected leaders. Fifty-eight (58%) of people polled believe that some or all the members of Parliament are corrupt (Afrobarometer, 2018). Senior officials are frequently thought to have impunity (BTI, 2018). In practice, claims of corruption involving high-ranking politicians and/or civil service employees of any level are not frequently investigated because, according to the official narrative, "there is no corruption" at this rank (Global Integrity, 2018).

An article by Brookings Institution (2019), indicates that the problem stems from a country's political past. Félix Houphouët-Boigny (2012) assert that the country's first post-independence president, established a highly centralized organization whereby the government was viewed as the president's private asset. Political allegiance was purchased through a vast patronage network, and the structure emerged to reflect the most important, possibly the only, avenue to gain personal wealth in the country (Brookings Institute, 2011). The consequent "winner-takes-all" attitude of the state and its wealth might be considered as a significant factor.

2.1.2.3 Patronage System

An article by Brookings Institution (2019), indicates that patronage systems involve a local position holder or contender for a political office offering favours from other contracts, or appointment to positions in exchange for political support. Patronage is frequently utilized for winning support and votes in elections or to pass legislation. Patronage systems flout the formal laws of a local government and gain an advantage through personal rather than formalized methods.

Patronage arrangements involve a government office holder or candidate for an elected office offering favours, contracts, or appointments to positions in exchange for political support. Patronage is frequently utilized to obtain support and votes in elections or to pass legislation. Patronage systems flout the formal laws of a local government and gain an advantage through personal rather than formalized methods.

2.1.2.4 Nepotism and Cronyism

Patronage arrangements entail a government official or candidate for elected office granting favours, contracts, or positions in return for political support. Patronage is frequently used to gain support from politicians and votes in elections or for passing legislation. Patronage systems violate a local government's official regulations and obtain a competitive edge using personal rather than established avenues.

2.1.2.5 Smuggling

Smuggling is a serious problem in a country, and it is encouraged by corruption and official participation. For example, significant amounts of cocoa, gold, and diamonds are traded on the illicit market rather than using authorized channels, with officials often simply turning a blind eye (Freedom House 2018). The problem is exacerbated by the country's permeable borders.

Smuggling of cocoa between Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, for example, was said to have grown significantly in 2017 when the Ivorian government reduced its guaranteed price for growers. Cross-border smuggling leveraged Ghana's pricing gap, with exporters claiming that 80,000 tonnes of cocoa beans were illegally brought into the country during April and June 2017 (African Arguments, 2017).

2.1.2.6 Embezzlement

Embezzlement is defined as the illegal taking or misappropriation of money or property entrusted to one person but possessed by another. In politics, this is known as graft, which occurs when an official in a government position unlawfully exploits public monies for personal gain.

2.1.2.7 Fraud

Fraud is defined as a misrepresentation or charging for products or services that were never delivered, changing specifications or timing of goods and services and their expiry dates, or overpricing goods and services to pay the expense of bribes. State funds are lost because of fraud. The public sector engages in fraudulent behaviour by failing to notice altered or missing papers or accepting bribes to "ignore" illicit activities.

2.1.2.8 Extortion

Extortion is defined as threat or causing harm to a person, their image, or their possessions to get money, actions, products and services, or other things from that person in an unjust manner, hence, a type of blackmail.

2.1.2.9 Bribery

Bribery is the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official, or other person, in charge of a public or legal duty. Regarding governmental operations, bribery is "Corrupt solicitation, acceptance, or transfer of value in exchange for official action (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bribery>).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Principal-Agent Theory of Corruption

The Principal-Agent theory, developed in the 1970s by a group of scientists and theorists (Stephen Rose and Barry Mitnick), analyses the hazards that frequently occur when one person or organization, known as the "agent," represents a different entity or individual, known as the "principal" (Mitnick, 2012). The principal-agent theory of corruption is the oldest and most employed in economic approach to corruption (Prasad et al., 2019). Based on this view, there is conflict involving principal who is often supposed to represent the interest of the public on one side, and the agent on the other hand. Corruption arises when the principal is unable to adequately monitor the agent while the agent violates the interest of the principal to pursue his or her own self-interest (Persson et al., 2013). This strategy is typically used to develop anti-corruption programmes (Villarreal-Diaz, 2018). According to the theory, corruption is an illustration of principal-agent dilemma in which the interests of the principal and an agent differ. This is due to asymmetric information, which takes place when the agent possesses adequate information than the principal (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). In this situation, the principal is not able to perfectly keep track of the agent's actions. This, consequently, result in the fact that the agent can pursue his/her own interests and act against the interest of the principal, which includes engaging in a corrupt deal that reduces the interest of the principal. Corruption differs

from other types of principal-agent problems in that it necessitates the existence of a third party, commonly referred to as a client (Fitzsimons, 2009).

In this regard, the client conspires with the agent to form a corrupt deal whereby the agent agrees to break the principal's obligations in favour of the client, or an individual associated to the client. The client or the associated individual receives in some way from the agent's violation of duty. According to this view, there is conflict involving principals and the agents. Corruption takes place when a principal is unable to adequately supervise the agent and the agent betrays the principal's interest to pursue his or her own self-centered interests (Persson et al., 2013).

Public servants or elected politicians, for example, are often able to abuse their public positions to solicit private rents as compensation for public services when the public (the "principals" in this case) are unable to hold them accountable. Alternatively, elected principals may struggle to ensure proper oversight over the behaviour and activities of public workers (the agents), who may participate in corrupt acts over which the principals (the elected officials) have no authority (Marquette & Peiffer, 2014). As a result, principal-agent theory views corruption exclusively as an agent problem, leaving the principal unable to assume an effective monitoring or oversight function, owing to an absence or lack of adequate information (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001).

The agent who makes the contract with the client undermines or harms the principal since the agent prioritizes the client's interests in preference to the principals. Some scholars (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) define corruption as "corruption without theft" and they use an instance of a government official selling a license for a price plus a bribe. From their perspective, such corruption is innocuous because the government continues to obtain its funds. Nevertheless, the bribe affects the terms of the contract. Sometimes, license applicants might be unwilling to give

a bribe and hence refuse to apply to obtain the license, but they might if there were no bribe. In this situation, the government loses money.

Agency theory typically does not distinguish between whether the agent deliberately seeks a corrupt contract or whether the contract is supplied by the client and the agent accepts it. The importance of incentives is greater. An agent will engage in corruption whenever possible if the circumstances permit (if the possible rewards exceed the risk of being detected). The corruption is the outcome of an inductive evaluation of the likelihood for corruption, the gains from corruption, and the cost of corruption. In this perspective, Klitgaard (1988) defines corruption as follows: corruption equals monopoly + discretion - accountability. Posner (2001) proposes a solution by balancing principal and agent interests.

When the interest of the principal become the agent's interests, the agent's likelihood of engaging in corruption or other kinds of opportunistic conduct decreases. Harmonization, on the other hand, may prove difficult or expensive. There is also vital task to examine the client's interest in entering a corrupt deal, which could undermine the attempt to harmonize. As a result, effective harmonization would dissuade the client against engaging in the deal. This can be accomplished through raising the client's costs, and these include: the costs for finding an agent; the costs of executing the agreement specification; what the client offers agent (bribe amount); additional costs associated with contract fulfilment; monitoring and avoidance costs, thus, the client must additionally track whether the agent complies with the corrupt deal; and failure costs. The failure cost includes instances in which (a) the agent fulfils what it offered but fails to fulfil the client's needs, causing the client to lose resources given to the agent; (b) the agent does not fulfil what they offered the client other than the client what they are seeking from the agent; or (c) the agent does not just accomplish what they offered to the client along with the

client fails to get what they want from the agent, causing the client to waste resources given to the agent. Agency theory gives little attention to these scenarios and methods of enhancing the client's concern about whether the agent would keep its commitments. Nevertheless, higher levels of uncertainty and the likelihood that the client would lose, or waste resources reduces the client's readiness to engage in corrupt action.

According to agency theory, corruption primarily affects agent, while principal does not engage in corrupt behaviour and has an interest in eradicating corruption. Alternatively (Martinsson, 2021) asserts that the principal-agent system necessitates an adequately informed and engaged principal who controls and punishes corrupt behaviour from agents. These are serious assumptions or demands. If corruption is endemic, there cannot be enough principles willing to take action to combat it. Corruption can also be advantageous to principals. Politicians can bribe citizens by offering them various perks (social benefits, lower-cost goods). Citizens turn a blind eye to politicians' wrongdoing in the name of reciprocity, and they even vote for leaders who promise them benefits.

Fernandez-Vázquez et al. (2016) used data from Spanish local government elections to provide empirical evidence in support of the exchange contention involving voters and politicians, demonstrating that political dealing is often obvious when voters believe they will get direct additional benefits from corruption (Cubel et al., 2022). Likewise, inept politicians can tolerate their dishonesty as principals of government officials or strike bargains with them regarding the division of corrupt areas.

According to Mungiu-Pippidi (2011), many principals might operate as sponsors or facilitators for corruption. In several instances, an individual serves as a principal and an agent. Politicians offer a good example because they serve as both principals for government officials and agents

for citizens. Since corruption is easy for his/her agent function, the individual's resolve to oppose corruption as a principal is typically reduced. Another aspect is the expense of fighting corruption: excessive costs reduce motivation to resist.

Khaile et al. (2021) discuss the failure of principals (people and politicians) to reduce failure to comply since the cost associated with the procedure outweighs the possible advantages from the perspective of the principals. The environment in which principals live influences their quality, and it may be anticipated that increased corruption affects their ability and motivation to battle corruption (Baig et al., 2022).

Anti-corruption strategies recommended by agency theory, such as a monopoly, increased accountability, and transparency, changing executive preferences, or the establishment of special anti-corruption agencies tasked with fighting and detecting corruption, fail in the face of organized and systemic corruption. If there are insufficient subjects eager to eliminate corruption, the space produced by such processes is unlikely to be utilized by non-corrupt players and will be employed by corrupt individuals.

There is very little meaning, for instance, to employ whistleblowers to expose corrupt behaviour. If a whistleblower alerts the public regarding such behaviour, she or he would most likely encounter condemnation or scorn, and others involved in corruption will cut off communication with him or her or perhaps act against him or her. Other methods of lowering the likelihood of committing a corrupt act are associated with comparable doubts. Look at the asymmetric designs of a corruption punishment, in which the bribed agent is severely punished if he/she violates his/her obligation, but only mildly punished if she/he agrees to gain from the corrupting agent despite taking any other action (Pramanik, 2022).

On the other hand, the corrupted agent faces severe consequences for providing to the corrupt agent but somewhat punished if she/he obtains some benefits offered for breaching the duty (Dasgupta & Radoniqi, 2021). The asymmetric arrangement prevents the corrupt agent from breaching his/her obligations, resulting in his/her principal offence, and prevents the corrupting agent from giving a corrupt reward, which is the primary explanation why the corrupt agent usually breaks his/her duty. However, in the case of institutionalized corruption, when corruption invades the organizations that should be fighting it, there may be a lack of willingness to implement this concept. Furthermore, in instances of systemic corruption, reducing monopoly power is not enough and will not result in increased competition. Greater openness can lead people who do not engage in corruption learning about how pervasive the corruption structure is and who benefits from it. Non-participants sometimes discover that when they refrain from interacting with a corrupt deal, they suffer and discover that it is more advantageous for them to be a part of a corrupt system than to fight against it. Anti-corruption organizations can only reduce corruption formally, and they can be manipulated by corrupt connections.

According to Prasad et al. (2019), anti-corruption efforts sometimes attempt to reduce corruption to a bare minimum or completely abolish it. However, even if general rules of human behaviour, the common good, and equitable public service are recognized, there will always be the chance that these ideals will be disregarded. According to this viewpoint, a society without corruption is inhumane, and that people would cease to possess their human character. Prasad et al. (2019) however, argues that humans lack the ability and skills to prevent every transgression of the universal laws of human behaviour. As a result, there will always be corruption or other sorts of opportunism. Any attempts to create societal conditions in which

opportunity-seeking behaviour would not take place at all have always resulted in severe challenges on freedom for everyone and human suffering, including the death of individuals who disagreed with such measures. In this regard, the anti-corruption campaign must be treated thoughtfully and with caution.

2.1.2 Collective Action Theory

Mancur Olson's magnum opus "The Logic of Collective Action" was released in 1965. This was widely recognized as a significant addition to existing literature addressing the successes and setbacks of collective action. It proved beneficial in explaining how lack of coordination could contribute to deficient macroeconomic results (Colander, 2008). The collective action theory is old-aged, but it has remained a critical source of information in collective action discussions. It is a universal method of individualistic perspective and economic estimation and continues to offer scholars new vital insights into the subject.

Before lately the principal-agent theory was the dominant theoretical solution for corruption. More recently, research analyzing corruption through a collective action viewpoint began to emerge, underscoring the social or possibly institutional aspect of corrupt behaviour compared to the solely individualistic facets of corrupt behaviour. Collective action theory has arisen because a different rationale for why institutionalized corruption continues notwithstanding laws declaring it illegal, as well as why corruption overcomes diverse anti-corruption initiatives in several countries. Corruption is considered an economic issue in developing countries as individuals rationalize their personal behaviour based on how they believe others are likely to do in a similar situation. Whenever corruption evolves into a social standard, everybody accepts the practice as the only means to get things done (Persson et al., 2013).

The research demonstrates that this remains true regardless of whether every individual reject corruption and recognizes that a less corrupt outcome would be more beneficial to society (ibid.). In short, the main assessment about the costs and benefits of corruption is based on the financial burden of having been the first individual to opt out of corruption in a certain environment or context.

Participating in collective action entails risks and obstacles for the participants because they are foregoing a portion of their profit techniques that are nevertheless still open to other enterprises. The difficulties stem from the decision to participate and if the collective action would be successful. Rothstein (2011) cites Olson's (1971) theory of collective action and claims that although individuals are aware that they can benefit jointly from a corruption-free circumstances, they do not have the motivation for altering their conducts and behaviours. In their pursuit of a fair procedure, single agents' risk being uncompetitive and penalized by the decision maker (Rothstein, 2011). In applying the collective action theory in this regard, to normalization of corruption in public sector organizations, the purpose is to establish a platform that enables companies to communicate and build trust (UN Global Compact, 2015; World Bank Institute, 2008).

2.2 Normalization of Corruption

Corruption is defined by Ashforth and Anand (2003, p. 2) as the "misuse of authority for personal, sub-unit, or organizational gain," where "misuse" can refer to illegal, unethical, or illegitimate behaviour. Corruption as criminal behaviour may appear less complicated considering how laws in a nation define what is and is not corruption, and consequently the most common forms of corrupt behaviours, such as bribery, fraud, or embezzlement, are illegal in most countries. The idea of normalization developed by Ashforth and Anand (2003) offers

an approach for understanding the persistence of corruption, detailing why corruption becomes accepted as the "way we do business here." The term "normalization" refers to how corruption is "embedded in the organization in such a way that it is more or less taken for granted and perpetuated" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 1). According to Ashforth and Anand (2003), three pillars contribute to the normalization of corruption: institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization.

Levels of perceived corruption in a society appear to be related to how individuals evaluate corruption and other sorts of normative breaches (Beramendi et al., 2020). Shalvi (2016) and Gächter and Schulz (2016) find experimentally that the frequent sense of transgression or rule violation damages people's inherent honesty within a society. This is related to a developing notion that dishonesty is more valuable (Marin, 1999). Individual dishonesty is influenced not just by the cost-benefit analysis of doing a deviant act, additionally by social norms and being exposed to unethical behaviours, as model of socialization, in different contexts of interaction among people (Alva et al. 2021).

Normalization is when justifications increase the extent with which fraudulent behaviours are committed, with no shame or pain because of the moral costs of such behaviour, if individuals maintain that the rewards from their deviant behaviour outweigh the moral costs (Wenzel et al., 2017). Individuals prefer to ascribe their own deviant behaviours to necessity or contextual constraints that drive them to breach the norms to escape the moral penalty of infractions (Delgado, 2013). Furthermore, Gächter and Schulz (2016) state people socially evaluate themselves to the extent of dishonesty they perceive in their social contexts to rationalize their dishonest behaviour.

Similarly, moral detachment is used for a form of cognition for permitting people to commit immoral behaviours (Zhao et al., 2019). Morally disassociation, according to Bandura (1999), disables the internalized moral norms that regulate individuals' behaviour, enabling individuals to reconstruct or reinterpret their immoral or deviant behaviour in a way that seems less destructive or socially acceptable. The process of normalizing corruption internalized dishonest behaviour within culture and even modifies some personal and social manifestations of identity (Cabezas & Paredes, 2020; Roth & Acosta, 2018).

According to Hadiprajitno and Amal (2019), positive views towards corrupt actions motivate people to attempt to commit corrupt acts. As a result, the larger the prevalence of corrupt behaviour in society, the greater the risk of repeating such behaviour (Tavits, 2010). Tolerant attitudes towards transgressive behaviours are historically anchored in specific Peruvian social groupings, getting internalized in culture and identity (Quiroz, 2013).

Arellano Gault (2017) and Ashforth and Anand (2003), argue that the process that strengthens the normalization of corruption consists of three factors (illustrated in Figure 1): (1) institutionalization of corruption, in which an initial corrupt respond becomes embedded in processes and structures till it grows into a routine; (2) rationalization of corruption, where a representational frameworks are created to justify and even positively value corruption; and (3) socialization of corruption, where individuals develop representational frameworks to justify and even positively value corruption.




Figure 1 Pillars of Normalization of Corruption (Source: Ashforth & Anand, 2003)

2.2.1 Institutionalization

Corrupt practices become routine and established into the organizational structure because of institutionalization (Oliver, 1991), and are carried out without conscious concern about their appropriateness. According to Ashforth and Anand (2003), there are three stages of corruption: (a) the first corrupt choice or act, (b) the embedding of the corrupt act in the organization's structures and procedures, and (c) the routinization of corruption which is comparable to what Suchman (1995) refers to as "taken for-granted legitimacy," in which an action, value, or procedure is followed because the option of an alternative is not even contemplated by the participants. As Palazzo et al. (2012) put it, "people may act unethically without realizing it." (p. 323).

Leadership (important factor), according to Zhao et al. (2020), can play a significant impact in the institutionalization process. Leaders not only control many of the institutionalization levers, but they also serve as role models for organizational members and may sanction wrongdoing.

Leaders do not have to actively engage in corruption to function as role models or authorizers: rewarding staff for accepting, disregarding, or otherwise supporting corruption - whether purposefully or unintentionally, whether overtly or implicitly - sends a clear signal to employees.

Organizational memory is a metaphor used to explain the process through which an organization collects, stores, and applies knowledge to its activities. Activities stored in organizational memory are frequently carried out by executing a succession of interconnected routines. As a result, full acts can be carried out without any one person being aware of them in their totality. When a corrupt decision or conduct has a favourable effect and is recorded in organizational memory, it is likely to be repeated in the future.

When similar challenges confront other managers, and if solutions are not immediately apparent, answers are sought from memory for two reasons: 1) past decisions and acts are thought to have been taken for sensible reasons; and 2) following a precedent helps legitimize the decision and act.

As corrupt practices become ingrained in the organization's daily routines, a deviant culture (or subculture, in the case of localized corruption) emerges to normalize the wrongdoing. Assumptions, ideals, and beliefs arise to rationalize corrupt practices in ways that neutralize the stigma of corruption, maybe drawing on the corporate principles mentioned above.

Corrupt practices become routinized and habitual when they are institutionalized and repeated. Routinizing is the process of converting an action into a routine, mechanical, highly programmed operation.

2.2.2 Rationalization

Individuals frequently detect the inherent inappropriateness of corruption, regardless of how normal or legal it becomes in an organization. Rationalization is the second pillar of normalization. Various psychological reasons assist individuals in both enacting corruption and absolving themselves of guilt. Rationalization is defined as "the process by which individuals who engage in corrupt acts use socially constructed accounts to legitimate the acts in their own eyes" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 3). They use rationalization to explain how and why corrupt individuals do not view themselves as corrupt, drawing on insights from the concept of moral disengagement theory (Bandura, 1999; Bandura et al., 1996), ethical fading theory (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), and neutralization theory (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Sykes & Matza, 1957). They highlight several rationalizations and denials of accountability that individuals may utilize prospectively or retroactively.

Corrupt people adopt rationalizing beliefs to ignore the identity consequences of their behaviour. These ideologies assist people and communities remove themselves from the erroneous moral attitude implied by their acts, and may even produce "a moral inversion, in which the bad becomes good." Individuals and communities are motivated to resolve the underlying ambiguity that frequently surrounds action and results in ways that benefit their own interests. The rationalizing ideologies either refute negative interpretations – or sometimes substitute positive ones – by articulating why specific corruptions are legitimate or excusable exceptions to general normative principles, or they redefine the fundamental definition of corruption to exclude those acts.

In everyday life, rationalizations are common. They are ritualized to members of a culture to explain unfavourable behaviours and events and to alter the acts and outcomes in accordance

with societal norms. To outsiders, rationalizations often sound exactly like what they are: self-serving attempts to justify problematic behaviour. However, because the rationalizations are designed for internal consumption, what matters is if the group accepts them as subjectively legitimate.

Rationalizing ideologies can be either prospective or retroactive. Prospective rationalizations are future-oriented and tend to be calculative, giving the actor a reason to engage in corrupt behaviour later. Retroactive rationalizations, on the other hand, are past-oriented and tend to be defensive because they are adduced post-hoc to make an act appear justifiable.

2.2.3 Socialization

Socialization is the third pillar of normalization, in which "newcomers are taught to perform and accept corrupt practices" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 25). The concept of a "social cocoon" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003) illustrates how novices are socialized into a covert corruption structure. This social cocoon isolates and conceals corruption from the outside world, whether that world be other elements of the organization or the larger environment. This precludes the cocoon's rationalizations from being challenged by public scrutiny.

As a result, visitors tend to tolerate and indulge in behaviours that they would have found unacceptable otherwise. The following describes the normalization of corruption in organizations. Individuals and/or groups engage in corrupt acts, although they usually do it covertly. This is sustained by the offenders' own normalization procedures, which include institutionalization, rationalization, and the socialization of newcomers. As a result, the "social cocoon" or "microcosm" of corruption may grow or intensify within the organization, a phenomenon known as a "slippery slope" or "snowballing effect," as demonstrated by earlier study (Palazzo et al., 2012).

2.4 Incentive Factors Contributing to Corruption in Public Sector Organizations

2.4.1 Bureaucratic Factors

According to Dimant and Tosato (2018), when leaders are corrupt and have power conferred in them for selfish purposes, they are unlikely to be exemplary leaders; additionally, they will not allow anti-corruption watchdogs, if any exist, to enforce the full length of the law against suspects of corrupt behaviour. A body of research on public sector corruption focuses on the motivations for individual bureaucrat to participate in corruption, as well as the consequences of such behaviour (Olken & Pande, 2013). One critical motivation examined by Olken and Pande (2013) is remuneration and wage levels in the public sector. The evidence is still split on this. Weder and Van Rijckeghem (2001). However, other research has questioned the strength of this link and the direction of causality (Rose-Ackerman & Sreide, 2012). Other bureaucratic rewards and mechanisms encompass public officers recruiting procedures, the relevance of public service occupations to the tasks at hand, and internal oversight and disciplinary processes, including penalty for corruption and incentives for improved performance (Khan, 2001).

Simplified requirements for obtaining a permit or other legal document from the state, such as a driver's license, are believed to reduce potential for corruption, and may end up in a rise in both the number of new firms and paid employment. Creating systems that stimulate competition among bureaucrats has been shown to reduce corruption. For example, if officials must compete for bribe earnings generated by the issuance of permissions and other legal documents, people on the other end of the relationship will, within theory, seek the lowest bribe connected with receiving a required service (Kiselev, 2012).

2.4.2 State and Macroeconomic Factors

De Simone, Gaeta and Mourao (2017) posit that a significant insight given from a macroeconomic perspective is that economic models wherein the state is extremely interventionist also happen to be more susceptible to corruption. The premise follows that when the state is heavily involved in the economy, particularly when checks and balances and larger systems for accountability are not present, individual politicians and bureaucrats can influence markets to generate profits utilizing non-competitive techniques. Furthermore, countries with similar kinds of regulation might encounter significantly distinct degrees of corruption contingent upon the larger context, such as how regulations function in practice and the degree of autonomy that bureaucrats have in their actual implementation (Duvanova, 2011). In environments where formal institutions are weak, formal regulation is applied unevenly or selectively, which encourages corruption.

2.4.3 Weak Governance and Institutions

One of the main drivers of corruption is poor governance. The economic and political incentives accessible across various political systems, as well as the quantitative examination of the strength and efficacy of state, social, and economic structures, define the circumstances under which corruption can thrive. The concentration of power in the executive, combined with inadequate accountability systems, provides individuals (particularly elites) far too much leeway (Johnston, 2005). The State establishes various institutions, such as the Ombudsman's Office, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Legislative Assembly. Some of these institutions arise from outside of formal State frameworks, such as the media and organized civil society.

Conversely, in the most corrupt countries, there exists an obvious weakness in obligation as well as a lack of accountability and ineffective internal checks and balances, which means that citizens' self-evident legitimate rights are unlikely to be recognized and enforced beforehand any state institution (Janenova & Knox, 2020).

More broadly, the literature implies that countries are experiencing political and economic transformation are particularly vulnerable to corruption due to battles for sources of capital accumulation, distribution of access, and the cost of purchasing legitimacy (Montinola & Jackman, 2002). In such circumstances, both formal and informal structures interact in ways that are not mutually reinforcing, and informal behaviour trumps formal rules (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011).

2.4.4 Natural Resource Curse

The so-called "resource curse" has spawned a plethora of literature. In theory, an abundance of natural resources should promote development by encouraging commerce and investment, which raises living standards. However, there is another viewpoint, frequently referred to as the "resource-curse": Governments become less efficient in the presence of abundant resources because residents and officials fight for rents and invest less in other forms of capital, such as human capital (Bicchieri & Ganegoda, 2017).

Plenty of research in developing countries, suggests that governments rich in mineral wealth are also highly corrupt and poorly managed, owing to the conditions and incentives that extractive resources provide for ruling elites (Vicente, 2010). According to the findings of research on the political economy of resource management, more state autonomy from its people lessens the desire for state leaders to negotiate long-run comprehensive political deals with various groups in society (Sogge, 2006).

The abundant supply of oil and diamonds, as well as other minerals such as gold, has been a major factor in weakening accountability, dissolving the link between the state and society, and allowing those in power to control vast networks of patronage while being indifferent to the public. Among other things, the reality that the government does not rely on its citizens to generate revenue contributes to the common belief that public services are a favour from the state as opposed to a right that can be demanded, and this severely undermines upward processes for accountability (Moore, 2004).

Furthermore, the distribution of mineral endowments and extractive rents can have a significant impact on conflict and pose problems to the peaceful coexistence of social groupings. Despite a rising number of international and domestic measures to promote openness in this sector, profits from oil and other resource extraction remain opaque and poorly accounted for in general. In this regard, governments in underdeveloped countries cannot bear exclusive responsibility (Capasso & Santoro, 2018). According to various observers, international firms frequently confront perverse incentives to engage in corrupt activity, such as bribing officials for contracts.

Furthermore, according to Sogge (2006), oil companies and other multinational companies are major players in promoting tax avoidance and evasion," and their practices have contributed to the reinforcement of corruption patterns and conduct in-country (Sogge, 2006). Thus, global drivers of (bad) governance play a key role in eroding a state's need to earn money from its own inhabitants, as well as in weakening accountability relationships between the state and society.

2.4.5 Corruption Perception

Bicchieri and Ganegoda (2017) investigate the motivations to commit corrupt acts, concluding that this issue is influenced by people's opinions of the extent of corruption and the

government's level of tolerance. This perception could have an impact on both the demand for and supply of corrupt activities. As a result, corruption perception may either help or hinder the existing level of corruption. In general, perceptions of corruption have aided the emergence of institutional instability and the weakening of relationships among individuals, institutions, and states. Furthermore, the idea of economic corruption has far-reaching consequences; it fosters a "culture of distrust" towards certain institutions.

2.4.6 Income Inequality

According to De Simone, Gaeta, and Mouro (2017), economic disparity is a key predictor of corruption. With rising inequality, the wealthy can utilize lobbying, political contributions, or bribery to influence law-enforcement systems and buy favourable interpretations of the law. Furthermore, the researchers contend that income inequality influence corruption perception in several different ways. Thus, if income disparities are high, the rich are far more likely to hold the opinion that corruption is a necessary means to maintain their status in society because this behaviour goes unpunished and the social channels of corruption expand, and individuals will more readily justify their corrupt behaviour as inequality increases (Dimant, & Tosato, 2018).

2.5 Effects and Consequences of Corruption

Corruption is a significant development challenge. Corruption in political and bureaucratic offices can be little or major, organized or unorganized. As a result, the economic, political, and societal implications of corruption are numerous.

2.5.1 Economic Effects

Many studies look at the relationship between these two factors since there is a discussion over the impact of corruption on economic growth. Some researchers, such as Huntington (1968),

suggest that corruption may boost efficiency and thus economic growth by allowing businesses to sidestep burdensome restrictions with bribes, particularly in developing countries. Many pieces of literature, however, claim that corruption reduces economic growth because it reduces the incentives for private investment (Bradhan, 1997) and distorts public investment decisions (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).

2.5.2 Disincentive to Investment

Corruption stifles both domestic and foreign investment and trade. Corruption is cited as one of the main barriers to conducting business in Sudan by private sector enterprises and foreign investors (Gadkarim, 2011). Foreign investors will avoid investing in a country where corruption is prevalent. There is evidence that private sector suffers significant growth and diversification hurdles because of special treatment for enterprises associated to the ruling class (Transparency International, 2012).

2.5.3 Political Effects

Corruption is a hindrance to democracy and the rule of law. Corruption undermines democracy and good governance in the political domain by subverting official processes. Corruption in elections and legislative agencies undermines accountability and representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary undermines the rule of law; and corruption in government institutions leads to unequal service delivery. Public organizations and offices may lose credibility in a democratic society if they abuse their power for self-interest (Castro, Phillips, & Ansari, 2020).

According to Dimant and Tosato (2018), corruption can also lead to increased cynicism and lower interest in involvement in politics, political instability, reduced political competition, reduced transparency of political decision making, distorting political development, and the

continuation of political engagement based on patronage, clientelism, and money, among other things. In general, corruption weakens the government's institutional capability through ignoring rules, siphoning off money, and hiring or promoting officials regarding performance.

2.5.4 Social Effects

Dimant and Tosato (2018) discovered that corruption hinders people from cooperating for common benefit. Frustration and general apathy among the general population contribute to a poor civic society. Bribes were demanded and paid as a matter of course. It also leads to increased social inequality and a wider gap between the rich and the poor. Corruption demoralizes the public and undermines trust in state institutions. Poor public services, greater social polarization, disinvestment, and marginalization are the most evident outcomes. The negative environmental repercussions of corruption are also described in the literature. Corruption worsens pollution, particularly in underdeveloped countries (Welsch, 2004).

2.5.5 Abuse of Fundamental Human Rights

According to Dimant and Tosato (2018), corruption exerts an adverse effect on citizens' human rights. A corrupt government will demonstrate no regard for the fundamental human rights provided by the constitution. As a result, it violates the rule of law and distorts the entire process of decision-making, eroding government credibility and legitimacy. Even those who attempted to expose corrupt practices found themselves to blame because they can be dealt with while the perpetrators walk away unpunished (Dimant & Tosato, 2018).

2.6 Conceptual Framework

To investigate normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector and to determine the extent of corruption perception and prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana,

the Ashforth and Anand (2003) framework was adopted and modified as illustrated in Figure 2. The Ashforth and Anand (2003) framework was founded on the principal-agent theory and collective action theory. The Ashforth and Anand (2003) framework helps to outline the research trajectory and the assumptions underlying the study. The main goal of the theoretical and conceptual framework is help make the findings of this study more relevant, meaningful, acceptable, and generalizable (Adom & Hussein, 2018). The two theories and conceptual framework also help to stimulate investigation and ensure advancement of knowledge by contributing to policy direction and drive advancement in knowledge especially in similar field of study (Akintoye, 2015).

Tackling corruption from an issue of principal-agent may prove worthwhile, although it has shortcomings. As a result, a new line of approach and thinking ought to be explored as alternative strategies for curbing corruption especially in public sector organizations. According to Dixit (2016), corruption is a supply-and-demand phenomenon. Therefore, anti-corruption interventions must focus equally on the supply and demand for corruption. Others suggest that corruption should be presented as an issue of collaborative action (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2012; Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013) hence, the need to combine both principal-agent theory and collective action theory in the fight against corruption.

What should be emphasized in this regard is that a collective action problem arises when a group of stakeholders benefit from a certain action, but the action has a significant cost associated with it that prevents any actor from solving the problem alone. Corruption causes a wide range of collective action issues. Citizens would be considerably advantageous if no one paid bribes to police officers, but individuals who refuse to bribe might incur greater costs compared to those who simply offer bribes (Castro, Phillips & Asnari, 2020).

Viewing corruption as an abuse of public office for private benefit reduces corruption to a type that is economic rent-seeking when a government official seeks to raise her portion of current wealth while not producing new wealth. Assuming the economic costs of reform can be kept low, reducing, or possibly eliminating, corruption will consistently render a government system more efficient. If this is the framework, then the problem of corruption is reduced to a simple principal-agent problem, in which a principal, typically the state or the citizens have delegated decision-making authority to an agent (government officials) who act in their best interest rather than in the best interest of the principal. Kliitgard (1997) reduces both the problem and the remedy to corruption by employing this argument that: $\text{Corruption (C)} = \text{Monopoly (M)} + \text{Discretion (D)} - \text{Accountability (A)}$.

Whenever the system lacks the right procedures and institutional systems for holding officials accountable for their conduct, public officials have broad discretionary authority, which are exacerbated by inconsistent, ever shifting, and poorly distributed norms and regulations (Bicchieri & Ganegoda, 2017). Corruption takes place when a principal must depend on an agent to carry out a task, whenever the agent in question has broad discretion, and when the agent is bound by minimal accountability. There is no monopoly and corruption are less possible if the principal can turn to other agents, or better yet, if the principal does not have to rely on an agent at all. This could happen if a citizen seeks authority from a governmental official.

2.6.1 Dependent Variable

In this regard, normalization of corruption is used as the dependent variable. In Figure 2, the conceptualization is to investigate how corruption in public sector organizations can be normalized. Based on Ashforth and Anand (2003) framework, formalization of corruption

exists when it is embedded in public sector organization such that corruption becomes less sensitive, taken for granted, and perpetuated. For formalization of corruption to exist, three factors become apparent and exist in the public sector organization. In other words, this study postulates that three mutually supporting factors must underpin normalization and these are institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

2.6.2 Institutionalization

Institutionalization is the beginning of corrupt in which choice or deed gets entrenched in institutional structures and processes and so turns into routine. The drive for and systems of corruption are external to every person in institutionalized corruption, thus, corruption becomes shared asset. Corrupt practices can infiltrate various parts and levels of an organization. Corruption is so ingrained in routines that people are unable to recognize the wrongdoing of their behaviour (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

2.6.3 Rationalization

Rationalization is regarded as selfish paradigms developed to safeguard and possibly valorize corruption. As a result, corrupt people do not see themselves being corrupt. Furthermore, it seems most corrupt persons do not renounce the virtues that society endorses and thereby those persons continue to respect justice, integrity, truthfulness, and so on, even though they commit corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

2.6.3 Socialization

In this scenario, socialization occurs when innocent new persons are persuaded and made to believe that corruption is acceptable and a good thing. The socialization process entails instilling in novices the principles, convictions, customs, abilities, and so on that these individuals would require to perform their duties and function well within the collective setting.

According to social influence, criminal ideals, motivations, attitudes, behaviours, and strategies are learnt by means of interactions in interpersonal groups (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

2.6.4 Robust and Coordinated Anti-Corruption Intervention

It is illustrated in Figure 2 that robust and coordinated anti-corruption interventions serve as moderating or intervening variables. The study posits that robust and coordinated anti-corruption interventions are vital ingredients for de-formalization of corruption in public sector organizations. In other words, robust and coordinated anti-corruption interventions play a significant role in fighting corruption in public sector organizations. To develop the best anti-corruption intervention strategies, there is the need to first identify the components that comprise the three normalization frameworks, namely institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. Secondly, for the anti-corruption intervention strategies to be effective requires strong political will. Thus, strong political will is critical for ensuring that corrupt conducts are punished with punitive sanctions, regardless of the political, social, or economic status of the perpetrators. Furthermore, to reinforce and strengthen political will, requires that civil society organizations (CSOs), the media, international development organizations and citizens play their respective role in supporting anti-corruption inventions as explained further in the sub-sections herein.

2.6.5 Political Will

Corruption can be challenging to tackle because according to the principal-agent theory, monitoring and penalizing corrupt behaviour entails technical obstacles. Indeed, when corruption is regarded as a 'normal,' phenomenon, only few people may have the willingness to refrain from engaging in corrupt activities or be hesitant to take the initial step towards enforcing anti-corruption policies, as the collective-action theory suggests. However, many

people employ corruption to tackle serious problems with profound social, institutional, economic, and political underpinnings.

When examining corruption utilizing a principal-agent perspective, the rational decisions of people that occur in discrete instances of corruption are highlighted. This emphasis implies that corruption is resolvable through policies that change the extent to which principals can oversee and discipline their agents, as well as the level of discretion allowed to agents and their own incentive estimations. Another interpretation offered by the principal-agent corruption literature is that the fault lies with political leaders who are unwilling to properly implement them (Kpundeh, 1998).

According to Brinkerhoff (2000), political leadership and a determination to combat corruption at the highest levels are required to initiate and sustain reforms over time, until results are obtained. Power holders are expected to act in the public interest rather than in their own. They are the primary actors who can transform a country's culture of corruption because they write the laws and provide the authority, manpower, and funding that allow them to be properly implemented. Indeed, some scholars argue that political will is the single most critical aspect in ensuring the effective execution of a holistic anti-corruption interventions (Brinkerhoff, 2000). Political will is required to implement anti-corruption laws and regulations and ensure that corrupt individuals are punished with punitive, proportionate, and dissuasive punishments, irrespective of the offenders' political, financial, or social standing (Malena, 2009).

2.6.6 Private Actors

2.6.6.1 The Role of Civil Society Organizations

Civil society organizations (CSOs) also play an important role in anti-corruption interventions. Combating corruption necessitates a coordinated strategy and an active role of every player,

and a coordinated effort. One of the key prerequisites for success in this process includes CSOs in the planning of anti-corruption measures within a shared policy framework.

As a result, anti-corruption strategies based on principal-agent frameworks have relied on reducing autonomy of civil servants, enhancing monitoring tactics, advocating transparency in her administrative government. It is important to indicate that working with anti-corruption organizations such as CSOs function as watchdogs, while sustaining sanctions on those who commit corruption. This help to match the incentives of possible 'agents' more precisely against those of their respective 'principals'.

Building strong and coordinated coalitions to generate an indispensable number of public officials, civil society groups of people, and private enterprises is especially vital for implementing long-term anti-corruption measures (Johnston & Kpundeh 2002). CSOs' anti-corruption roles are more concrete, encompassing education, research, monitoring, raising awareness, advocating, mobilization, and organization, as well as the encouragement of private prosecutions where possible. CSOs, consisting of the media, may keep public sector officers more accountable and put pressure on the government to enact anti-corruption measures (De Sousa, 2005).

2.6.6.2 The Role Media

Building cross-sectoral coalitions of support to generate a critical number of government officials, CSOs, and the private sector are particularly vital to the successful implementation of long-term anti-corruption interventions (Johnston & Kpundeh 2002). CSOs' anti-corruption responsibilities tend to be more tangible, which involve research, education, monitoring, awareness-creation, advocacy, mobilization, and organization, as well as promoting good conduct of individual prosecutions where appropriate. CSOs, like the media, may hold

politicians accountable and exert pressure on the government by demanding action (De Sousa, 2005). Both viewpoints lead to the reasonable conclusion that enhanced monitoring and retribution can promote accountability while decreasing corruption. When the principle is better equipped to monitor or discipline the agent, the incentive to participate in corruption is lessened, according to principal-agent theory. However, comparable outcomes might be drawn from other instances of collective action theory-inspired anti-corruption techniques such as values-driven education or media awareness raising (Rajak, 2014).

The media is an essential sociocultural foundation and a significant political influencing pillar. The media influences and shape peoples' opinions of what is considered acceptable or unacceptable. They inform people concerning corruption and possible alternative solutions. Through considerable media coverage, they can force and influence politicians to pay particular attention to corruption and its related activities. They offer platforms for the citizens to speak about corruption and demand transparency and accountability from those in political authority (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Furthermore, in relation to anti-corruption interventions, the media disseminates crucial information on governmental, administrative duties, and economic activities in the society, affording the people an invaluable capacity to keep those in power in check and accountable (Mendes, 2013). The media can considerably enhance the political risk of individuals uncovered their corrupt practices while creating critical awareness by uncovering, disclosing, informing, and educating concerning the negative repercussions of corruption on the people and society at large (Mendes, 2013).

2.6.6.3 International Development Organizations

Other stakeholders that play significant role in anti-corruption strategies are international development organizations and these include donor countries, international financial

institutions, and foreign development partners among others. Donor countries play an important role by contributing the financial resources needed to fund anti-corruption interventions. Donors understand the complications of the incentives for collaborative effort to combat corruption. The most apparent motivation is the overarching objective to curb corruption, with the overall benefits of more efficient government, improved services, and more environmentally friendly development (Marquette & Peiffer, 2019).

Prestige that is an important incentive for political leaders to be passionate about fighting corruption. Transparency International and the World Bank, for example, provide annual corruption indices, which make it simpler to use for international organizations and civil society in many different countries to measure the level of corruption in a particular country. Through these, international organizations are helping build incentives for political leaders in corrupt nations to generate political will, as there are significant reputational costs for politicians who are ranked at the bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2014).

2.6.6.4 The Role of Citizen

Citizens can contribute to an effective anti-corruption intervention by conveying corruption to authorities or the media, assisting with education and sensitization campaigns aimed at creating a culture of truthfulness, transparency and zero tolerance for corruption (Verdenicci & Hough, 2015). Even refusing to cooperate in corrupt practices can be a kind of resistance (Obed, Ramya, & Yahya, 2023).




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Adopted from Ashforth and Anand (2003) and modified

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter provides the methodology employed in the study and explains the research philosophy.

3.1 Research Philosophy

A research philosophy is an opinion on how knowledge regarding a phenomenon must be gathered, examined, and applied (Saunders et al., 2012). Philosophy highlights the knowledge presumptions taken by the researcher and the potential usage of research procedures, techniques, and approaches utilized by the person conducting the study for the research being conducted (Johnson & Clark, 2006). The study used the pragmatism philosophy in examining normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector and determines the extent of corruption perception and prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.

A fundamental philosophy known as pragmatics research recognizes that notions are just useful if they facilitate action. According to Saunders et al. (2012), pragmatism acknowledges the existence of numerous approaches to investigate and understand the world, that no one point of view is capable of offering an accurate depiction; that there exist multiple realities. A decision-maker inside a genuine, real-world scenario is the primary focus of pragmatic research. Finding something to investigate and understanding something in its broader perspective are the first steps in conducting a pragmatic study. This prompts research inquiry, which aims to comprehend the issue more thoroughly and eventually discover a solution. Multiple methodologies, a number of which are probably recognizable to members use the more

conventional approach of learning, could be used in pragmatics research, enabling the integration of these techniques (Saunders et al., 2012).

3.2 Research Design

A research design is an overarching framework or technique to carrying out research to investigate specific verified research topics of attention and interest (Lavrakas (2008). The study used cross-sectional design in the investigation. Cross-sectional studies employ an epidemiological design which can be conceived of in the form of descriptive or analytical, based on the ultimate purpose. This quick and inexpensive design allows for the estimation of conditions and incidence.

Furthermore, the temporal relationship between the discourse and the outcome is measured sequentially across a single time, making time dimension directionality impossible to determine. The importance of this study stems from the utilization of cross-sectional surveys to generate research data. Cross-sectional data is data collected in a field over a set length of time frame having the goal of evaluating a phenomenon (Cooper & Schindler, 2004). To achieve this goal, the study used mixed research methodologies, which included both quantitative and qualitative research approaches. The mixed method is vital in informing the use of pragmatism philosophy. The use of realistic methodologies and philosophies to explore the subject being investigated (Hall, 2013). Pragmatic philosophy usually uses a mixed methodological approach, in which quantitative and qualitative techniques are blended to provide better insight into the phenomenon or research problem (Hall, 2013).

3.3 Study Area

The study was conducted in Accra which is the capital town of the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. Accra was chosen considering the fact that it has the largest population around 4.6 million people and serves as Ghana's administrative and business hub. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2016), Accra is typically regarded as Ghana's biggest industrial and business district. Accra is the seat of government and where all the public sector organizations in Ghana are headquartered. Government institutions such as Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA), the Passport Office and the Office of the Registrar of Companies (ORC) among other agencies have their headquarters in Accra.

3.3 Study Population

The population for the study consisted of public sector workers in Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA), the Passport Office and the Office of the Registrar of Companies (ORC). According to earlier research by Ciziceno and Travaglino (2019), the criteria for participants who work full-time in public sector organizations are better placed to articulate the occurrence of corruption in public sector organizations. Researchers consistently establish respondent criteria which are comparable to those used in prior research in order to examine the issues of normalization of corruption in Ghana. Moreover, the study included members of the public who in last 12 months have dealt with officials in the selected public sector organizations.

3.4 Sampling Technique

The study used convenience sampling techniques in the selection of the research participants. Akomah and Nani (2016) used convenience sampling in investigating the determining causes of corruption in public procurement in Ghana. The method of convenience sampling was used

to choose the respondents. According to Bailey (1994), the researcher uses the easiest cases or readily available participants who are eager to participate in this sort of sampling.

Obtaining a larger sample size was difficult considering the context-specific sensitivity of corruption (Brown & Skitmore, 2015). The respondents, initially, were concerned about maintaining their identities and avoiding retaliation. To allay these fears, ethical control mechanisms were put in place (Tabish & Jha, 2011).

Based on the fact that a sample is a representative of its complete population, its range and size must be comprehensive as well as statistically appropriate (Tabish and Jha, 2011; 2012). As a result, reasonable generalizations about the universe might be developed. The sample size determination formula developed by Dillman (2000) as stated below was used:

$$n = \frac{[(N)(p)(1 - p)]}{\left[(N - 1) \left(\frac{B}{C} \right)^2 + (p)1 - p \right]}$$

$$n = \frac{[(585)(0.5)(1 - 0.5)]}{\left[(585 - 1) \left(\frac{0.05}{1.96} \right)^2 + (0.5)1 - 0.5 \right]}$$

$$n = 232 \cong 244 (\pm 5\%)$$

In which n is the calculated sample size required for the desired degree of precision; N is the expected population size; p is the proportion of the population expected to choose; B is the appropriate amount of sampling error, or precision; and C is the Z statistic connected to the confidence level, which is 1.96, corresponding to the 95% level. B can be set to 0.1, 0.05, which corresponds to 5% of the actual population size. The allowable variability in sampling or precision is set at 0.05 or 5%. A level of confidence of 1.96 equates to a level of 95%. Based

on the Dillman (2000) formula, the computed sample size is 232. The sample was chosen to help obtain optimum statistical precision in the estimations and, secondly, to avoid bias in sample selection (Kumar, 2005). The study's sample size was rounded up to 244 in order to assure linearity of the sample and account for non-response rate i.e. $\pm 5\%$ was added.

Furthermore, for the qualitative data, it is argued that sample size for qualitative investigations have been debated from several angles. According to Bernard (2000), 10 to 20 informed interviewees are sufficient to discover and comprehend the key characteristics in every specific research domain. Similarly, Ritchie et al. (2014) recommend a maximum size of 50 for interview research because bigger groups may impair data collection and analytic quality. Nonetheless, Boddy (2005) recommended a maximum of 12 focus groups or 30 in-depth interviews when studying a generally homogeneous population. Despite their wider criticisms, Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007) did not support the need for sampling particular numbers in qualitative research. However, they advised considering sample sizes in previous research of comparable design that achieved saturation and choosing a number that falls between the ranges of sample sizes of previous studies. In similar studies 30 was used as sample size for the qualitative data collection in which 25 public sector workers and 5 public were interviewed (Damoah et al., 2018). Therefore, this study used 50 as sample size for the interviews with the public.

3.5 Data Collection Procedure

To have a comprehensive data in providing an in-depth understanding on corruption in Ghana, the study used secondary data. Primary data were obtained through questionnaires and interview guides. The questionnaires were administered to public sector workers using Google Form. The questionnaire contains six sections and the first was on demographic information of

the respondents. The second section dealt with the prevalence and typologies of corruption in public sector organizations. The third section sought the views of the respondents on the factors contributing to normalization of corruption in public sector organizations. The fourth section of the questionnaire entailed the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. The fifth section investigated normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations: perception or fact. The last section found out the mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption (anti-corruption interventions) in Ghana's public sector. The study allowed five weeks (21st August, 2023 to 30th August, 2023) for the data collection and as at the end of the period, 215 questionnaires were submitted via online using Google Forms.

An interview guide was also used to collect primary data from the public. The interviewees' consent had to be obtained, and they provided advance notice of the study's details and goals. Also, secondary data were collected from the Transparency International which covered 23-year period from 2000-2022. This is to provide further adequate data to complement the primary data.

3.6 Data Analysis

The study was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). The pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) model, fixed effects models, and random effects models made up the techniques to be used in the research. To determine which model is the most effective and appropriate for interpreting the results, the Hausman test was conducted. The study used regression analysis to investigate normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector.

3.7 Model Specification and Description of Variables

The independent variable was the pillars of corruption, and these are institutionalization, rationalization, socialization, and normalization of corruption was used as the dependent variable. The study used robust and coordinated anti-corruption interventions, strong political will, and active private sector actors as moderating variables to investigate how corruption can be curbed or de-normalized in Ghana's public sector. The following model was developed based on the regression analysis technique:

$$COR = \beta_0 + \beta_1INS_1 + \beta_2RAT_2 + \beta_3SOC_3 + \beta_3ACI_3 + \beta_3SPW_3 + \beta_3APSA_3 + \varepsilon \dots \dots \dots 1$$

Where:

INS denotes Institutionalization.

RAT denotes rationalization.

SOC denotes socialization.

ACI denotes anti-corruption interventions.

SPW denotes strong political will.

APSA denotes active private sector actors.

β_0 denotes the constant term.

$\beta_1 - \beta_3$ denote the regression coefficients.

ε denotes the error term

3.8 Diagnostic Testing

3.8.1 Validity and Reliability

Validity in research relates to the correctness of inference drawn from the result of a measure, whereas reliability in research encompasses the uniformity of results (Suter, 2012). The degree to which a measure produces the same results whether applied to various situations, populations, or instrument versions is known as its reliability (Vanderstoep and Johnston,

2009). On the contrary, a measure's validity demonstrates whether it accurately captures the goal of the measurement (Vanderstoep and Johnston, 2009).

The reliability and validity of a research study are key steps in the research process. This is because the integrity of the results and findings must be ensured for a researcher to explain the empirical consequences of a study (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). Similarly, Bisman (2010) asserts that the validity of quantitative research is critical to recognize the importance of richness and draw conclusions based on generalization of findings. Bisman (2010) distinguishes between two types of validity.

This study carefully collected data to ensure the objectivity and validity of the findings. Finally, the use of external regulators to acquire proof of the study's dependent variable aims to assure validity and reliability. To enhance further dependability of the study, the instrument utilized was rigorously reviewed by supervisors and peers before being administered to the respondents. Furthermore, the questions in the questionnaire were specific, unbiased, and aligned with the current literature and research aims, thus avoiding biases. To ensure the validity of the results, the researcher additionally ensured that the questions were answered by the people who were supposed to respond.

A pilot test was carried out to make sure that the study was valid. This was done to ensure that the questions were pertinent and helpful in achieving the study's goals. Additionally, surveys were standardized to increase their dependability.

The reliability of the research scale was also assessed using Cronbach's Alpha values. A reliability test on the instruments in question revealed that the Cronbach's Alpha for both the dependent and independent variables was greater than 0.8. It has been proposed that for a

research scale to be considered credible, its Cronbach's Alpha value must be at least greater than 0.6 (Malhotra, 2002; Cronbach, 1951). This illustrates the internal consistency of questionnaire the items on the role and that they produce identical results if employed in a similar context. In addition, similar studies have extensively used questionnaires (Ahmad et al., 2019; Ali et al., 2017).

The reliability test results are shown in Table 1. Cronbach's Alpha value is used to perform this test. Cronbach's Alpha should be greater than 0.6. It signifies that the data utilized in the study has no issues with reliability. The dependent variable was built on earlier existing research, and the measures utilized in the present research were developed, tested, and verified dependable by scholars. The Cronbach's Alpha reliability test was used for the dependent and independent variables, and the findings show that the dependent variable, and the independent variables are greater than 0.8. The Cronbach's alpha values are regarded as highly excellent (Cronbach, 1951).

Table 1: Reliability Test

| Variable | Cronbach's alpha | Item |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Institutionalization | 0.893 | 4 |
| Rationalization | 0.872 | 4 |
| Socialization | 0.855 | 4 |
| Anti-corruption interventions | 0.912 | 4 |
| Strong political will | 0.976 | 2 |
| Active private sector actors | 0.904 | 4 |

Source: Field Survey Data (2023)

3.8.2 Normality

Normality tests are used in statistics to examine if a data set is well-modeled by its normal distribution and to compute the likelihood that a random variable underpinning the data set is normally distributed. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was utilized in the investigation to test for the normality of the data. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was employed to find out whether the data is normal. The Kolmogorov Smirnov test generates test statistics that are used to perform tests for normality.

3.10.3 Multicollinearity

The tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) values were used to perform a multicollinearity test. A multicollinearity test aids in the detection of multicollinearity in a model. Multicollinearity is defined as the existence of inter-association or inter-relationship within two or more independent variables.

3.10.4 Heteroskedasticity

Glejser (1969) performed the heteroskedasticity test. Herbert Glejser devised the Glejser test for heteroscedasticity, which regresses residuals on the explanatory variable assumed to be connected to heteroscedastic variance. It was utilized for testing for heteroskedasticity in a model of linear regression, with the error terms assumed to be normally distributed. It determines if the variation of a regression's errors is affected by the results of the independent variables.

3.13 Ethical Considerations

Ethical concerns are steps taken to reduce the impact of research on the sample population. Bryman (2016) went into great detail about the various types of ethics must be considered, as different research has distinct criteria. For example, researchers are urged to determine whether

their study may cause harm to respondents or invade their privacy, and they are cautioned against misrepresenting their respondents (Bryman, 2016). These, among other things, are deemed inappropriate because they may cause respondents to lose self-esteem or stress. Respondents were informed about the study as part of the prevention efforts. This helped them understand the issue and reply appropriately to the questions.

Similarly, respondents were given an informed permission form to self-approve their participation in the questionnaire. This was done on purpose to ensure their anonymity and confidentiality. It gave them the option of continuing or abandoning their completion of the survey questionnaires they had received. Aside from corruption, gender and gender issues are extremely sensitive topics for which valid answers are difficult to come by. As a result, they were informed that the research would not endanger them or their livelihoods. In quantitative research, confidentiality is easily established because information may be acquired anonymously without meeting or contacting respondents (Bryman, 2016).

Another critical topic to address is data protection in order to avoid disclosing information received. According to Bryman (2016), respondents' data is protected in accordance with the Data Protection Act. Furthermore, in accordance with the Data Protection Act (Republic of Ghana, 2012), the survey information acquired from respondents were not published on any sensitive websites without their approval. Deception is another important element to consider during research because it might have a negative impact on future study (Bryman, 2016). This technique is most common in experimental investigations and is done to gather data that would otherwise be difficult to get. This was not the case with this survey; nevertheless, as previously indicated, respondents were given a briefing to provide clarity to the topic and to develop trust for future studies.

Another important issue in this new era of doing social science research was the use of the intranet and internet services as a data collection method (Bryman, 2016). This was widely discussed because the role of new media cannot be overstated. Ethical concerns are thus a top consideration, especially as more academics continue to study on the internet and other web-based platforms. Google forms have been demonstrated to be one of the most secure methods of data collection. This application was chosen and deployed due to its ability to help regulate internet difficulties and secure all information from attackers by refusing them access to the platforms being used.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.0 Introduction

This Chapter analyses the quantitative and qualitative data collected from the field. The purpose of this Chapter is to provide empirical evidence on normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector and assess the prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana and establish whether corruption in public sector organizations is a perception or fact. The Chapter begins with the analysis of quantitative data collected through the survey questionnaire from the workers of the selected public sector organizations. This is followed by the analysis of the qualitative data gathered from the interviews conducted with the public. The findings revealed therefrom are discussed in this Chapter.

4.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

In this section, the study analyses the quantitative data obtained from the responses received. It is a systematic analysis and evaluation of measurable and verifiable field data which includes a statistical technique for evaluating the data for the purpose of addressing the research objectives.

4.1.1 Demographic Characteristics

The study of demographics of the respondents is analyzed in this section. The examination of characteristics of respondents analyzed in this Chapter are gender, age, education, level of position at work and years of work experience. According to the results in Table two (2), 136 of the respondents were males representing 63.3 percent while 78 constituting 36.3 percent were females. With regards to age, the results indicate that 41 respondents representing 19.1 percent

were between 21 to 30 years, 92 (42.8 percent) were 31 to 40 years, and 54 being 25.1 percent of the respondents were between 41 to 50 years while 28 being 13 percent were between 51 to 60 years.

Moreover, the results on highest educational qualification as illustrated in Table 2 indicate that 31 respondents representing 14.4 percent had Diploma, 65, thus, 30.2 percent had First Degree, 106 respondents constituting 49.3 percent had master's degree, and 6 being 2.8 percent had Doctorate degree, while another 6 respondents being 2.8 percent had Professional Qualifications. The results also revealed that most of the respondents were subordinates (junior staff), thus, 147 representing 68.4 percent. This was followed by 29 junior management staff (13.5 percent), 22 senior management staff (10.2 percent), while 12 being corporate management staff (5.6 percent). Furthermore, the results in Table 2 show the number of years of work experience which indicate that 50 of the respondents representing 23.3 percent had below 5 years work experience, 92 being 42.8 percent had between 5 to 10 years, 54 constituting 25.1 percent had between 11 to 15 years while 15 being 7 percent had more than 15 years of work experience.

The results on the demographic characteristics of the respondents suggest that the respondents have a high level of education and with substantial years of experience. They are, therefore, able to comprehend the issues of corruption in public sector organizations and are best placed to share their views on corruption. The data captures background data that helped the researcher to better grasp each respondent's identity as well as how they fit in within the issues under consideration. It is worthy of note that analyzing demographic information is both necessary and beneficial in assisting researchers in developing a better knowledge of the research population being studied.

Table 2: Demographic Characteristics

| Demographics | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|----------------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Male | 136 | 63.3 |
| Female | 78 | 36.3 |
| Total | 215 | 100.0 |
| Less than 21 years | 0 | 0.0 |
| 21- 30 years | 41 | 19.1 |
| 31 - 40 years | 92 | 42.8 |
| 41 - 50 years | 54 | 25.1 |
| 51 - 60 years | 28 | 13.0 |
| More than 60 years | 0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 215 | 100.0 |
| SHS Certificate | 0 | 0.0 |
| Diploma | 31 | 14.4 |
| First Degree | 65 | 30.2 |
| Master's Degree | 106 | 49.3 |
| Doctorate's degree | 6 | 2.8 |
| Professional Qualification | 6 | 2.8 |
| Total | 215 | 100.0 |
| Corporate Management | 12 | 5.6 |
| Senior Management | 22 | 10.2 |
| Junior Management | 29 | 13.5 |
| Subordinate | 147 | 68.4 |
| Other | 4 | 1.9 |
| Total | 215 | 100.0 |
| Below 5 years | 50 | 23.3 |
| 6 -10 years | 92 | 42.8 |
| 11- 15 years | 54 | 25.1 |
| 16 years and above | 15 | 7.0 |
| Total | 215 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Survey 2023

4.1.2 Diagnostic Tests

Because the study used regression analysis, it is critical to run diagnostic tests to verify the model assumptions and determine whether there are any data that have a big, unreasonable impact on the analysis. In essence, the diagnostics tests ensure that the regression model's assumptions are fulfilled. The sections that follow discuss the numerous diagnostic tests used to validate the data's stability and validity, as well as the assumptions that underlie them.

4.1.2.1 Normality Test

The outcome of the first traditional assumption test, the normalcy test, is shown in Table 3. The purpose of this test is to determine whether the data used in this study is normally distributed. If the p value of Kolmogorof-Smirnov is more than 0.05, the data is classified as normal. It is found from Table 3 that the p-value is 0.415, indicating that the data used in this study are normally distributed.

Table 3: One-Sample Kolmogorv-Sminov Test

| | Cronbach's alpha | Unstandandised Residua |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| N | | 215 |
| Normal Parameters | Mean | 0.000 |
| Most Extreme Differences | St. Deviation | 4.877 |
| | Positive | 0.097 |
| | Negative | 0.112 |
| Kolmogorv-Sminov Z | | 8.72 |
| Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) | | 0.415 |

Source: Field Survey Data, 2023

4.1.2.2 Multicollinearity Test

The multicollinearity test is another classic assumption used in this study. Multicollinearity occurs when the R² between any predictor and the remaining predictors is very high. The purpose of this test is to determine whether the independent variables are connected to one another. This test was carried out by examining the tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) values. Table 4 shows that the tolerance values for all independent variables are greater than 0. VIF levels, on the other hand, are fewer than 10. It signifies that all independent variables are uncorrelated and free of multicollinearity.

Table 4: Test for Multicollinearity

| Independent Variables | Collinearity Statistics | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-------|
| | Tolerance | VIF |
| Institutionalization | 0.635 | 1.574 |
| Rationalization | 0.297 | 3.364 |
| Socialization | 0.224 | 2.341 |
| Anti-corruption interventions | 0.353 | 1.344 |
| Strong political will | 0.452 | 1.955 |
| Active private sector actors | 0.092 | 2.113 |

Source: Field Survey Data, 2023

4.1.2.3 Heteroskedasticity

The last classical assumption test in this study is the heteroskedasticity test, which was performed through the Glejser test. The results demonstrate that the p-values for all variables are greater than 0.05. It implies that all the independent variables are not affected by heteroskedasticity.

4.1.3 Prevalence and typologies of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana

This section assesses the prevalence and typologies of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. The results are presented in Table 5, and it indicate that the majority of respondents were of the view that corruption is prevalent in the selected public sector organizations. For instance, 78.1 percent asserted that bribery exists in the public sector. Bribery consists of money/gifts, gratuities received for speeding up a process. The prevalence of fraud according to the results indicate 36.3 percent, thus, fraud entails act of misinformation, trickery, misrepresentation, concealment of facts personal gains.

With regards to embezzlement which is intentional misuse of funds for personal or political gains, 25.1 percent of the respondents expressed that it exists in the public sector. Also, 80 percent of the respondents said that nepotism and favouritism (favours, contracts, or positions in return for political support) exists in the public sector. With conflict of interest, 91.6 percent of the respondents were of the view that there is a class between personal interest and that of the selected public sector organizations.

Moreover, 40.5 percent opined those kickbacks (illicit incentives used to obtain a position or contract) exists and 21.4 percent indicated that fronting (creating companies to obtain contracts) exists in public sector organizations. However, 20.9 percent of the respondents were of the view that sextortion (use of sexual favours for a position or contract) does not exist in public sector organizations.

Table 5: Prevalence and typologies of corruption

| Corruption Typology | None | | Very low | | Low | | Moderate | | High | | Extremely high | | Prevalence |
|-------------------------|-------|------|----------|------|-------|-----|----------|------|-------|------|-------------------|------|------------|
| | Freq. | % | Freq. | % | Freq. | % | Freq. | % | Freq. | % | Freq. | % | % |
| Bribery | 30 | 14.0 | 20 | 9.3 | 19 | 8.8 | 16 | 7.4 | 43 | 20.0 | 70 | 32.6 | 78.1 |
| Fraud | 149 | 69.3 | 33 | 15.3 | 14 | 6.5 | 11 | 5.1 | 11 | 5.1 | 9 | 4.2 | 36.3 |
| Embezzlement | 161 | 74.9 | 10 | 4.7 | 14 | 6.5 | 13 | 6.0 | 11 | 5.1 | 6 | 2.8 | 25.1 |
| Nepotism | 39 | 18.1 | 19 | 8.8 | 16 | 7.4 | 30 | 14.0 | 50 | 23.3 | 57 | 26.5 | 80.0 |
| Conflict of interest | 20 | 9.3 | 20 | 9.3 | 11 | 5.1 | 35 | 16.3 | 58 | 27.0 | 73 | 34.0 | 91.6 |
| Kickbacks | 128 | 59.5 | 21 | 9.8 | 12 | 5.6 | 13 | 6.0 | 16 | 7.4 | 25 | 11.6 | 40.5 |
| Fronting | 169 | 78.6 | 13 | 6.0 | 11 | 5.1 | 9 | 4.2 | 8 | 3.7 | 5 | 2.3 | 21.4 |
| Sextortion | 170 | 79.1 | 16 | 7.4 | 9 | 4.2 | 7 | 3.3 | 4 | 1.9 | 9 | 4.2 | 20.9 |

Source: Field Survey 2023

Furthermore, data on corruption perception index in Ghana obtained from the Transparency International as illustrated in Figure 2 indicate that corruption is persist in Ghana. As shown in Figure 2, the trend of corruption in Ghana was ranked 52nd out of 180 countries with a score of 35 percent in the year 2000. In the 2001 Index by score was 34 decreasing Ghana's rank (position) to 59 with increasing trend. This trend continued till 2015 which Ghana's position in corruption improved.

Ghana's perceived corruption rank fell to 72 in 2022, down from 73 the previous year. Ghana's place in the worldwide corruption perception rating fluctuated but usually rose during the observed period. The highest improved rank was attained in 2015 (56th), while the lowest was recorded in 2017, at 81st. Based on these results, the question that this study sought to address is whether corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana is a perception as illustrated in Figure 2 or it is normal as a fact. Evidently, the results in Table 3 confirm that corruption in the public sector is prevalence and this is examined further in the subsequent sections.




Figure 2: Corruption Perception Index (2000 – 2022)

Source: Transparency International

4.1.4 Fundamental factors for normalization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana

In this section, the study examines the fundamental factors for normalization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana and the results are displayed in Table 6. According to the results, three main normalization factors of corruption were assessed, and these are institutionalization, rationalization and socialization. With regards to institutionalization, the respondents were of that leaders condone corrupt acts ($\mu = 4.1116$); corrupt acts are seemingly tolerated ($\mu = 4.0884$); corrupt acts seemed normal ($\mu = 4.0930$); and corruption is part of the culture ($\mu = 4.0330$).

Table 6: Fundamental factors for normalization of corruption

| | Descriptive Statistics | | | | |
|--|------------------------|---------|---------|--------|----------------|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| Institutionalization: | | | | | |
| Leaders condone corrupt acts | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.1116 | 0.87894 |
| Corrupt acts are seemingly tolerated | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0884 | 0.89474 |
| Corrupt acts seemed normal | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0930 | 0.94260 |
| Corruption is part of the culture | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0330 | 0.92761 |
| Rationalization: | | | | | |
| Some public officials make corrupt acts seem justifiable | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0465 | 0.90051 |
| Loopholes in the laws are exploited | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0605 | 0.94279 |
| Some public officials justify their wrongdoing | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0791 | 0.94636 |
| Corrupt acts are committed without guilt | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0392 | 0.73834 |
| Rationalization: | | | | | |
| Beliefs, norms, and values are infused to sustain an existing corrupt act | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0875 | 0.98951 |
| New employees are induced to sustain an existing corrupt act | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0433 | 0.92134 |
| Some public officials are seen as living identity of a culture of corruption | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0720 | 0.96340 |
| Some public officers are self-motivated in acts of corruption | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0744 | 0.95411 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 215 | | | | |

Source: Field Survey 2023

The results also revealed that the fundamental factors for rationalization are that: some public officials make corrupt acts seem justifiable ($\mu = 4.0465$); loopholes in the laws are exploited (4.0605); some public officials justify their wrongdoing ($\mu = 4.0791$); and corrupt acts are committed without guilt ($\mu = 4.0392$).

Concerning socialization, it was revealed that the factors are: beliefs, norms and values are infused to sustain an existing corrupt acts ($\mu = 4.0875$); new employees are induced to sustain an existing corrupt acts ($\mu = 4.0433$); some public officials are seen as living identity of a culture of corruption ($\mu = 4.0720$); and some public officers are self-motivated in acts of corruption ($\mu = 4.0744$).

4.1.5 The effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana

The study evaluates the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. Table 7 presents the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. The results show that the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana are: economic effects: corruption reduces economic growth ($\mu = 4.0977$); disincentive to investments: It stifles both domestic and foreign investment and trade ($\mu = 4.0512$); political effect: It is a hindrance to democracy and the rule of law ($\mu = 4.0279$); social effect: It hinders people from cooperating for the common benefit, contributes to a poor civic society, increases social inequality between poor and rich, worsens pollution, etc. ($\mu = 4.0698$); corruption abuses fundamental human rights ($\mu = 4.0452$).

Table 7: Effects of Corruption

| | N | Descriptive Statistics | | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|---------------------------------------|-----|------------------------|---------|--------|-------------------|
| | | Minimum | Maximum | | |
| Economic effects | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0977 | 0.87261 |
| Disincentive to investments | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0512 | 0.88190 |
| Political effect | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0279 | 0.88559 |
| Social effect | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0698 | 0.84332 |
| Abuses fundamental human rights | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0452 | 0.89555 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 215 | | | | |

Source: Field Survey 2023

4.1.6 Normalization of corruption in Ghana’s public sector organizations is a perception or fact?

As explained in the literature, three pivotal pillars contribute to the normalization of corruption, and these are institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. Using their fundamental factors as revealed in the previous section, the sought to determine whether normalization of corruption in Ghana’s public sector organizations is a perception or fact. To address this objective, a regression analysis was employed. In effect, institutionalization (INS), rationalization (RAT), and socialization (SOC) were used as independent variable, corruption (COR) was used as the dependent variable while anti-corruption interventions (ACI), strong political will (SPW) and active private sector actors (APSA) were used as moderating variables. The regression results for models 1 and 2 are shown in Table 8, 9 and 10. In model 1 shows the

effect of normalization factors on corruption while in model 2, the moderating variables are infused into the model to moderate the effect of the normalization factors on corruption.

In Table 8, it is shown that the value of R (coefficient of determination) in Model 1 is 0.781 and this is translated as 78.1 percent. The value of R-square is 0.601 which implies 60.1 percent. The R-square is the amount of variance in the dependent variable that can be accounted for by the independent variables. The larger value of R-square of 0.601 (60.1 percent) indicates that the model can determine the link between normalization and corruption. This means that variation in the independent variables is able to explain changes in the dependent variable. Moreover, in Model 2, the value of R is 0.225 (22.5 percent) and this shows the strength of the independent variable using anti-corruption interventions (ACI), strong political will (SPW) and active private sector actors (APSA) to moderate the relationship between the factors for normalization and corruption. Also, R-square is 0.050 (5 percent) and this shows how the dependent variable is explained by the variation in the independent variable with the inclusion of the moderating variables. It can be observed from the two models that values for both R and R-square in Model 1 reduce drastically in Model 2. This seeks to suggest that the moderating variables have strong impact in reducing the effect of the factors for normalization on corruption.

Table 8: Model Summary

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|--------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1 | 0.781 ^a | 0.610 | 0.601 | 0.58252 |
| 2 | 0.225 ^a | 0.050 | 0.023 | 0.99999 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), INS, RAT, SOC

b. Predictors: (Constant), INS, RAT, SOC, ACI, SPW, APSA

In Table 8 it is revealed that the moderating variables can reduce the effect of the factors for normalization on corruption. In this regard, Table 9 displays the results on whether the independent variables have statistically significant on the dependent variable. The F-test as shown in Table 9 indicates the general significance and evaluates all the coefficients together. Observing the results in Table 9, in Models 1 and 2 the p-values are 0.000 and this is less than the test statistics value of 0.05. This shows that the overall F-test discovered that overall coefficients of the independent variables are highly significant jointly. The F-test results in Table 9 add up the statistical significance across all independent variables and concludes that all of the coefficients are unlikely to equal zero. This means that there is significant relationship between factors for normalization of corruption and the moderating variables, thus, anti-corruption interventions (ACI), strong political will (SPW) and active private sector actors (APSA).

Table 9: ANOVA

| Model | | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|--------------|------------|-----------------------|-----------|--------------------|----------|--------------------|
| 1 | Regression | 78.544 | 3 | 26.181 | 60.725 | 0.000 ^b |
| | Residual | 90.541 | 210 | 0.431 | | |
| | Total | 169.084 | 213 | | | |
| 2 | Regression | 82.042 | 6 | 13.674 | 32.518 | 0.000 ^c |
| | Residual | 87.042 | 207 | 0.420 | | |
| | Total | 169.084 | 213 | | | |

a. Dependent Variable: COR

b. Predictors: (Constant), INS, RAT, SOC

c. Predictors: (Constant), INS, RAT, SOC, ACI, SPW, APSA

Although the t-tests in Table 9 show that the independent variables and moderating variables are significant in both models, the tests are unable to find the level of significance separately for the individual independent variables including the moderating variables. Therefore, the tests whose results are shown in Table 10 t-test for each and every coefficient of the independent and

moderating variables and evaluates them separately. The coefficients of the individual independent and moderating variables depict the strength of the relationship, i.e. the variable's relevance in the model and the extent with which each of them influences the dependent variable.

In Table 10, the results show that in Model 1, the coefficients of institutionalization (INS), rationalization (RAT) and socialization (SOC) are $\beta = 2.080$, $\beta = 1.975$ and $\beta = 1.266$ respectively, and all these are significant at 0.000. These results imply that there is a positive relationship between the factors for normalization (institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization) and corruption. The existence of institutionalization, rationalization and socialization seeks to suggest that their normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations and this is a fact considering the high prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.

Nevertheless, even though in Model 2, normalization variables (independent variables) still show positive coefficients and significant p-values, their t-test values reduced due to the inclusion of the moderating variables. Thus, institutionalization ($t = 7.852$), rationalization ($t = 4.553$), and socialization ($t = 3.333$) as compared to their t-values in Model 1. More so, the results in Table 8 indicate that the coefficients of the moderating variables are negative. Thus, anti-corruption interventions (ACI: $\beta = -3.924$; p-value = 0.000); strong political will (SPW: $\beta = -1.370$; p-value = 0.000); and active private sector actors (APSA: $\beta = -2.331$; p-value = 0.000). These results suggest that there is a significant inverse relationship between corruption and anti-corruption interventions, strong political will and active private sector actors. This also means that increase in anti-corruption interventions, strong political will and active private sector actors will significantly reduce corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.

Table 10: Coefficients

| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
|-------|------------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|--------|-------|
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| 1 | (Constant) | 1.304 | 0.211 | | 6.173 | 0.000 |
| | INS | 2.080 | 0.265 | 0.455 | 7.852 | 0.000 |
| | RAT | 1.975 | 0.237 | 0.223 | 4.119 | 0.000 |
| | SOC | 1.266 | 0.236 | 0.287 | 5.368 | 0.000 |
| 2 | (Constant) | 1.061 | 0.240 | | 4.428 | 0.000 |
| | INS | 0.513 | 0.098 | 0.333 | 5.384 | 0.000 |
| | RAT | 0.778 | 0.101 | 0.380 | 4.553 | 0.000 |
| | SOC | 0.538 | 0.100 | 0.345 | 3.333 | 0.000 |
| | ACI | -3.924 | 0.168 | -0.202 | 15.384 | 0.000 |
| | SPW | -1.370 | 0.207 | -0.286 | 17.553 | 0.000 |
| | APSA | -2.331 | 0.195 | -0.522 | 11.954 | 0.000 |

a. Dependent Variable: COR

4.1.7 Mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana

As part of its objectives, the study seeks to examine the mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana. The results of descriptive statistics of mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana are shown in Table 11. According to results, the mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana are: ensuring transparency and accountability ($\mu = 4.0884$); adopting technological innovations in public sector operations ($\mu = 4.0930$); establishing internal punitive disciplinary measures and enforcing them ($\mu = 4.0923$); establishing more robust and comprehensive laws and regulation against corruption ($\mu = 4.0465$); exercising strong political will by leaders ($\mu = 4.0605$); reducing discretionary powers of public officials in controlling decision-making ($\mu = 4.0791$); active participation of Civil Society Organizations and Media in the fight against corruption ($\mu = 4.0465$); educating the general public about the effects of corruption ($\mu = 4.0419$); changing the attitudes and values of public officials and societies ($\mu = 4.0744$); and active participation of citizens (refusing to cooperate in corrupt practices and voting against corrupt political leaders ($\mu = 4.0093$)).

Table 11: Mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption

| | Descriptive Statistics | | | | |
|--|------------------------|---------|---------|--------|----------------|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| Robust & Coordinated Anti-Corruption Interventions | | | | | |
| Ensuring transparency and accountability | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0884 | 0.89474 |
| Adopting technological innovations in public sector operations | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0930 | 0.94260 |
| Establishing internal punitive disciplinary measures and enforcing them | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0923 | 0.92761 |
| Establishing more robust and comprehensive laws and regulation against corruption | | | | | |
| Public naming and shaming | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0465 | 0.90051 |
| Strong Political Will | | | | | |
| Exercising strong political will by leaders | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0605 | 0.94279 |
| Reducing discretionary powers of public officials in controlling decision-making | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0791 | 0.94636 |
| Active Private Sector Actors | | | | | |
| Active participation of Civil Society Organizations and Media in the fight against corruption | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0465 | 0.98951 |
| Active participation of citizens (refusing to cooperate in corrupt practices and voting against corrupt political leaders) | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0791 | 0.92134 |
| Educating the general public about the effects of corruption | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0419 | 0.96340 |
| Changing the attitudes and values of public officials and societies | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0744 | 0.95411 |
| Active participation of Civil Society Organizations and Media in the fight against corruption | 215 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 4.0093 | 0.93224 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 215 | | | | |

Source: Field Survey 2023

4.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

The analyses of the qualitative data obtained from the interviewees; thus, the public is done to complete the quantitative results for better understanding of the normalization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. The analysis delved profoundly into the issue of corruption and shows how prevalent corruption is in the public sector. The researcher's ability to critically analyze the qualitative data play crucial role in providing evidence on the issues of normalization of corruption in public sector organization in Ghana.

4.2.1 Personal Characteristics

Out of the 50 interviewees, results show that 35 (72 percent) of them were males while 15 (25 percent) were females. The majority of interviewees had Senior High School as their highest level of education. Other interviewees had diplomas and first degrees. Some of the occupations/professions of the interviewees include drivers, marketers, artisans, consultants, teachers, and students.

4.2.2 Prevalence of Corruption

The research wanted to know whether the interviewees had contact with a public official in the last 12 months and if so, how many times do the contacted a public official. According to the results, all 50 interviewees had contacted public officials in the last 12 months. For instance, one of the interviewees had this to say:

“In the last 12 months, I have contacted several public officials due to the nature of work I do” (Interviewee 12).

Another interviewee is reported to have said as follows:

“I can say that at least, every week one public official came into contact with me” (Interviewee 27).

In an answer to another question as to whether the interviewees have ever paid bribe to a public official in the last 12 months and if yes, in what form the bribe was, the following responses were given:

“In return for a service I require from a public officer in one of the public institutions which I don’t want mention the name of the institution, I paid in cash as a token to help facilitate documentation processes” (Interviewee 21).

Furthermore, the researcher wanted to find out whether the interviewees have been directly or openly requested by a public official to pay a bribe in exchange for a promise to render a public service to you and whether the promise was fulfilled. The results showed that:

“The truth is that in most cases I pay money to public officials as a way of facilitating the process. Last year for instance, I paid about GHS15,000 to a public official to get my son recruited in one of the public institutions” (Interviewee 45).

According to one of the interviewees, a bribe is paid before a service is rendered and this has become a norm in most public institutions. The fact that such a substantial portion of bribes are paid in advance of the service being rendered indicates that bribes to officials in the public sector are frequently expected in Ghana. It also emphasizes public officials' bargaining power, since their position of relative power allows them to demand payment in return for a promise to provide a public service which need to have been served as upon request while this service should have been even free of charge.

It is normal now a days to find public officials requesting bribe before rendering a service to you which has been for free” (Interviewee 50).

The researcher asked for the main reasons for paying a bribe to a public official and some of the reasons provided by the respondents were to speed up processes, avoid the payment of fines, avoid cancellation of public service due to defaults,

“In most cases bribes are paid to expedite or complete an administrative procedure and if you don’t pay, what you are requiring from the public institution will take too long a time or would not be rendered” (Interviewee 31).

“Bribes are paid in order to avoid paying a fine or cancelling a public service, such as facilitating license and permit requests” (Interviewee 44).

In response to a question on whether bribery/corruption has become a normal day-to-day practice in public sector organizations in Ghana, majority (73.7 percent) of the respondents were of the view that bribery/corruption is a normal and that it is no more a perception. Moreover, according to the results, corruption is not seemed a crime due to the way it being practiced in the public. Some of the interviewees had to this to say:

“My brother, the truth must be said, it is now a normal practice to pay bribes to public officials. For instance, to the police, this is not secret, it is done as normal thing. Corruption is common everywhere, and businesses operating in rural areas are exposed to bribes” (Interviewee 32).

“I do not think payment of money to encourage a public official to fasten your work for you is crime but if it is requested by the public official then that is a crime” (Interviewee 34).

In finding out what the interviewees suggest curbing corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana, the results revealed these suggestions: they expect the government to sanction offending public official, prosecution of those involved in corrupt practices, intensive public education, and provision of the right working conditions for public sector workers.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

This section discusses the findings of the study, and the goal of the discussion is to interpret and convey the relevance of the findings considering what was previously known about the research problem under investigation. It is also to shed more light on any newly discovered knowledge or fresh insights into the subject under consideration. The discussions in this section centres on the specific objectives of the study.

4.3.1 Prevalence and typologies of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana

The study found that there is high prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana and typologies of corruption that are rampantly practiced are bribery, nepotism, and conflict of interest. This finding is consistent with similar studies done in Ghana. For instance, a study by UNODC (2022) revealed that According to a UNODC (2022) research conducted in Ghana, 26.7 percent of all adults who had a minimum of one encounter with a public official in 2021 paid a bribe or were solicited to give a bribe by a public official but declined to do so. According to the results of UNODC (2022), the level of frequency with which bribes are given is a crucial aspect of public sector corruption. Similarly, records of corruption-related experiences show that they are prevalent from person to person and from one region to the next (rural and urban). According to a recent study, 83.8 percent of the adult population have experienced some form of corruption, with 86.1 living in urban areas and 80.5 in rural Ghana (UNODC, 2022).

It is important to note that interactions with public authorities are an important element of daily life in Ghana. According to the World Bank (2013), in Ghana, as a developing country, pervasive dishonesty among public and government officials has caused public concern. Corruption remains a pervasive and unrelenting problem, and Ghana's ratings on the

Transparency International (TI) corruption index have routinely dipped below the midpoint of the TI's 63 scale of 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (extremely clean). These results show widespread corruption in Ghana's governmental sector (Transparency International 2021).

4.3.2 Fundamental factors for normalization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana

It was revealed that three main normalization factors of corruption in the public sector organizations in Ghana are institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. According to Ashforth and Anand (2003), corruption is so engrained in routines that people are unable to recognize their own wrongdoing. With institutionalization, to most corrupt people, it appears, do not forsake the virtues that society encourages, and thus they continue to respect justice, honesty, truthfulness, and so on, even while they commit corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Furthermore, the socialization process comprises establishing in newcomers the beliefs, convictions, conventions, abilities, and so on that these people will need to accomplish their responsibilities and function properly within the communal context. Criminal beliefs, motivations, attitudes, behaviours, and techniques are learned through encounters in interpersonal groups, according to social influence (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

In demonstrating how institutionalized corruption has been in the public sector, the study found that corruption is practiced due to bureaucracy in public sector organizations and that bribes are paid to speed up or finalize administrative procedures. According to Khan (2001), bureaucratic rewards and mechanisms include public officer recruiting procedures, the relevance of public service occupations to the tasks at hand, and internal oversight and disciplinary processes, including penalties for corruption and incentives for improved performance. Simplifying the conditions for obtaining a permit or other legal document from the state, such as a driver's

licence, is thought to lessen the opportunity for corruption and may result in an increase in the number of new enterprises and paid jobs.

Similarly, when corrupt behaviours, such as bribery, is widespread, permitted, and frequently go free of punishment in society, people will underestimate the ramifications of being caught performing an unlawful act, calling into doubt the opinions they have about what fraudulent behaviour means (Nordin et al., 2013). As a result, people may justify wrongdoing and transgressions in particular mundane circumstances without harming their sense of self of honesty (De Klerk, 2017).

Individuals (especially elites) are given much too much discretion due to the concentration of power in the executive and insufficient accountability procedures (Johnston, 2005). The Ombudsman's Office, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Legislative Assembly are all established by the State. Some of these institutions, such as the media and organized civil society, emerge from outside of formal state frameworks.

4.3.3 The effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana

The study found that the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana are: economic effects which reduces economic growth, disincentive to investments; It stifles both domestic and foreign investment and trade; it has a political effect which means corruption is a hindrance to democracy and the rule of law; Corruption has social effect which hinders people from cooperating for the common benefit, contributes to a poor civic society, increases social inequality between poor and rich, worsens pollution; and corruption abuses fundamental human rights.

Corruption boosts the cost of doing business by adding bribes and drawn-out negotiations to a business transaction. According to the OECD Foreign Bribery Report, bribes account for 10.9% of transaction value and 34.5% of profits (OECD, 2014). Corruption also generates uncertainty because a competing corporation is always eager to give a greater bribe to sway the business in its favour.

Corruption has a negative impact on competitiveness, according to Cerdeira and Lourenço (2022). Corruption distorts competition in the country's public procurement systems. They explained that corruption is a cause of low investment, which has a negative impact on both foreign and domestic economic growth. An economy weakened by corruption discourages international investment and public donations. As a result, there is a scarcity of funds for profitable investment. Simply, corruption is a deterrent to direct foreign investment.

According to the OECD (2016), corruption may also distort investment by corporations opting to utilize their resources for unproductive rent-seeking activities such as lobbying or corruption-specific know-how in order to get access to the exclusive market of insiders. Where businesses choose to participate in such activities, there are fewer resources available for productive investment in physical or knowledge-based capital.

It is important to note that corruption reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector. Corruption also has the potential to undermine the quality of government services. When public sector workers obtain employment based on nepotism or favouritism rather than merit and skill, their judgements might align with the interests of the people who recruited them. Furthermore, corruption may inhibit governments from employing the most talented individuals.

Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) discovered that corruption had a significant adverse impact on policy on environmental stringency, implying that corruption influences pollution, mostly through environmental policymaking. To summarize, corruption has a negative impact on the economic, political, social, and environmental domains.

According to the OECD (2016), customs revenue-related corruption costs World Customs Organization members at least USD 2 billion in customs income each year. Thus, tax evasion, in a similar vein, can be one of the channels via which corruption happens and the results of corruption are passed. Furthermore, the poor are disproportionately affected by corruption in the form of inadequate social programmes that are neglected or poorly administered.

4.3.4 Normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations is a perception or fact?

The research found that there is a positive relationship between the factors for normalization (institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization) and corruption. The existence of institutionalization, rationalization and socialization seeks to suggest that the normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations and this is a fact considering the high prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. It has evident that corruption is a normal practice and majority of public sector workers think that it is a part of the day-to-day operation and the culture of public sector organizations in Ghana as also evident in UNODC (2022) and GAN Integrity (2018). The study revealed that a great number of bribes are directly asked by public officials and offered prior to the provision of a service, indicates that bribes are given because people seeking a service are informed, either implicitly or explicitly, by a public official that a procedure will not be processed unless a bribe is paid. The results show that some public officials have been known to request a "dash" (tip) in exchange for facilitating licence

and permit applications, and businesses seeking licences and permissions are routinely challenged with requests for facilitation fees.

Based on this finding, it is worthy to state that corruption which has been argued by many public officials as a perception is no longer a perception but a fact. Normalization of corruption has been shown to be part of the administrative procedures in public sector organizations. Thus, corruption is routinely taken-for-granted, accepted, and practiced. In effect, when corruption becomes institutionalized in practices and structures, and when individuals rationalize their actions to relieve their responsibility/guilt, or where newcomers are socially conditioned to view corruption as permissible and/or essential practice of the "day", then, corruption is normalized.

From the findings, corruption is found to be normal in the spheres of public sector organizations as the public also experience this to be so. According to Mullard (2020), corruption may be linked to norms within an organization or society due to the principles of exchange and reciprocity. According to studies, corruption is the product of norms developed throughout socialization. These studies demonstrate appropriate and anticipated behaviour (Alatas, 1990). Alatas (1990) refers to social norms in general, which are impacted by societal views that can promote both economic and social benefits and drawbacks. Descriptive norms typically develop when actual transactions occur and requests are put forward for other unauthorized transactions to support an action or process (Mullard, 2020).

They are accepted as standard procedure, the "this is how we do it here" syndrome. Mullard (2020) says that an acceptable norm is provided for injunctive norms such that people are forced to demonstrate thanks (illegitimate) after a genuine trade has occurred. He claims that these

rules are followed because of pluralistic ignorance, and that they encourage corruption (Mullard, 2020). Furthermore, in a social setting, norms are defined as "the standards of behaviour that are based on widely shared beliefs about how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation" (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004, p. 185). Norms are also defined as "shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden within a society" (Ostrom, 2000, pp. 143-144). Studies on norms show how their sheer nature has an impact on people's lives.

Investigating perception has a major subjective component (Osei-Amoako, 2018). Expert or educated opinions were gathered and arrayed with or against other perceptions and assessed views to create indicators (Besancon, 2003). In this regard perception-based indicators rely solely on perceptions, their ability to reflect reality is contingent on whether perceptions reflect reality, i.e. they may lack impartiality and accuracy (Maurseth, 2008). It is, therefore, shown that perception is aligned with reality. A philosopher, Linda Humphreys once said that "Perception moulds, shapes, and influences people's experience of their personal reality" (Estrada, 2020).

According to UNODC (2022), bribes are paid to public authorities for a variety of services and purposes, but the most common is during routine police motor traffic control (23.7 percent). UNODC (2022) further revealed that overall, 35.4 percent of incidents include police officers, either in relation to routine traffic control or other police problems. According to UNODC (2022), other common bribe-paying scenarios in people's daily lives include medical visits, public utility services, admission to a public school, and Driving and Vehicle Licencing Agency (DVLA) services such as a roadworthy certificate or a driving licence.

Furthermore, according to UNODC survey data (2022), the prevalence of bribery in respect to police officers is significantly higher than in relation to any other sort of public official in Ghana, at 53.2 percent. Ghana Immigration Service Officers and Ghana Revenue Authority Customs Officers follow, with 37.4 and 33.6 percent, respectively. At 2.9 percent, elected officials are at the bottom of the list. According to UNODC (2022), 6 out of 10 bribes paid to public officials in Ghana are requested directly by such authorities. This shows that bribes have become prevalent and requested, and it emphasizes the ability to negotiate with public officials, whose position allows them to request payments in exchange for the promise of offering a public service which is supposed to be provided upon request and, on occasion, completely free of charge. According to UNDOC (2022), "three out of every hundred people in Ghana who paid a bribe in 2021 revealed the payment to an official or an unofficial institution." The two most common reasons for failing to report are that bribery is simply a widespread practice and that people believe it is futile because no one cares" (p.24).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, under the law, corruption is a criminal act. This is incorporated in Section 179c of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29), Using Public Office for Profit (Republic of Ghana, 2012). Efforts to combat corruption have been made in several African countries over the years. For example, the Whistleblowers Act (Act 720) (Republic of Ghana, 2006) provides protection to people/workers who disclose any sort of misconduct. There are also the Conflict-of-Interest Guidelines (CHRAJ, 2006), the Public Procurement Act 2016 (PPA Act, 663) as amended (Public Procurement Authority, 2013), and the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 Act (959) (Republic of Ghana, 2017). Furthermore, significant entities designated to combat corruption and money laundering in Ghana include the Financial Intelligence Centre, the Economic and Organized Crime Office, and the Office of the Special

Prosecutor. Moreover, active and passive bribery, extortion, willful misuse of public office, use of public office for personal gain, and bribery of foreign public officials are all crimes under Ghana's penal code (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2012; Duodo & Goddard 2017). Furthermore, corruption is considered unlawful, as well as both agent and principal are held accountable - irrespective of the nationalities of the individual offering or accepting bribes (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2012).

Ghana has a strong anti-corruption regime, however implementation of the regime and policy framework based on the United Nations Convention against Corruption has been lacking. Ensuring that the punishment outlined in the sanctions regime is carried out remains a monumental issue and a challenges (Osei-Amoako, 2018). This seeks to suggest that people in authority in Ghana have failed in the fight against corruption in the country.

4.3.5 Mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana

The study findings on the mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana are that increase in anti-corruption interventions, strong political will and active private sector actors will significantly reduce corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. However, it must be emphasized that no single policy can have a long-term impact; rather, it is the interaction of several factors and conditions that are capable of eliminating corruption in a sustainable manner (Prasad et al., 2019).

According to agency theory, anti-corruption strategies such as monopoly, increases transparency and accountability, transforming managerial preferences, or the setting up of separate anti-corruption agencies charged with combating and discovering corruption fail in the face of organized and systemic corruption. However, Prasad et al. (2019) contend that people

lack the necessary capacities and abilities to prevent every violation of the universal standards that regulate human behaviour.

Corruption is thus founded in the reality that, where it is prevalent, the principals also become corrupt, and thus do not always behave in the best interests of society as it is, but rather seek particularistic goals (Persson et al. 2013). Rothstein (2011) cites Olson's (1971) theory of collective action and claims that although individuals are aware that they can benefit jointly from a corruption-free circumstances, they do not have the motivation for altering their conducts and behaviours.

Only by repeatedly striking its pillars with adequate force can the normalization structure be brought down. Corruption will be eradicated from Ghana's public sector institutions only via collective action, when the government leadership, social, organizational, and individual schemata are re-engineered to view it as an anomaly rather than the norm.

In democratic countries, where political power is derived from "the power of the people" through elections, overcoming the fear of losing power could serve as a first method for generating interest in anti-corruption measures among those in authority. In such cases, it is vital to campaign for anti-corruption measures and demonstrate to politicians that by cultivating transparency, accountability, and public empowerment, they can increase their popularity and authority (Hollyer, 2011).

Anti-corruption agencies can improve the public perception of corruption by collaborating with the media thoroughly informing the public, accurately representing their mission and its successes, educating citizens regarding the adverse effects of corruption on their daily lives,

and mobilizing both citizens as well as the media to support the institutions attain good governance requirements (Elaine, Anne-Katrin, & Fumiko, 2010).

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This Chapter contains a summary of findings which provides a brief overview of each of the primary research questions. It also presents the conclusions of the study, and it provides insights on the underlying issues and the policy implication. The recommendations of the study are also presented in this Chapter. The contributions, limitations and suggestions for further studies are also contained in the Chapter.

5.1 Summary of Findings

The first objective of the study is to assess the prevalence and typologies of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. The study found that there is high prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana and typologies of corruption that are rampantly practiced are bribery, nepotism, and conflict of interest.

The second objective of the study is to examine the fundamental factors for normalization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. It was revealed that three main normalization factors of corruption in the public sector organizations in Ghana are institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization.

The third objective is to evaluate the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. In this regard, the study showed that the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana are: economic effects which reduces economic growth, disincentive to investments; It stifles both domestic and foreign investment and trade; it has a political effect which means corruption is a hindrance to democracy and the rule of law; Corruption has social

effect which hinders people from cooperating for the common benefit, contributes to a poor civic society, increases social inequality between poor and rich, worsens pollution; and corruption abuses fundamental human rights

Fourthly, the study sought to determine whether normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations is a perception or fact. With this objective, the research found that there is a positive relationship between the factors for normalization (institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization) and corruption. The existence of institutionalization, rationalization and socialization seeks to suggest that there is normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector organizations, and this is a fact considering the high prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.

Finally, the study sought to examine the mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana. In addressing this, the study findings on the mechanisms for de-normalization of corruption in Ghana are that increase in anti-corruption interventions, strong political will and active private sector actors will significantly reduce corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.

5.2 Conclusion

The study sought to investigate normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector and assess the prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana and establish whether corruption in public sector organizations is a perception or fact. The study employed mixed methods to collect primary data from public sector workers from selected public sector organizations in Accra using questionnaire and the public using interviews. The study has

shown that there is high prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations, and it has adverse effect on political, social, and economic conditions in Ghana.

The study concludes that corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana is a fact due to institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. There is, therefore, the need to curb corruption in public sector organizations.

5.3 Recommendations

The study proposes the following recommendations:

1. There is the need for robust and coordinated anti-corruption interventions by establishing more robust and comprehensive laws and regulation against corruption. The government should ensure transparency and accountability in public sector organizations. The government should adopt technological innovations and establish internal punitive disciplinary measures and enforce them.
2. To combat corruption, the highest levels of dedication and leadership are required, ensuring that formal requirements are really applied in practice to achieve the anticipated effects, and that corrupt individuals are properly held accountable and sanctioned. Policymakers can focus on three pillars to combat corruption on a systemic level. Those at the top political and managerial levels should set clear institutional duties and a risk-based integrity policy that incorporates clear integrity principles and norms to create a cohesive and comprehensive transparency system. Political leadership should enable effective accountability through internal controls and regulatory oversight to ensure compliance with public integrity standards by the public, private, and citizens.

3. Combating corruption should, of course, include moral education; values and social norms play an important role. Systems, on the other hand, should be designed with the possibility of misuse in mind. There are unethical people who will participate in corruption anytime it is profitable for them. It is critical to build systems in such a way that bribery appears unprofitable even to the most opportunistic people. An examination of the motivations and variables underlying dishonest transactions provides some rules for designing such a robust system.
4. The media's role in raising public awareness, encouraging integrity, and identifying and reporting on corruption is crucial. Successful anti-corruption activity is contingent on knowledge and information given by the media. First, the media enhances public knowledge about corruption, its origins, repercussions, and potential remedies, and can thus foster an integrity culture. Second, the media can investigate, detect, and publicize instances of corruption, bringing corruption cases to light and inciting judicial intervention. Having access to information and freedom of expression, coupled with a skilled and ethical structure of investigative journalists, all contribute to the effectiveness of the media in fighting against corruption. Furthermore, a number of elements must be in place for the media to fulfil this function, including freedom of information laws and procedures, effective competition among a variety of media firms, and adequate protection for journalists who expose corruption or investigate the desires of influential private and public sector leaders. Encouraging and empowering journalists to report corruption cases to the appropriate anti-corruption agencies. Promoting anti-corruption campaigners and publicizing success stories in the fight against corruption.

5. Civil Society Organizations (CSO) should relate the fight against corruption to the fight for the upholding of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, and they should seek to network more effectively and visibly through specified topics and themes to be more successful and prominent in executing their interventions. CSOs should promote democratic values, support good governance, be responsive, and demand accountability from the government.
6. Donor countries, international financial institutions, and foreign development partners, among others, should play a significant role in the fight against corruption by contributing the financial resources required to finance anti-corruption interventions. Donor governments and organizations recognize the complexities of the incentives for coordinated anti-corruption efforts. Donors can play an important role in supplying the financial resources needed to continue anti-corruption operations.

5.4 Contributions, Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

This section highlights important future research directions that resulted from this study. The study provides evidence on normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector and established that corruption in public sector organizations is a fact. The study has shown that to de-normalize corruption in Ghana's public sector, requires anti-corruption interventions, strong political will, and active private sector actors.

Given the scope of this study and the strong results obtained, additional research will be advantageous. This study produced a one-of-a-kind and substantial data set, as well as high-quality analyses and discussions of results and conclusions that systematically analyze the internal structures and operations of public-sector organizations that allow corruption to occur.

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APPENDIX 1

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS CONSENT:

Introduction:

I am Gideon Asamoah Tetteh, pursuing a PhD Study and I am conducting research on the topic *“The Normalization of Corruption in Ghana's Public Sector Organizations: A Perception or Fact?”*

Your organization has been chosen as one of the Public Sector organizations in Ghana selected for this study. In view of this, I am kindly asking you to take a few minutes of your time to participate in this study by answering the questions contained herein.

Goal and Purpose of the Study:

The study sought to examine normalization of corruption in Ghana's public sector and determine the extent of corruption perception and prevalence of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. This study is purely for academic purposes and shall not be used for any other purpose.

Confidentiality

You are being asked to take part in this survey under the highest confidentiality arrangement. Any information that is obtained from you for the purpose of this study shall not be identified with your personality and shall not be disclosed. Your name and any other identification will not be asked for in the questionnaire.

Voluntary participation

Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide not to participate in this study, your decision will not affect the outcome of the research. You are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation without you incurring any penalty.

Offer to answer questions

If you have any questions concerning this study or consent form beyond the information provided herein, including questions about the research, your rights as a research participant, or any other information, please feel free to contact me through the number below.

GIDEON ASAMOAH TETTEH

CONTACT: Mobile: 0249 563 990

Email: gattex@yahoo.com>

GENERAL INSTRUCTION

You are requested to answer the following questions by ticking (√) or marking (X) in the appropriate box that you think as **honestly as possible** and to the **best of your knowledge** represents your view.

SECTION 1: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

The following information is required to help us understand your views better during the statistical analysis of the data.

1. Your gender:
 - a) Male
 - b) Female
2. Which of the following age group do you belong?
 - a) Less than 21 years
 - b) 21- 30 years
 - c) 31 - 40 years
 - d) 41 - 50 years
 - e) 51 - 60 years
 - f) More than 60 years
3. What is your highest educational qualification or nearest equivalent?
 - a) SHS Certificate
 - b) Diploma
 - c) First Degree
 - d) Master's Degree
 - e) Doctorate's degree
 - f) Master's degree
 - g) Professional Qualification
4. What is your level of position at work?
 - a) Corporate Management
 - b) Senior Management
 - c) Junior Management
 - d) Subordinate
 - e) Other (please specify):.....
5. How many years of work experience do you have?
 - a) Below 5 years
 - b) 6 -10 years
 - c) 11- 15 years
 - d) 16 years and above

SECTION B: PREVALENCE AND TYPOLOGIES OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS

This section seeks information to assess the prevalence and typologies of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana.

6. To what extent have you personally been involved in the under-listed types of corruption? You are kindly requested to use the following scale in expressing your view:
0 = None; 1 = Very low; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Extremely High

| Types of Corruption | Definition/Meaning | None [0] | Very low [1] | Low [2] | Moderate [3] | High [4] | Extremely high [5] |
|----------------------------|--|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| Bribery | Money/gifts, gratuities received for greasing and speeding a process | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Fraud | Acts of misinformation, trickery, misrepresentation, concealment of facts personal gains | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Embezzlement | Intentional misuse of funds for personal or political gains | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Nepotism and favouritism | Favours, contracts, or positions in return for political support | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Conflict of interest | Class between your personal interest and that of the organization | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Kickbacks | Illicit incentives used to obtain a position or contract | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Fronting | Creating companies to obtain contracts | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Sextortion | Use of sexual favours for a position or contract | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |

SECTION C: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS

7. This sought to find out the fundamental factors that contribute to normalization of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. How would you agree or disagree with the existence of the following factors in your organization? You are kindly requested to use the following scale in expressing your view: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Slightly disagree; 3 = Indifferent; 4 = Slightly agree; 5 = Strongly agree

| Factors | Strongly disagree [1] | Slightly disagree [2] | Indifferent [3] | Slightly agree [4] | Strongly agree [5] |
|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Institutionalization | | | | | |
| 1. Leaders condone corrupt acts | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 2. Corrupt acts are seemingly tolerated | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 3. Corrupt acts seemed normal and part of day-to-day operation | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 4. Corruption is part of the culture of the organization | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Rationalization | | | | | |
| 1. Some public officials build up argument to make corrupt acts seem justifiable | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 2. Loopholes in the laws are exploited to justify past corrupt acts | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 3. Some public officials justify their wrongdoing due to circumstances beyond their control | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 4. Corrupt acts are committed without guilt | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Socialization | | | | | |
| 1. Beliefs, norms and values are infused or absorbed to sustain an existing corrupt acts | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 2. New employees are induced or influence to inadvertently act corruptly without them knowing that such acts are wrong | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |

| | | | | | |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 3. Some public officials are seen as living identity of a culture of corruption | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 4. Some public officers are self-motivated in acts of corruption | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |

SECTION D: EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN GHANA

8. This section sought to seek your views on the effects of corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following as the effects of corruption in public sector organizations? You are kindly requested to use the following scale in expressing your view: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Slightly disagree; 3 = Indifferent; 4 = Slightly agree; 5 = Strongly agree

| Effects | Strongly disagree [1] | Slightly disagree [2] | Indifferent [3] | Slightly agree [4] | Strongly agree [5] |
|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Economic effects: corruption reduces economic growth | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 2. Disincentive to investments: It stifles both domestic and foreign investment and trade | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 3. Political effect: It is a hindrance to democracy and the rule of law | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 4. Social effect: It hinders people from cooperating for the common benefit, contributes to a poor civic society, increases social inequality between poor and rich, worsens pollution, etc. | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 5. Corruption abuses fundamental human rights | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |

SECTION E: NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN GHANA'S PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS: PERCEPTION OR FACT

9. How would you describe the statement that "corruption is a normal thing in public sector organization?"
- a) It is a perception []
 - b) It is a fact []
 - c) None of the above []

SECTION F: MECHANISMS FOR DE-NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION (ANTI-CORRUPTION INTERVENTIONS) IN GHANA'S PUBLIC SECTOR

10. Which of the following would you agree or disagree with as the mechanisms for de-normalization (fighting against) of corruption in Ghana's public sector? You are kindly requested to use the following scale in expressing your view: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Slightly disagree; 3 = Indifferent; 4 = Slightly agree; 5 = Strongly agree

| Anti-Corruption Measures | Strongly disagree [1] | Slight disagree [2] | Indifferent [3] | Slightly agree [4] | Strongly agree [5] |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Robust & Coordinated Anti-Corruption Interventions | | | | | |
| 1. Ensuring transparency and accountability | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 2. Adopting technological innovations in public sector operations | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 3. Establishing internal punitive disciplinary measures and enforcing them | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 4. Establishing more robust and comprehensive laws and regulation against corruption | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| Strong Political Will | | | | | |
| 1. Exercising strong political will by leaders | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 2. Reducing discretionary powers of public officials in controlling decision-making | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |

Question 10 Continued:

| Active Private Sector Actors (CSOs, Media, IDOs & Citizens) | | | | | |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1. Active participation of Civil Society Organizations and Media in the fight against corruption | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 2. Active participation of citizens (refusing to cooperate in corrupt practices and voting against corrupt political leaders) | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 3. Educating the general public about the effects of corruption | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| 4. Changing the attitudes and values of public officials and societies | [] | [] | [] | [] | [] |

THANKS SO MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND CONTRIBUTION

APPENDIX 2

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC

INTERVIEWEE CONSENT:

Introduction:

I am Gideon Asamoah Tetteh, pursuing a PhD Study and I am conducting research on the topic *“The Normalization of Corruption in Ghana's Public Sector Organizations: A Perception or Fact?”*

In view of this, I am kindly asking you to take a few minutes of your time to participate in this study by answering the questions contained herein.

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You are being asked to take part in this survey under the highest confidentiality arrangement. Any information that is obtained from you for the purpose of this study shall not be identified with your personality and shall not be disclosed. Your name and any other identification will not be asked for in this interview.

Voluntary participation

Your participation in this interview is voluntary. If you decide not to participate in this interview, your decision will not affect the outcome of the research. You are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation without you incurring any penalty.

Offer to answer questions.

If you have any questions concerning this study or anything beyond the information provided herein, including questions, your rights as a research participant, or any other information, please feel free to ask me now.

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS:

1. Sex: Male [] Female []
2. What is your occupation/profession?
3. What is your highest level of education?
4. Have you ever had contact with a public official in the last 12 months? If yes, how many times do you contact a public official?
5. Have you ever paid bribe to a public official in the last 12 months? If yes, in what form was the bribe?
6. How many times have you paid bribe to a public official in the last 12 months?
7. Have you been directly or openly requested by a public official to pay a bribe in exchange for a promise to render a public service to you? If yes, was the promise fulfilled?
8. What was the main reasons for you paying a bribe to a public official?
9. Do you think bribery/corruption has become a normal day-to-day practice in public sector organizations in Ghana?
10. Do you think bribery/corruption is a crime? If you think that bribery/corruption is a crime, why did you pay bribe to public officials?
11. What do you think should be done to curb corruption in public sector organizations in Ghana?
12. Is there any other thing you would want say before we end this interview?